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Abstract 
Anarchism is rarely given serious consideration by political philosophers, often being 
dismissed as 'utopian', or naively optimistic about human nature. Likewise, although 
there is a substantial anarchist tradition of educational ideas and practice, this is rarely 
mentioned in texts on philosophy or history of education. 
Drawing on work in political philosophy, philosophy of education and history of 
education, I explore the theoretical foundations of anarchism and the educational 
ideas of anarchist theorists and activists. The anarchist perspective, it is argued, is 
unique in the world of radical education, and should not be conflated with libertarian 
education. In order to highlight the philosophical insights which emerge from 
anarchist thought and practice, I compare anarchism with the connected traditions of 
liberalism and Marxism. 
In addition to dismissing some common misperceptions of anarchism, I discuss the 
educational implications of fundamental anarchist ideas. Central to this discussion is 
the notion of human nature which, while at the crux of much of the criticism of 
anarchism, also has a crucial bearing on the role of education within anarchist 
thought. It is argued that one cannot grasp the anarchist position on education 
without understanding the political context from which it stems. Equally, one cannot 
assess the viability of anarchism as a political ideology without appreciating the role 
played by education within anarchist thought — a role which is often overlooked. 
While not purporting to resolve the theoretical tensions within anarchism, I show that 
anarchist thought yields insights for educational philosophers, policy makers and 
practitioners. In exploring the charge of utopianism, I suggest that a consideration of 
anarchist ideas prompts us to ask questions about the role of philosophy of education. 
Anarchism, it is shown, overlaps significantly with both the liberal and the socialist 
traditions. Thus, although anarchism may seem in many ways to challenge the liberal 
tradition, it in fact both affirms important liberal principles and offers a motivating 
ideal for educators and philosophers of education. 
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Introduction 
`To declare for a doctrine so remote as anarchism at this stage of history', wrote 
Herbert Read in 1938, 'will be regarded by some critics as a sign of intellectual 
bankruptcy; by others as a sort of treason, a desertion of the democratic front at the 
most acute moment of its crisis; by still others as merely poetic nonsense....' (Read, 
1938, in Read, 1974, p. 57). 
After witnessing the responses of friends and colleagues over the past few years on 
hearing the topic of my research, I must say I can sympathize with Read's sentiments. 
Why, then do I think anarchism is worth taking seriously? And why, particularly, do I 
think it has something to say to philosophers of education? 
Part of my motivation is the need to address what appears to be a gap in the literature. 
Although the anarchist position on education is, as I hope to establish, distinct and 
philosophically interesting, and although it has been expressed powerfully at various 
times throughout recent history, it is consistently absent from texts on philosophy of 
education — even amongst those authors who discuss 'radical' or 'progressive' 
educational theories. Indeed, one issue which I address in this thesis is the failure of 
many theorists to distinguish between libertarian education (Tree schools'), and 
anarchist educational projects and ideas. I hope to establish that the principles 
underlying the anarchist position make such projects significantly distinct from other 
approaches in radical education, and arguably more educationally defensible. 
Similarly, both academic texts and public perceptions often involve simplifications, 
distortions or misunderstandings of anarchism. 
	 The typical response of 
contemporary scholars to the anarchist idea — that it is 'utopian', 'impractical', or 
`over-optimistic regarding human nature' (see, for example, Wolff, 1996; Scruton, 
1982) - needs to be scrutinized if one is to give anarchism serious consideration. To 
what extent are these charges justified? And what are the philosophical and political 
assumptions behind them? Indeed such charges themselves have, for me, raised 
fascinating questions about the nature and role of philosophy of education. In what 
sense are we bound by the political and social context within which we operate? To 
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what extent should we be bound by it, and what is our responsibility in this regard as 
philosophers? If philosophy is to reach beyond the conceptual reality of our present 
existence, how far can it go before it becomes 'utopian', and what does this mean? 
And if we do want to promote an alternative vision of human life, to what extent are 
we accountable for the practicality of this vision? Trying to answer these and other 
related questions is not only an intriguing intellectual task, but also an important part 
of the ongoing project to define the scope of philosophy of education and its relation 
to other disciplines. So while the focus of this work is an exploration of the 
philosophical issues involved in anarchist ideas of education, these broader questions 
form the back-drop to the discussion. 
The bulk of this work, however, consists in an attempt to piece together a systematic 
account of what could be described as an anarchist perspective on education. This 
project involves examining the central philosophical assumptions and principles of 
anarchist theory, with particular reference to those ideas which have an obvious 
bearing on issues about the role and nature of education. Specifically, I devote 
considerable space to a discussion of the anarchist view on human nature, which is 
both at the crux of many misconceptions about anarchism, and also plays a crucial 
role in the anarchist position on education. 	 I also discuss several attempts to 
translate anarchist ideas into educational practice and policy. This discussion, I hope, 
serves to highlight the distinct aspects of the anarchist perspective, as compared to 
other educational positions, and furthers critical discussion of the way in which 
anarchism can be seen to embody a philosophically interesting perspective on 
education. 
The thrust of my account of anarchist educational ideas and practice is to show how 
such ideas are intertwined with the political and moral commitments of anarchism as 
an ideological stance. One cannot, I argue, appreciate the complexity of the anarchist 
position on education without understanding the political and philosophical context 
from which it stems. Yet equally importantly, one cannot appreciate or assess 
anarchism's viability as a political position without adequate understanding of the 
role played by education within anarchist thought. 
7 
In the course of this discussion, I refer extensively to other traditions which inform 
major trends in philosophy of education, namely, the liberal and the Marxist 
traditions. While this discussion cannot claim to offer a comprehensive account of 
either of these traditions, nor of their educational implications, it does, I hope, serve 
the purpose of situating anarchist ideas within a comparative framework. I believe it 
establishes that, while anarchism overlaps in important ways with both liberal and 
Marxist ideas, it can offer us new ways to conceptualize educational issues. The 
insights drawn from such an analysis can thus shed new light both on the work of 
philosophers of education, and on the educational questions, dilemmas and issues 
confronted by teachers, parents and policy makers. 
It is important to stress, at the outset, that this work is not intended as a defence of 
anarchism as a political theory. I believe that philosophers of education can benefit 
from a serious examination of anarchist ideas, and that many of these ideas have 
value whether or not one ultimately endorses anarchism as a political ideology, and 
even if one remains skeptical regarding the possibility of resolving the theoretical 
tensions within anarchist theory. 
More specifically, I believe that the very challenge posed by what I refer to as the 
anarchist perspective, irrespective of our ultimate ideological commitments, can 
prompt us to ask broad questions about the nature and role of philosophy of education 
and its relationship with other disciplines. While I cannot attempt, in a work of this 
scope, to offer a comprehensive account of the state of philosophy of education, I do 
highlight some central questions and problems within the field, our understanding of 
which can be enriched by consideration of the anarchist perspective. 
Most contemporary philosophers of education acknowledge that philosophy of 
education has, at the very least, political implications. As John White puts it (White, 
1982, p.1), 'the question: What should our society be like? overlaps so much with the 
question [of what the aims of education should be] that the two cannot sensibly be 
kept apart'. 	 Likewise, Patricia White laments the fact that philosophers tend to 
avoid 'tracing the policy implications of their work' (White, P., 1983, p2), and her 
essay Beyond Domination is a good example of an attempt to spell out in political 
terms what a particular educational aim (in this case, education for democracy) would 
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look like. A compelling account of the historical and philosophical context of the 
relationship between educational theory and political ideas has been notably 
developed by Can and Hartnett, who lament the `depoliticization of educational 
debate' (Carr and Hartnett, 1996, p. 5) and argue for a clearer articulation of the 
political and cultural role of educational theory, grounded in democratic values. But 
even work such as this tends to takes present basic social framework and institutional 
set-up as a given. Even philosophers of education such as John and Patricia White, 
Can and Hartnett, Henry Giroux, Nel Noddings and others who take a critical stance 
towards the political values reflected in the education system, tend to phrase their 
critique in terms of making existing society 'more democratic', 'less chauvinistic', 
`more participatory', 'more caring', and so on. The basic structural relations between 
the kind of society we live in and the kind of education we have are, more often than 
not, taken for granted. Indeed, it is this which makes such theories so appealing as, 
often , they offer a way forward for those committed to principles of democracy, for 
example, without demanding an entire revolution in the way our society is organized. 
In political terms, the acknowledgement by philosophers of the essentially political 
character of education seems to mean that, as succinctly put by Bowen and Hobson 
(1987, p. 445): 'It is now clear to most in the liberal-analytic tradition that no 
philosopher of education can be fully neutral, but must make certain normative 
assumptions, and in the case of the liberal analysts, these will reflect the values of 
democracy'. In philosophical terms, what this acknowledgement means is that 
discussion of 'aims' and 'values' in education often assumes that the kind of social 
and political values we cherish most highly can be promoted by particular 
conceptualizations of the curriculum. Richard Pring captures this idea in stating that 
debates on the aim of education 'take the word aim to mean not something extrinsic 
to the process of education itself, but the values which are picked out by evaluating 
any activity as educational' (Pring, 1994, p. 21). Thus much work by philosophers 
within the liberal tradition focuses on questions as to how values such as autonomy —
argued to be crucial for creating a democratic citizenry — can best be fostered by the 
education system. Many theorists in this tradition make no acknowledgement of the 
fact that 'education' is not synonmous with 'education systems'. Even those who do 
explicitly acknowledge this fact, like John White who opens his book The Aims of 
Education Restated with the comment that 'not teachers but parents form the largest 
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category of educators in this country', tend to treat this issue simply as a factor to be 
dealt with in the debate conducted within the framework of the existing democratic 
(albeit often, it is implied, not democratic enough) state. The normative questions 
regarding the desirability of this very framework are not themselves the focus of 
philosophical debate. 
In short, the sense in which many philosophers of education regard their work as 
political is that captured by Kleinig, when he states: 
Philosophy of education is a social practice, and in evaluating it 
account needs to be taken not only of what might be thought to follow 
`strictly' from the arguments used by its practitioners, but also the 
causal effects of those arguments within the social contexts of which 
they are a part. (Kleinig, 1982, p.9) 
Critical discussion about the desirability of this social context in itself, it is implied, is 
beyond the scope of philosophy of education 
The anarchist perspective seems at the outset to present a challenge to such 
mainstream views in that it does not take any existing social or political framework 
for granted. Instead, it has as its focal point a vision of what an ideal such framework 
could be like — a vision which has often been described as utopian. The question of 
why the anarchists were given the label 'utopian', what it signifies, and whether or 
not they justly deserved it, is one which is hotly debated in the literature, and which I 
shall take up later. But what anarchism seems to be suggesting is that before we even 
engage in the enterprise of philosophy of education, we must question the very 
political framework within which we are operating, ask ourselves what kind of 
society would embody, for us, the optimal vision of 'the good life', and then ask 
ourselves what kind (if any) of education system would exist in this society. 
Of course, any vision of the ideal society is formulated in terms of particular values, 
and many of the values involved in the anarchist vision may overlap with those 
promoted by philosophers writing in the liberal-democratic tradition (e.g. autonomy, 
equality, individual freedom). But it is not just a question of how these values are 
understood and translated into political practice; nor is it a question of which of them 
10 
are regarded as of primary importance; the distinction is not, then, between 
emphasizing different sets of values in philosophical debates on education, but, 
rather, of changing the very parameters of the debate. Thus the question of 'what 
should our societ} be like' is, for the anarchist, not merely 'overlapping', but 
logically prior to any questions about what kind of education we want. 
An anarchist perspective suggests that it is not enough to say, with Mary Warnock, 
that philosophy of education should be centrally concerned with 'questions about 
what should be taught, to whom, and with what in mind' (Warnock, 1977, p. 9); one 
has to first ask the crucial question 'by whom?' And how one answers this question, 
in turn, has important political implications which themselves inform the framework 
of the debate. For example, if one assumes that the nation state is to be the major 
educating body in society, one has to get clear about just what this means for our 
political, social and educational institutions, and, ideally, to be able to offer some 
philosophical defence of this arrangement. The view of society which informs the 
anarchists' ideas on education is not one of 'our society' or 'a democratic society', 
but a normative vision of what society could be like . The optimality of this vision is 
justified with reference to complex ideas on human nature and values, which I 
explore. 
The question for the philosopher of education, then, becomes threefold: one, what 
kind of society do we want? Two: what would 'education' look like in this ideal 
society? And three: what kind of educational activities can best help to further the 
realization of this society? Of course, the arguments of anarchist thinkers do not 
always acknowledge the distinction between such questions, nor do they always 
progress along the logical route implied here, and untangling them and reconstructing 
this perspective is one task of this thesis. 
Why, then, to go back to the opening quote from Herbert Read, is anarchism regarded 
as so eccentric — laughable, even - by mainstream philosophers? Is it the very idea of 
offering an alternative social ideal that seems hard to swallow, or is it that this 
particular ideal is regared as so 'utopian' that it is not worth seriously considering? 
And wherein does its 'utopianism' lie? Is it just a question of impracticality? Are we, 
as philosophers, bound to consider only those political programmes which are clearly 
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immediately feasible? Yet if we are concerned primarily with feasibility, then we 
have to address the claim, made by anarchist thinkers and activists, that their 
programme is feasible in that it does not demand a sudden, total revolution, but can 
be initiated and carried out 'here and now'. For the anarchist utopia, as we shall see, 
is built on the assumption of propensities, values and tendencies which, it is argued, 
are already present in human social activity. Is it, then, that philosophers believe that 
this utopian vision of the stateless society goes against too much of what we know 
about human nature? Yet there is little agreement amongst philosophers as to the 
meaning, let alone the content, of 'human nature'. Many anarchists, however, have 
an elaborate theory of human nature which arguably supports their claims for the 
possibility of a society based on mutual aid and self-government. Is it, then, simply 
that we (perhaps unlike many radical thinkers of the mid-nineteenth century) are 
simply so firmly entrenched in the idea of the state that we cannot conceptualize any 
kind of social reality without it? Does the modern capitalist state, in other words, look 
as if it is here to stay? Have we, similarly, fallen victim to the post-modern 
skepticism towards 'grand narratives', suspicious of any political ideal which offers a 
vision of progress towards an uniquivocally better world? These are all valid and 
interesting points against taking anarchism seriously, but they, in their turn, deserve 
to be scrutinized as they reflect, I believe, important assumptions about the nature and 
scope of the philosophical enterprise. 
Perhaps the very perspective implied by taking a (possibly utopian) vision of the ideal 
society as the starting point for philosophical debates on education is one which 
deserves to be taken seriously. It is certainly one which challenges our common 
perceptions about the nature and scope of philosophy of education. We are already 
well acquainted with talk of 'the good life' and 'human flourishing' as legitimate 
notions within the field of philosophy of education. But how broadly are we to 
extend our critical thought and our imagination in using these notions? If we admit 
(with Hirst, Peters, Dewey and others) that such notions cannot be understood without 
a social context, then is it not incumbent on us — or at the very least a worthwhile 
exercise — to consider what we would ideally like that social context to be? We are 
accustomed to the occasional philosophical argument for states without schools. Yet 
how often do we pause to consider the possibility of schools without states? 
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The above points, I hope, constitute a strong case for considering the anarchist 
position from the perspective of philosophy of education. The form that this account 
will take is, broadly, as follows: 
Chapter One offers an overview of some central anarchist ideas and a historical 
account of the development of anarchist theory, without, at this stage, going into 
detail about the educational insights raised by this tradition. In this chapter, I also 
explain my decision to focus on a particular group of anarchist theorists. 
Chapter Two suggests ways in which the anarchist position could raise questions and 
insights relevant to philosophers of education. In the course of this discussion, I 
describe some philosophical tensions within anarchist theory, as well as some 
common misperceptions about anarchism, to be dealt with later in the thesis. In 
trying to theoretically situate anarchism, I argue that it is helpful to contrast it with the 
liberal position. I thus outline the central philosophical ideas associated with this 
position, and discuss how it has constituted a framework for a particular approach to 
philosophy of education. 
Chapter Three focuses on the notion of human nature which, I argue, is a pivotal 
concept both in addressing some common criticisms of anarchism and in 
understanding the role played by education within anarchist theory. Following a 
detailed discussion of the anarchist account of human nature, I consider the 
educational implications of this account, and compare it with the treatment of human 
nature within the liberal tradition. 
Chapter Four develops the account of the role of education which emerges from the 
anarchist position by means of a closer look at some key notions in anarchist thought, 
such as autonomy, authority and community. The analysis of these ideas also 
sharpens the comparison between anarchism, liberalism and Marxism. In the course 
of this discussion, I assess the substance and form of the anarchist objection to the 
state, again, both with the aim of further grasping the educational implications of the 
anarchist position, and so as to situate this position relative to other philosophical and 
educational perspectives. 
13 
Chapter Five fills out the picture of an anarchist perspective on the role and nature of 
education which has emerged from the previous chapters by means of an examination 
of the positive values at the heart of anarchism, namely fraternity and equality. While 
discussing the philosophical account of these notions in a comparative context, this 
chapter also suggests ways in which they can be translated into educational thought 
and practice. 
Chapter Six consists of an overview of some historical attempts to establish anarchist 
schools. While not offering a comprehensive account of anarchist educational 
practice, the descriptions of the schools serve to illustrate how anarchist principles 
and ideas such as those discussed in previous chapters were translated into 
educational practice. The picture of an anarchist educational approach emerging from 
these descriptions both sharpens the distinction between anarchist education and 
libertarian education, and highlights the philosophical insights — as well as some of 
the problems — involved in this approach. 
Chapter Seven continues the exploration of the educational implications of an 
anarchist perspective by means of a discussion of a particular policy issue, namely 
that of vocational education. This discussion both opens the way for a detailed 
account of the key anarchist notion of integral education, and involves further 
philosophical analysis of the difference between the anarchist and the liberal 
perspective, regarding both the conceptual understanding of this issue, and its 
practical consequences. This analysis leads to a discussion of the role of moral and 
political education from an anarchist perspective.  
Chapter Eight draws together the insights from the foregoing discussion in order to 
suggest ways in which philosophy of education, and particuarly liberal philosophy of 
education, can be enriched by a consideration of anarchist ideas. In pinpointing the 
unique educational perspective embodied in the anarchist position, I contrast this 
position with neo-liberal arguments against state schooling. I then return to a 
discussion of some criticisms of anarchism and address the issue of utopianism, 
suggesting some philosophical and educational implications of this notion. 
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An analysis of anarchist thought seems unlikely, due to the very nature of the subject, 
to yield a coherent, comprehensive and unique philosophical account of education. 
Indeed, part of anarchism's complexity is a result of its being intellectually, 
politically, and philosophically intertwined with many other traditions. Thus any 
questions about exactly where to situate anarchism on the liberal-socialist continuum 
must remain, to a certain extent, open. Nevertheless, in the course of exploring the 
educational ideas associated with the anarchist tradition, and their philosophical and 
historical connections with other traditions, many — often surprising — insights 
emerge. Some of these challenge common perceptions about anarchism; some of 
them suggest important links between anarchist ideas and liberal aspirations; some of 
them prompt a rethinking of the distinctions between various educational traditions; 
and some of them prompt questions about how we see our role both as educators and 
as philosophers of education. All of them deserve exploration. 
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Chapter One 
Anarchism - Definitions and Complexities 
The following discussion presents the historical development and the central 
concepts and ideas of anarchist theory in as concise a form as possible, indicating 
some of the tensions and difficulties involved, and explaining my decision to focus 
on a particular group of anarchist thinkers. 
As a political ideology, anarchism is notoriously difficult to define, leading many 
commentators to complain of its being 'amorphous and full of paradoxes and 
contradictions' (Miller, 1984, p.2). One reason for the confusion surrounding the use 
of the word 'anarchism as a political philosophy is the derogatory meanings 
associated with the connected terms 'anarchy' and 'anarchic'. The Oxford English 
Dictionary defines anarchy as '1. absence of government or control, resulting in 
lawlessness. 2. disorder, confusion'; and an anarchist as 'a person who believes that 
government is undesirable and should be abolished'. In fact, the title 'anarchist' was 
first employed as a description of adherence to a particular ideology by Pierre-Joseph 
Proudhon in 1840 and, as will transpire, the substantial part of this ideology 
consisted in far more than a simple rejection of government. Indeed, as many 
anarchists have stressed, it is not government as such that they find objectionable, but 
the state. 
A second reason for the difficulty in reaching a conclusive definition is the fact that 
anarchism - by its very nature - is anti-canonical, and therefore one cannot refer to 
any single body of written work (unlike in the case of Marxism) in the search for 
definitive answers to questions on the nature and principles of the anarchist position. 
Furthermore, those anarchists who have written extensively on the subject have 
seldom formulated their views in the form of systematic works - largely out of a 
conscious commitment to the popular propaganda of their ideas. 
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Yet in spite of these difficulties, and in spite of the great variance amongst different 
anarchist thinkers at different times in history, it is possible to approach a working 
definition of anarchism by asking what it is that distinguishes it from other 
ideological positions. From this point of view, Reichert (1969, p. 139) is undoubtedly 
right in pointing out that anarchism is 'the only modem social doctrine that 
unequivocally rejects the concept of the state...' 
As the discussion in the following chapters will reveal, as a theory anarchism also 
addresses basic philosophical issues concerning such notions as human nature, 
authority, freedom and community. All of these issues have an important bearing on 
philosophical questions about education, and can be usefully understood in contrast 
with the views articulated from other ideological perspectives. It is, though, perhaps 
in light of its rejection of statehood that the theoretical cluster of anarchist ideas is 
best understood. 
Historically speaking, it has been argued (e.g. by Miller, Chomsky, and Guerin) that 
the origins of anarchism as a comprehensive political theory can be traced to the 
outbreak of the French Revolution. Miller claims that the Revolution, by radically 
challenging the old regime, opened the way for other such challenges to states and 
social institutions. Specifically, institutions were now regarded as vulnerable to the 
demand that they be justified in terms of an appeal to first principles, whether of 
natural right, social utility, or other universal abstract principles (see Miller, 1984, 
pp. 2-4). Yet anarchism as a political movement did not develop until the second 
half of the nineteenth century, especially in conjunction with the growing workers' 
movement. Indeed Joll argues that although philosophical arguments for anarchism 
can be found in texts of earlier historical periods, as a political movement, anarchism 
is 'a product of the nineteenth century.' (Joll, 1979, p. ix) . As Joll points out, 'the 
values the anarchists attempted to demolish were those of the increasingly powerful 
centralized, industrial state which, in the nineteenth and twentieth century, has 
seemed the model to which all societies are approaching.' (ibid). 
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However, the philosophical ideas embodied in anarchist theory did have historical 
precedents. Some writers have made the distinction between anarchism as a political 
movement and 'philosophical anarchism' which consists of a critique of the idea of 
authority itself. Miller, for example, notes that, as opposed to the political objection 
to the state, philosophical anarchism could entail a very passive kind of attitude, 
politically speaking, in which the proponent of this view evades 'inconvenient or 
immoral State dictates whenever possible', but takes no positive action to get rid of 
the state or to propose an alternative form of social organization (Miller, 1984, p. 15). 
On this view, one can be an anarchist without subscribing to philosophical anarchism 
- that is, without rejecting the idea of legitimate authority - and vice versa. However, 
other theorists, such as Nicholas Walter, argue that, irrespective of the existence of a 
philosophical position against authority, all those who identify themselves as 
anarchists share the positive idea that a stateless society is, however remotely, 
possible and would be preferable to current society. 
Most theorists, in short, seem to agree that, as a political movement, albeit not a 
continuous one, anarchism developed from the time of the French Revolution 
onwards, and that it can thus be seen as historically connected with the other major 
modern political doctrines which were crystallized at around this time, namely, 
liberalism and socialism. It is indeed around the question of the relationship between 
these two intellectual traditions that many of the criticisms of anarchism and the 
tensions within the movement can be understood. In a certain sense, the tensions 
between liberal and socialist principles are reflected in the contradictions often to be 
found within the anarchist tradition. While many commentators (for example Joll, 
Woodcock and Morland) have noted these apparently irreconcilable tensions as a 
weakness in anarchism as a coherent ideology, anarchist thinkers writing within the 
tradition often refuse to see them as contradictions, drawing on particular concepts of 
freedom to support their arguments. Thus Walter, for example, notes that anarchism 
may be seen as a development from either liberalism or 
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socialism, or from both liberalism and socialism. Like 
liberals, anarchists want freedom; like socialists, anarchists 
want equality. But we are not satisfied by liberalism alone 
or by socialism alone. Freedom without equality means that 
the poor and the weak are less free than the rich and strong, 
and equality without freedom means that we are all slaves 
together. Freedom and equality are not contradictory, but 
complementary [...] Freedom is not genuine if some people 
are too poor or too weak to enjoy it, and equality is not 
genuine if some people are ruled by others. The crucial 
contribution to political theory made by anarchists is this 
realization that freedom and equality are in the end the same 
thing. (Walter, 1969, p. 163) 
Walter, like many anarchist theorists, often fails to make the careful philosophical 
distinctions necessary to fully appreciate these complex conceptual issues. 
Presumably, he does not wish to argue that freedom and equality are actually 
conceptually identical. Rather, the point he seems to be making is that they are 
mutually dependent, in the sense that the model of a good society which the 
anarchists are defending cannot have one without the other. I shall examine these 
conceptual issues in greater depth in the following discussion. 
In spite of Walter's observation, it is undoubtedly true that, throughout history, 
different people calling themselves anarchists have often chosen to place more 
weight on one rather than the other side of the 'old polarization of freedom versus 
equality'. Specifically, it is common to find a distinction between anarchists of more 
`individualist' leanings, and 'social anarchists', who see individual freedom as 
conceptually connected with social equality and emphasize the importance of 
community and mutual aid. Thus writers like Max Stirner, (1806-1956) who 
represents an early and extreme form of individualism (which Walter suggests is 
arguably not a type of anarchism at all) view society as a collection of existentially 
unique and autonomous individuals. Both Stirner and William Godwin (1756-1836), 
commonly acknowledged as the first anarchist thinker, portrayed the ideal of the 
rational individual as morally and intellectually sovereign, and the need to constantly 
question authority and received opinion - to engage in a process which Stirner called 
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`desanctification'. However while Stirrer seemed to argue for a kind of rational 
egoism, Godwin claimed that a truly rational person would necessarily be 
benevolent. Although sharply critical of the modern centralist state, and presenting 
an elaborate doctrine of social and political freedom, Godwin, writing in the 
aftermath of the French Revolution, placed great emphasis on the development of 
individual rationality and independent thinking, believing that the road forward lay 
not through social revolution but through gradual reform by means of the rational 
dissemination of ideas at the level of individual consciousness. 
As Walter comments (Walter, 1969, p.174), such individualism, which over the years 
has held an intellectual attraction for figures such as Shelley, Emerson and Thoreau, 
often tends towards nihilism and even solipsism. Walter ultimately questions 
whether individualism of this type is indeed a form of anarchism, arguing rather that 
libertarianism - construed as a more moderate form of individualism which holds that 
individual liberty is an important political goal - is simply one aspect of anarchist 
thought, or 'the first stage on the way to complete anarchism'(ibid). 
Many commentators have acknowledged that leading anarchist theorists did not see 
individual freedom as a political end in itself (see for example Ruth Kynna, in 
Crowder, 1991). 	 Furthermore, central anarchist theorists, such as Kropotkin and 
Bakunin, were often highly disparaging about earlier individualist thinkers such as 
William Godwin and Max Stirner, for whom individual freedom was a supreme 
value. 'The final conclusion of that sort of Individualist Anarchism', wrote 
Kropotkin in his 1910 article on 'Anarchism' for the Encyclopaedia Britannica, 
maintains that the aim of all superior civilization is, not to permit all 
members of the community to develop in a normal way, but to permit 
certain better- endowed individuals 'fully to develop', even at the cost 
of the happiness and the very existence of the mass of mankind.... 
Bakunin, another leading anarchist theorist, was even more outspoken in his critique 
of 'the individualistic, egoistic, shabby and fictitious liberty extolled by the school 
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of J.J. [Rousseau] and other schools of bourgeois liberalism' (Bakunin, 1971). 
Accordingly, several theorists have proposed that it is in fact equality, or even 
fraternity (see Fidler, 1989), which constitutes the ultimate social value according to 
the anarchist position. Others, like Chomsky, have taken the position that anarchism 
is simply 'the libertarian wing of socialism' (Chomsky, in Guerin, Introduction, p. 
xii), or that 'anarchism is really a synonym for socialism' (Guerin, 1970, p.12). 
Indeed, Adolph Fischer, one of the 'Haymarket martyrs' sentenced to death for their 
part in the libertarian socialist uprising over the struggle for the eight-hour work day 
in Chicago, in 1886, claimed that 'every anarchist is a socialist but not every socialist 
is an anarchist' (quoted in Guerin, 1970, p. 12). 
This perspective is supported by the work of anarchist theorists such as Noam 
Chomsky and Daniel Guerin, who argue that the best way to understand anarchism is 
to view it as 'libertarian socialism', as well as by political scientists such as David 
Miller and Barbara Goodwin, who argues that 'socialism is in fact the theoretical 
genus of which Marxism is a species and anarchism another.' (Goodwin, 1987, p. 
91). 
The most influential anarchist theorists in recent history, in terms of developing and 
disseminating anarchist ideas, undoubtedly belong on the socialist end of the 
anarchist spectrum. Many of the central ideas of this tradition were anticipated by 
Pierre-Joseph Proudhon (1809-1865), commonly regarded as the father of social 
anarchism. Yet the bulk of social anarchist thought was chrystalized in the second 
half of the nineteenth century, most notably by Michael Bakunin (1814-1876) and 
Peter Kropotkin (1842-1912). Other significant anarchist activists and theorists in 
this tradition include Errico Malatesta (1853-1932), Alexander Berkman (1870-
1936), Emma Goldman (1869-1940), and, more recently, Murray Bookchin (1921-), 
Daniel Guerin (1904-1988) and Noam Chomsky (1928 - ). 
Apart from the differences in emphasis in terms of the 'individualist - socialist' 
continuum, one can draw other distinctions within the broadly socialist approach 
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amongst different variants of social anarchism which have been expressed in 
different political and historical contexts. Briefly, these five main variants are: 
mutualism, federalism, collectivism, communism and syndicalism. Although this 
taxonomy is conceptually useful, it is important to remember that the views of many 
leading anarchist theorists often involved a combination of strands from several of 
these different traditions. 
A closer examination of these different various strands within anarchism reveals 
further important insights regarding the desired structure of society. Most important 
of these, perhaps, is the view that society should be organized not on the basis of a 
hierarchical, centralist, top-down structure such as the state, but on the basis of 
reciprocal voluntary agreements between individuals. Perhaps the best-known, and 
certainly the earliest, proponent of this type of anarchism was the mutualist 
anarchist, Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, who, writing in the mid-nineteenth century, 
envisaged a society composed of cooperative groups of individuals exchanging 
goods on the basis of labour value, and enjoying the credit of a 'people's bank'. 
Proudhon was criticized by later anarchists for appealing primarily to the petit 
bourgeoisie, and for failing to deal with the basic issues of social structure as regards 
the class system, industry and capital. Indeed, he often wrote with horror of the 
increasing threat of massive industrialization, expressing a romantic wish to preserve 
small-scale trade, artisans' workshops and cottage industry. Nevertheless, his views 
on private property and his argument that social harmony could only exist in a 
stateless society, were highly influential and were developed by leading anarchist 
thinkers, notably Bakunin. 
While this notion of non-hierarchical social organization is clearly relevant primarily 
to the internal structure of society, other anarchists emphasized the connected idea of 
federalism as the principle for social and economic organization between 
communities. The idea is that the society of voluntarily-organized communities 
should be coordinated by a network of councils. The key difference between this 
anarchist idea and the principle of democratic representation is that the councils 
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would be established spontaneously to meet specific economic or organizational 
needs of the communities; they would have no central authority, no permanent 
bureaucratic structure, and their delegates would have no executive authority and 
would be subject to instant recall. This principle was also elaborated by Proudhon 
and his followers, who were fond of pointing to international systems for 
coordinating railways, postal services, telegraphs and disaster operations as 
essentially federalist in structure. What is notable about the elaborate attempts by 
Proudhon, Bakunin, Kropotkin and other anarchists to show how federalist 
arrangements could take care of a wide variety of economic functions, is that they 
illustrate the point that anarchism is not synonymous with disorganization. As the 
anarchist activist and theorist Voline (1882-1945) clarifies: 
...it is not a matter of 'organization' or `nonorganization', but of 
two different principles of organization....Of course, say the 
anarchists, society must be organized. However, the new organization 
must be established freely, socially, and, above all, from below. The 
principle of organization must not issue from a center created in 
advance to capture the whole and impose itself upon it, but, on the 
contrary, it must come from all sides to create nodes of coordination, 
natural centers to serve all these points... (quoted in Guerin, 1970, p. 
43). 
It thus seems appropriate to view the federalist and anti-hierarchical position not so 
much as a strand within anarchist thought but, as Walter suggests, 'as an inevitable 
part of anarchism' (Walter, 1969, p. 175). 
While, as mentioned above, most nineteenth century anarchist thinkers were 
socialists, some of them were more explicitly committed to collectivist and 
communist principles than others, arguing that the free and just society can only be 
established by a workers' revolution which will reorganize production on a 
communal basis. Many central figures of the twentieth century anarchist movement -
notably Bakunin and his followers in the First International - were in fact 
collectivists. Yet while such thinkers and activists were often opposed to the 
reformist position of many within the social anarchist tradition, they were equally 
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critical of what they regarded as the authoritarian revolutionary position of the 
Marxists. 
Many of the central ideas and principles of social anarchism overlap with those of 
Marxism, perhaps nowhere more explicitly than in collectivism, the form of 
anarchism most closely associated with Marxist socialism in that it focuses on the 
class struggle and on the need for social revolution. However, there are crucial 
differences between the anarchists and the Marxists, and indeed much of Bakunin's 
political theory took the form of an attack on Marx. Specifically, the anarchists 
opposed common, central ownership of the economy and, of course, state control of 
production, and believed that a transition to a free and classless society was possible 
without any intermediate period of dictatorship (see Walter, 1969, p. 176). 
Fundamentally, the anarchists consider the Marxist view of the state as a mere tool in 
the hands of the ruling economic class as too narrow, as it obscures the basic truth 
that states 'have certain properties just because they are states' (Miller, 1984, p. 82). 
By using the structure of a state to realize their goals, revolutionaries will, according 
to anarchism, inevitably reproduce all its negative features (the corrupting power of 
the minority over the majority, hierarchical, centralized authority and legislation, and 
so on). Thus the anarchists in the First International were highly skeptical (with, it 
has to be said, depressingly accurate foresight) about the Marxist idea of the 
`withering away of the state'. 
The anarchists also argued that the Marxist claim to create a scientific theory of 
social change leads to a form of elitism in which the scientific 'truth' is known only 
to an elect few, which would justify attempts to impose this truth on the 'masses' 
without any critical process. Bakunin, in a speech to the First International, attacked 
Marx as follows: 
As soon as an official truth is pronounced - having been 
scientifically discovered by this great brainy head labouring all alone 
- a truth proclaimed and imposed on the whole world from the 
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summit of the Marxist Sinai - why discuss anything? (quoted in 
Miller, 1984, p. 80) 
In contrast, a fundamental aspect of the anarchist position is the belief that the exact 
form which the future society will take can never be determined in advance: the 
creation of the harmonious, free society is a constant, dynamic process of self-
improvement, spontaneous organization and free experimentation. In keeping with 
this view, anarchist revolutionary theorists insisted that the revolution itself was not 
subject to scientific understanding and its course could not be determined in advance, 
favouring instead an organic image of social change. As Bakunin wrote: 
Revolution is a natural fact, and not the act of a few persons; it does 
not take place according to a preconceived plan but is produced by 
uncontrollable circumstances which no individual can command. We 
do not, therefore, intend to draw up a blueprint for the future 
revolutionary campaign; we leave this childish task to those who 
believe in the possibility and the efficacy of achieving the 
emancipation of humanity through personal dictatorship (in Dolgoff, 
1971, p. 357). 
It is in the context of this position that anarchists have consistently refuted the 
charges of utopianism - charges made both by right-wing critics and by orthodox 
Marxists. This point will be discussed in greater detail below. 
Anarcho-Communism is the view that the products of labour should be collectively 
owned and distributed according to the principle of 'from each according to his 
ability, to each according to his needs'. Those anarchists - notably Kropotkin, 
Malatesta, Berkman and Rocker - who proclaimed themselves to be communist-
anarchists shared the collectivists' critique of Marxist socialism, but rejected the title 
`collectivist', as they saw themselves as presenting a broader and more radical vision, 
involving the complete abolition of the wage and price system. Most revolutionary 
anarchist movements have in fact been communist in terms of their principles of 
economic organization - the most notable example being the anarchist communes 
established during the Spanish Civil War. 
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Anarcho-Syndicalism is that strand of anarchist thought which emphasizes the issue 
of labour and argues that the trade unions, as the ultimate expression of the working 
class, should form the basic unity of social reorganization. There is naturally 
considerable overlap between the syndicalist view and the collectivist or communist 
form of anarchism, but historically, anarcho-syndicalism as a movement is closely 
tied with the development of the French syndicalist (i.e. trade unionist) movement at 
the end of the nineteenth century. As the anarcho-syndicalist position emphasizes 
workers' control of the economy and means of production, its proponents have 
tended to be less libertarian in their sympathies. 
In summary, it is abundantly clear that people of fairly diverse political views have, 
at one time or another, called themselves anarchists. Indeed, as Walter remarks, it is 
hardly surprising that 'people whose fundamental principle is the rejection of 
authority should tend to perpetual dissent' (Walter, 1969, p.172). Nevertheless, a few 
general points emerge, based on the above analysis: 
1. All anarchists share a principled rejection of the state and its institutions; 
and in doing so they: 
2. Do not reject the notion of social organization or order per se; 
3. Do not necessarily regard freedom - specifically, individual freedom - as 
the primary value and the major goal of social change, and; 
4. Do not propose any 'blue-print' for the future society. 
As discussed above, it is the work of social anarchist theorists which constitutes the 
bulk of theoretical development of the anarchist position. Likewise, it is, I believe, 
these theorists who offer the most interesting insights on the relationship between 
education and social change. Thus, in what follows, I shall refer primarily to the 
tradition of social anarchism and the philosophical and educational ideas associated 
with it. 
However, in adopting this perspective, I by no means wish to gloss over the tensions 
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and apparent contradictions within anarchist theory. These tensions are perhaps an 
inevitable historical consequence of the fact that, as Joll puts it: 
On the one hand, they are the heirs of all the Utopian, millenarian 
religious movements which have believed that the end of the world is 
at hand and have confidently expected that 'the trumpets shall sound 
and we shall be changed, in a moment, in the twinkling of an eye.[...] 
On the other hand, they are also the children of the Age of 
Reason[...]. They are the people who carry their belief in reason and 
progress and peaceful persuasion through to its logical limits. 
Anarchism is both a religious faith and a rational philosophy...(Joll, 
1979, p. x). 
In fact, as I shall argue, it is these tensions which make the anarchist tradition so 
fascinating and rich in philosophical insights. Futhennore, the process of trying to 
resolve and understand these tensions is part of the process of making sense of 
anarchist ideas on education. 
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Chapter Two 
Anarchism, Philosophy of Education, and Liberal Suspicions 
At first glance, trying to construct an anarchist philosophy of education may seem to 
the reader an unpromising line of enquiry, or at least one which, while perhaps being 
of some scholarly interest, has little to offer in the way of practical or philosophical 
value. 
There are several reasons why this may be so. Some of these concern anarchism's 
viability as a political ideology, and some refer more explicitly to what are assumed 
to be the educational implications of such an ideology. 
As far as the first group of concerns go, most of these involve, whether implicitly or 
explicitly, assumptions about the alleged utopianism of the anarchist position. This 
common line of critique, which encompasses both the charges of utopianism from 
classical Marxists and the skepticism of contemporary liberal theorists, can be broken 
down into several distinct philosophical questions. Most critics have tended to focus 
(often implicitly) on one or the other of these points. 
1. Are the different values promoted by anarchist theory mutually 
compatible? Many contemporary liberal theorists, for example, 
working with the notion of personal autonomy, have argued that 
freedom, in this sense, is incompatible with the ideal of the anarchist 
community. Similarly, it is almost a built-in assumption of the neo-
liberal position that trying to realize both individual freedom and 
social equality is bound to lead to insurmountable conflicts. It is from 
this perspective that some critics have argued that anarchism, as 
political theory, lacks internal cohesion (see Taylor, 1982). 
2. Is the anarchist vision of the ideal human society feasible given the 
structure of human nature? This question can be broken down into 
two further questions: a. The question of inner consistency - i.e. is the 
anarchist social ideal consistent with human nature as the anarchists 
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understand it? and b. The question of external validity - is the anarchist 
social ideal feasible given human nature as commonly understood? 
This second line of criticism inevitably takes the form of a challenge 
to the anarchist view of human nature - a view which, as will be 
discussed below, is regarded as unrealistically optimistic, as opposed 
to the rather more pessimistic view, according to which the inherently 
egotistical, competitive elements of human nature could not sustain a 
society organized along anarchist lines. 
3. Can anarchism be implemented on a large scale in the modern 
industrialized world? This line of criticism focuses on the problems of 
translating anarchist ideas about self-governing, freely established 
communities based on mutual aid and non-hierarchical forms of social 
organization, to the world of industrial capitalism, global economy and 
multi-national corporations. In other words, while the previous two 
points concern primarily the feasibility of establishing and maintaining 
an anarchist community, this point is more concerned with the 
problem of relations between communities. 
As this brief summary suggests, the anarchist conception of human nature is the key to 
understanding much of anarchist thought and thus to addressing the criticisms of 
anarchism as a political theory. Furthermore, this notion is an important element in 
the anarchist position on education. 
It is harder to articulate the criticisms of anarchism from an educational perspective 
due to the simple fact that very little has been written, from a systematic 
philosophical point of view, about the educational ideas arising from anarchist theory. 
On the face of it, there are many ways in which anarchist theory can have 
implications for our ideas about education. These concern questions about 
educational provision and control; questions about the content, curriculum and 
underlying values of the educational process, and questions about the moral 
justification of education per se. In spite of the dearth of philosophical literature on 
this subject, the remarks made informally by philosophers of education on 
encountering work such as my own suggest that their suspicions, apart from reflecting 
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the above broad skepticism with regard to anarchism's feasibility as a political 
programme, reflect problems such as the following: 
1. Firstly, the anarchist challenge to the idea of authority may seem in itself to 
undermine our basic assumptions regarding the very legitimacy and value of 
education as an intentional human endeavour. If anarchists reject authority and 
hierarchies, one wonders whether it is possible to develop a coherent theory of 
education within the context of a commitment to anarchist ideals. Thus the 
concept of authority and its interpretation within the anarchist tradition needs to 
be examined further with this question in mind. 
2. Secondly, the central anarchist argument against the state in itself goes against 
the idea of universal educational provision, which has become an implicit 
assumption in nearly all contemporary philosophical debates on education. This 
challenge to the liberal ideal of universal, compulsory, state-controlled education 
is both implicit in the anarchist critique of the centralist state as a mode of social 
organization, and explicitly argued for in anarchist work, from Godwin on. Of 
course, the anarchist argument for abolishment of the centralist state is based on 
an understanding of and commitment to specific human values and, connectedly, 
to a specific view of human nature. If one accepts these values, the rejection of 
the liberal democratic state as the optimal framework for social organization then 
prompts the question of what framework is to replace it, and whether these same 
values would indeed be better promoted and preserved under alternative 
arrangements. 
3. Although anarchists — as will be discussed below — advocate a broadly libertarian 
approach to education, their normative commitments imply a vision — some 
would argue a utopian vision — of social change. If anarchist education is to be 
consistent with anarchist principles, then this seems to suggest the following 
dilemma: either the education in question is to be completely non-coercive and 
avoid the transmission of any substantive set of values, in which case it is hard to 
see how such an education could be regarded as furthering the desired social 
change; or it is to involve the explicit transmission of a substantive curriculum 
regarding the desired social order — in which case it would appear to undermine 
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the libertarian ideal. In effect, if the anarchist position is actually a libertarian 
one, is not all educational intervention morally problematic from an anarchist 
point of view? This issue poses both internal and external problems: the internal 
problem has to do with the consistency between a substantive educational agenda 
and a broadly libertarian outlook, whereas the external problem has to do with 
the difficulty of accommodating a normative - perhaps utopian — vision with the 
liberal commitment to autonomy. 
In order to address these often inter-connected issues, it is important to untangle the 
conceptual web of educationally relevant concepts in anarchist thought, primarily: 
freedom, authority, autonomy and community, and to understand more fully the basis 
for the anarchist rejection of the state. One can then pose the question of whether any 
qualitatively different educational perspective, or indeed any philosophically 
defensible advantage is gained by simply replacing the state with, for example, the 
community. 
Furthermore, it is important to clarify the way in which anarchist ideas on education 
are connected to anarchist values and ideals, and thus to articulate an anarchist 
conceptualization of education and its role in achieving social change. One important 
aspect of this project is the distinction, to be discussed below, between anarchist 
educational practice and other broadly libertarian approaches. 
The aim of the following chapters, then, will be to explore the philosophical 
underpinnings of central concepts in anarchist thought, and to articulate the picture of 
education which emerges from this thought. 
In the course of this analysis, I will try to establish whether the anarchist position on 
education is significantly different from other positions, and whether it can shed any 
new light on philosophical debates on the nature and role of education. 
As mentioned above, one cannot begin to answer any of these questions without a 
detailed understanding of the anarchist conception of human nature — a notion which 
is central both to the charges of utopianism raised against anarchism, and to the role 
assigned to education in the process of social change. Indeed, it could be argued that 
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any philosophical position on the nature and role of education in society involves, at 
least implicitly, assumptions about human nature. A key step in this thesis, then, will 
be to unpack the anarchist notion of human nature, and to provide an account of the 
values associated with it. This task is relatively straightforward as several leading 
social anarchist theorists, notably Kropotkin, and several anarchist commentators, 
have addressed the issue of human nature explictly and at some length in their 
writings. 
Unpacking the other, educational questions, is a somewhat more complicated task. 
The anarchist theorists who wrote about education did so in a rather unsystematic and 
often sketchy way, so this thesis is largely a project of reconstructing their position. 
It is possible to formulate a further question, a meta-question in a sense, which links 
both the above sets of questions: Does the question of whether or not anarchism is 
viable as a political ideology have any direct bearing on its educational value? In 
other words, if it can be convincingly argued that the anarchist vision of a free, equal 
and harmonious society is hopelessly unrealistic, does this fact detract from its ability 
to function as an animating force in educational thought and practice? I hope to 
suggest some answers to this meta-question in the course of discussing the 
philosophical perspective on education embodied in anarchist theory. 
Liberalism and Liberal Education 
In order to create a coherent framework for this discussion, the position broadly 
referred to as the liberal theory of education will form my main point of reference for 
much of the following comparative analysis. 
	 Apart from methodological 
considerations, there are, it seems to me, several connected reasons why this approach 
makes sense. Firstly, as Anthony O'Hear (0' Hear, 1981) puts it, many of the 
central ideas of liberal education have become so common as to be almost axiomatic 
within the field of educational theory and practice. Indeed, liberalism as a political 
theory has, as many theorists note, achieved such ascendancy, at least in the West, 
that in a certain sense 'from New Right conservatives to democratic socialists, it 
seems we are all liberals now' (Bellamy, 1992, p.1). This is hardly surprising when 
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one considers that 'liberal ideals and politics fashioned the states and social and 
economic systems of the nineteenth century, creating the institutional framework and 
the values within which most of us in the West continue to live and think' (ibid). In as 
much as this is true, it is certainly the case that the central values of liberal theory 
underly much contemporary philosophical discourse on the role, aims and nature of 
education, and most participants in this discourse take it for granted that the education 
under consideration is education in - and controlled by - a liberal state. In addition, 
anarchist theory itself, as a nineteenth century tradition (see Chapter One), is often 
most interestingly and constructively understood when compared and contrasted with 
the other nineteenth century tradition of liberalism, with which it is closely connected. 
Indeed, some commentators (notably Chomsky) argue that anarchism is best 
understood as a logical development out of classical liberalism. I shall examine this 
argument in the course of the following discussion for, if anarchist ideas can be 
construed as a variant of liberalism, then it may be possible to construct an anarchist 
view of education that can accommodated within, and perhaps shed new light on, the 
paradigm of liberal education. 
Thus, in order to identify some useful points of reference for further exploration, I 
turn now to a brief discussion of some of what are generally accepted as basic 
assumptions of liberalism as a political theory, indicating how these assumptions have 
come to be associated with certain educational ideas. 
Liberal Theory 
Some theorists claim that liberalism is not, in fact, a single, coherent doctrine, but a 
`diverse, changing, and often fractious array of doctrines that form a "family"...' 
(Flathman, 1998, p.3). Indeed, one can draw distinctions, within this 'family', 
between fairly different perspectives — for example, the central distinction between 
philosophical, or neutralist liberalism (most notably represented in recent years by the 
work of Rawls, Dworkin, Hayek and Nozick), versus what Bellamy dubs 
`communitarian liberalism' (as exemplified in the work of Walzer and Raz). Yet it is 
possible to identify a few basic ideas - or, as Andrew C. Gould puts it 'aspirations' 
common to all variants of liberalism: 
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1. The commitment to constitutional parliamentary government as the preferred 
form of political rule. This idea developed out of the rejection of monarchism, 
reflecting the view that the arbitrary authority of monarchs and their officials 
should be replaced by predictable, rational decision-making processes established 
in written laws. 
2. The commitment to individual freedoms laid down and protected by constitutions. 
3. The pursuit of enlightened self-interest and the idea that such self-interest, if 
pursued in the framework of free markets, can lead to public benefit. 
Connectedly, the expansion of markets is usually one aim of liberal theory, 
although nearly all contemporary liberal theorists acknowledge the need for some 
regulation of the market. 
(Gould, 1999) 
Meira Levinson, in her overview of contemporary liberal theory, offers an account 
similar to Gould's, but adds as a further liberal commitment: 'An acceptance — and 
more rarely, an embracing — of the fact of deep and irremediable pluralism in modern 
society' (Levinson, 1999, p. 9). John Kekes, writing from a more conservative 
position, has expressed these liberal ideas in negative terms, arguing that 'essential to 
liberalism is the moral criticism of dictatorship, arbitrary power, intolerance, 
repression, persecution, lawlessness and the suppression of individuals by entrenched 
orthodoxies' (Kekes, 1997, p.3). 
Kekes, citing the classic Lockean position that the only reasonable justification of 
government is an appeal to the argument that individual rights are better protected 
than they would be under a different arrangement, supports the view that the 
individual and individual freedoms and rights is the basic unit of liberal theory. 
While certain theorists, notably Kymlicka, have defended an interpretation of 
liberalism which, while championing individual liberty and property, at the same 
time stresses the cultural and communal context which 'provides the context for 
individual development, and which shapes our goals and our capacities to pursue 
them' (Kymlicka, 1989, p. 253), it nevertheless seems reasonable to accept that, in 
some basic sense, liberalism is a doctrine in which, as Gould puts it, 'individuals 
count'. 
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It is thus no coincidence that liberal views are often associated with the promotion of 
the value of individual autonomy. Indeed, it has been argued by several theorists that 
autonomy is the central value in liberal theories — even, as John White argues, within 
the neutralist liberal position (i.e. the position which holds, with Dworkin, that the 
state should be neutral with regard to different conceptions of the good life) — which 
`collapses in to a hidden perfectionism in favour of autonomy' (White, 1990, p.24). 
Kekes too notes that 'the central importance that liberalism attributes to individuals is 
greatly enhanced by the idea of autonomy as formulated by Kant' (Kekes, ibid), while 
Meira Levinson goes so far as to argue that 'liberal principles depend for their 
justification on an appeal to the value of individual autonomy'. (Levinson 1999, p.6). 
Thus the ideal of the autonomous individual — the person who reflects upon and freely 
chooses from amongst a plurality of conceptions of the good — both justifies the 
establishment of liberal freedoms and rights and the institutions intended to guarantee 
these rights, and, so the argument goes, is fostered within the framework of the liberal 
state. To this view (the details of which will be developed below) is often added the 
insight that in exercising autonomy one is in some sense fulfilling one's essential 
potential as a human being, as expressed by J.S. Mill in his classic statement of 
liberalism: 
He who lets the world, or his own portion of it, choose his plan of life for 
him, has no need of any other faculty than the ape-like one of imitation. 
He who chooses his plan for himself, employs all his faculties. (Mill, 
1991, p. 65) 
It is therefore not surprising that many educational philosophers, writing within the 
liberal tradition, have chosen to emphasize autonomy as a central educational goal or 
value, relying on the argument that each person has the right to determine and pursue 
her own vision of the good life. This argument yields, at the policy level, the view 
that, in the context of a liberal state, the national system of education must refrain 
from laying down prescriptive programmes aimed at a particular vision of the good 
life. On the content level, such views often assume (whether explicitly or not) a view 
of human nature which puts great emphasis on the rational capacities deemed 
necessary for the exercise of autonomy, and construct curricula designed to foster 
these capacities. 
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However, even if one accepts the position, as argued by Levinson and others, that 
autonomy is a necessary component of contemporary liberal theory, this does not, of 
course, lead to the conclusion that liberalism is the only political theory consistent 
with the value of autonomy. Indeed, autonomy can — and perhaps, as John White 
argues (White, 1990, pp. 95-105), should — be justified as a human value on 
independent grounds (e.g. from a utilitarian perspective, within a Kantian view of 
morality, or by reference to a notion of personal well-being). Thus one could 
acknowledge, with the liberals, the value of autonomy, but question the framework of 
the liberal democratic state and its institutions. One could, in fact, with the 
anarchists, argue that alternative social and political arrangements are more suited to 
the promotion and maintenance of autonomy. In order to examine this position, I 
shall, in what follows, discuss the anarchist understanding of autonomy, compare this 
with the liberal notion, and ascertain whether the anarchist idea of the community as 
the basic unit of social organization is consistent with the value of personal 
autonomy. Does a rejection of the framework of the liberal, democratic state yield 
new insights into the philosophical issues which are generally associated with the role 
and nature of education within a liberal framework? 
Liberal Education 
The idea of 'liberal education', as suggested above, is logically connected to the idea 
of liberalism per se by virtue of the fact that the underlying values of education 
assumed in this context overlap with central liberal aspirations. Furthermore, the 
connection has obvious historical and political dimensions as the idea of a liberal, 
universal education developed in conjunction with the ascendancy of liberalism as a 
political theory. However, it is important to refer also to the systematic work of 
leading philosophers of education who, particularly during the nineteen-sixties and 
seventies, developed a coherent analytical account of the notion of 'liberal 
education'. In addition to the above points, an examination of this account yields the 
following insights. 
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Philosophers within the liberal tradition, from Richard Peters on, have focused on the 
idea of non-instrumentality as central to the philosophy of liberal education. As 
Peters put it, 'traditionally, the demand for liberal education has been put forward as a 
protest against confining what has been taught to the service of some extrinsic end 
such as the production of material goods, obtaining a job, or making a profession.' 
(Peters, 1966, p. 43). Similarly, Paul Hirst, in his classic account (Hirst, 1972), notes 
that the liberal education ideal is intentionally non-utilitarian and non-vocational. 
Hirst also emphasizes the idea of the mind and mental development as an essential 
feature of liberal education, involving a conception of human nature that regards 
human potential as consisting primarily in the development of the mind. 
To talk of intrinsic aims of education is to imply that a particular aim 'would be 
intrinsic to what we would consider education to be. For we would not call a person 
"educated" who had not developed along such lines' (Peters, 1966, p.27). Thus, for 
example, an 'aim' such as 'developing the intellect', would be intrinsic in the sense 
that this is arguably one aspect of what we understand education, as a normative 
concept, to be. In contrast, to say that it is an aim of education to contribute to the 
productivity of the economy is to say something that goes beyond the concept of 
education itself and is, therefore, 'extrinsic' to it. 	 This classic view of liberal 
education has been the subject of much criticism in recent years (see, for example 
Kleinig, 1982 and White, 1982). Indeed Meira Levinson, in her recent book The 
Demands of a Liberal Education, is rather disparaging of Peters and his defense of 
the idea that the concept of education is logically connected with the idea of 
intrinsically worth-while activities. In claiming that this assertion is simply wrong 
(Levinson, 1999, p. 3), Levinson misses the point, which is a purely analytical one: 
namely, that one's idea of which educational aims are worthwhile is inherently built 
into one's concept of education — or, more explicitly, to one's concept of what it 
means to be educated. It may of course be true, as John White and others have 
argued, that the conception of education as having intrinsic aims - a conception 
underlying much of the liberal educational tradition - is in conflict with the 
conception of education as having extrinsic — e.g. economic — aims (see White, 1982, 
pp. 61-65). For example, one can argue, albeit with a certain degree of simplification, 
that specific aims typical of the liberal educational tradition, such as autonomy, 
reflectiveness, a broad and critical understanding of human experience, etc., can very 
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well conflict with typical extrinsic aims of education - specifically those construed as 
`economic' aims — for example, obedience to authority, specialized training and 
knowledge of specific skills, and an uncritical attitude to existing socio-economic 
reality. 
The liberal-analytical tradition in philosophy of education, as opposed to the rather 
more cynical Marxist view, rests, of course, as White (1982) points out, on the 
assumption that it is possible to provide a 'neutral', logical analysis of what is 
involved in the concept of 'education'. Yet although this analytic enterprise has been 
the subject of much criticism in recent years, the analytical distinction between 
extrinsic and intrinsic aims of education seems to have practically achieved the status 
of orthodoxy in contemporary philosophy of education. While this distinction is 
undoubtedly useful as a conceptual tool, highlighting certain differences in emphasis 
between varying positions on the nature and role of education, it can also entail 
certain philosophical problenms. Many of these problems have to do with the 
assoicated, and equally problematic, distinction between 'means' and 'ends' in 
education, which I discuss below (see Chapter Six). 
I turn now to a discussion of the anarchist perspective on certain relevant concepts 
which are central to any discussion of education, especially in the context of liberal 
theory. My aim in this discussion, in keeping with the above analysis, is to establish 
whether the anarchist position yields a different philosophical perspective on these 
concepts from that embodied in liberal thought. This will necessitate addressing the 
question of whether or not anarchism can arguably be construed as an extension of 
liberalism, or whether it is qualitatively distinct from liberalism. Consequently, we 
will be able to determine whether or not the anarchist position implies a challenge to 
the basic values underlying liberal educational ideas, and whether a consideration of 
this tradition can yield philosophical insights which contribute to our thinking about 
educational issues. 
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Chapter Three 
Anarchism, Liberalism and Human Nature 
As stated in the previous chapter, many of the criticisms of anarchism as a viable 
political ideology and thus as a sound philosophical base for constructing ideas on 
education, hinge on the concept of human nature. This chapter, therefore, offers an 
exploration of the anarchist position on human nature, with a view to both addressing 
these criticisms, and beginning to grasp the role of education in anarchist thought. 
Many critics have dismissed anarchism as a coherent or serious political theory 
precisely on the basis that its view of human nature is, they argue, unrealistic or 
naive. Thus for example, Max Beloff (1975) states that the case for anarchism 
is based on a fundamental misunderstanding of human nature, on the 
unproven supposition that given total absence of constraints, or 
alternatively material abundance secured by communism, human 
societies could exist with no coercive element at all, the freedom of 
each being recognized as compatible with the freedom of all. 
Similarly, Jonathan Wolff, in his account of anarchism in his Introduction to Political 
Philosophy, states that 'to rely on the natural goodness of human beings to such an 
extent seems utopian in the extreme' (Wolff, 1996, p. 34). As we shall see, statements 
such as this are based on a misrepresentation of the anarchist view of human nature 
and its consequences for the anarchist ideal of society. In order to proceed with this 
analysis, then, it is important to establish exactly what the anarchist account of 
human nature consists in, what its role is within anarchist theory, how it compares 
with connected ideas within the liberal tradition, and the educational implications of 
this account. 
In general, the focus here will be on the way the construct of human nature is put 
forth in order to support a particular idea. Bikhu Parekh has remarked that, although 
the concept of human nature 'is one of the oldest and most influential concepts in 
Western philosophy', (Parekh, 1997, p.16), there has been little agreement, 
throughout the history of philosophy, on what the term actually means. Parekh 
ultimately offers a defense of a minimalist definition of human nature, emphasizing 
not only the universal constants of human existence, but the 'ways in which they are 
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creatively interpreted and incorporated into the process of human self-articulation and 
self-understanding' (ibid, p.26). As such, his definition challenges the underlying 
assumption, common to all classic accounts of human nature, that there is a fairly 
clear distinction between nature and culture — between 'what is inherent in humans 
and what is created by them' (ibid, p. 17). I tend to agree with Parekh that the 
concept of human nature is inherently problematic, and that relying on it in 
philosophical discussions can have undesirable implications due to its tendency to 
assume an ahistorical position and to deny the cultural imbeddedness of human 
experience and character. However, what is important in the present context is the 
methodological role which the concept of human nature has played within 
philosophical positions. As Parekh notes, philosophers have used it to serve three 
purposes: 'to identify or demarcate human beings; to explain human behaviour; and 
to prescribe how human beings should live and conduct themselves'. It is the second 
and third purposes which are of central concern to us here. 
In the context of philosophy of education, Anthony O'Hear has articulated a view 
similar to that of Parekh in stating that 'human nature is not something that is just 
given. It is something we can make something of, in the light of how we conceive 
ourselves and others'. Given 0' Hear's understanding of philosophy of education as 
essentially involving a reflection on 'one's values and concept of what men (sic) 
ought to be' (O'Hear, 1981, p.1) and one's 'ideals for society as whole', it is thus 
clear that the notion of a common human nature can be a useful conceptual tool, in 
that emphasizing particular traits, virtues or potentialities as uniquely and essentially 
human often plays an important methodological role in philosophically evaluating 
particular normative positions on education. 
In anarchist theory, given that the central animating ideal is that of the free society, 
based on mutual cooperation, decentralization and self-government, the concept of a 
common human nature is employed in order to demonstrate the feasibility of this 
social ideal. However, contrary to the opinion of many critics, (see for example, 
May, 1994) the anarchists, in the same way as they did not believe that the future 
anarchist society would be free from all social conflict, did not in fact subscribe to a 
simplistic, naively optimistic view of human tendencies and characteristics. Nor, so I 
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shall argue, were they unaware of the philosophical complexities involved in the idea 
of a common human nature. 
Human Nature in Social Anarchist Theory 
In his detailed study of anarchist views on human nature, Morland (1997) notes that 
both Proudhon and Bakunin, two of the leading social anarchist theorists, 
acknowledged human nature to be innately two-fold, involving both an essentially 
egotistical potential and a sociable, or altruistic potential. As Bakunin picturesquely 
expressed this idea: 
Man has two opposed instincts; egoism and sociability. He is both 
more ferocious in his egoism than the most ferocious beasts and more 
sociable than the bees and ants. (Bakunin, 1927). 
A similar perspective arises from the work of Kropotkin, the anarchist theorist who, 
more than any other theorist within the tradition, devoted considerable energy to 
developing a systematic theory of human nature. Much of Kropotkin's work —
primarily his monumental treatise, Mutual Aid, which he wrote before becoming 
identified with the anarchist movement - can be interpreted as an attempt to counter 
the extreme version of social Darwinism often put forward (both in Kropotkin's own 
time and by contemporary theorists) as a justification of the capitalist system, 
elevating free competition amongst individuals to a positive virtue (see Hewetson, 
1965). Kropotkin was anxious to show that the simplistic notion of 'survival of the 
fittest' was a misleading interpretation of evolutionary theory, and that Darwin 
himself had noted man's social qualities as an essential factor in his evolutionary 
survival. As contemporary theorists have noted, 'for most of us, Darwinism suggests 
anything but communality and cooperativeness in nature' (Nisbet, 1976, p.364). Yet 
The Origin of Species is full of references to man's 'social nature', which, Darwin 
argues, has 'from the beginning prompted him to live in tightly-knit communities, 
with the individual's communal impulse often higher indeed than his purely self-
preservative instinct' and without which it is highly probable that 'the evolution of 
man, as we know it, would never have taken place'. (ibid). By ignoring this clear 
emphasis in Darwin's work, the position referred to as 'social Darwinism' amounts 
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to, as Nisbet notes, 'scarcely more than a celebration of the necessity of competition 
and conflict in the social sphere' (ibid). Accordingly, one can see the logic of trying 
to establish cooperation as a fundamental principle of nature in order to celebrate and 
promote the anarchist ideal of a society based on cooperation and communalism. 
Thus, with the help of a zoologist colleague, Kropotkin embarked on an extensive 
study of evolution and animal behaviour, with the aim of redressing this perceived 
imbalance in the interpretation of Darwinism. Although some critics have questioned 
aspects of Kropotkin's methodology, contemporary anthropological research seems to 
support his basic thesis that the principle of social cooperation has been a 
characteristic of human and other species since earliest times — predating, apparently, 
the primacy of the family unit. The paradigm case of the prominence of 'mutual aid' 
(a term derived from the biologist Karl Kessler — see Morland, 1997, p.132) as a 
factor in the evolution of animal species is that of ants. The important conclusion 
here is that while there may be aggressive fighting for survival between species, 
within the ant community, mutual aid and cooperation prevail. As Kropotkin puts it, 
`The ants and termites have renounced the "Hobbesian war", and they are the better 
for it' (Kropotkin, 1987, p. 30). Thus, although Kropotkin does not deny the principle 
of the struggle for existence as a law of nature, he ultimately regards the principle of 
mutual aid as more important from an evolutionary point of view, as it is this 
principle which 'favours the development of such habits and characters as insure the 
maintenance and further development of the species, together with the greatest 
amount of welfare and enjoyment of life for the individual, with the least waste of 
energy' (Kropotkin, 1987, p. 24). As Morland sums up Kropotkin's conclusions from 
the wealth of evidence collected from observations of the animal world : Tut quite 
simply, life in societies ensures survival'. (Morland, 1997, p. 135). 
Of course, philosophically speaking, it is highly problematic to attempt to draw 
conclusions for human behaviour from evidence from the animal kingdom. However 
Darwin himself, whose methods Kropotkin obviously sought to emulate, argued that 
`what is so often to be found among animals is [... ] utterly universal among human 
beings' (Nisbet, 1976, p. 368). Furthermore, Kropotkin assembled a wealth of 
evidence, which he often cited later in his various anarchist writings, of the presence 
of a propensity for spontaneous cooperation and mutual aid within human society. 
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Indeed, anarchist writers today are fond of referring to cases such as that of the life-
guard association, the European railway system, or the international postal service, as 
instances of mutual aid and voluntary cooperation in action. Even given the 
limitations of such examples, it seems that the point Kropotkin is making is a purely 
methodological one: if one wants to argue for the feasibility of an anarchist society, it 
is sufficient to indicate that the propensity for voluntary cooperation has some 
historical and evolutionary evidence in order to render such a society not completely 
unfeasible. Furthermore, as Barclay points out, 
Some criticise anarchism because its only cement is something of 
the order of moral obligation or voluntary co-operation. But 
democracy, too, ultimately works in part because of the same 
cement. (Barclay, 1990, p. 130) 
I shall discuss, below, the question of the extent to which Kropotkin and other 
anarchist theorists relied on this 'cement' as the principal force in shaping and 
maintaining anarchist society, and to what extent they acknowledged the need for 
institutional frameworks and social reform. 
The question remains as to whether Kropotkin saw the principle of mutual aid as 
simply an essential aspect of human nature. Morland suggests that, through the 
evolutionary process, mutual aid has indeed become a kind of 'psychological drive', 
basic to our consciousness of ourselves as social beings. But DeHaan (1965) has 
argued that while Kropotkin's theory can be described as an 'instinct theory', the 
`tendencies' he mentions do not have ontological status, but rather should be regarded 
as a hypothesis. 'Natural laws', he argues, 'are not imbedded in reality; they are 
human constructs to help us understand nature.' (DeHaan, 1965, p. 276). It is 
important to bear this in mind when discussing the next step in Kropotkin's thesis, 
which is the argument that mutual aid is the basis for morality, and that without it, 
`human society itself could not be maintained'. As Morland notes, it is only through 
the medium of consciousness that the propensity for mutual aid can surface and 
flourish — a view which clearly contradicts the Rousseauian notion of a pre-social 
human nature, to which Kroptokin was vehemently opposed. 
	 Indeed, in 
acknowledging human nature to be essentially contextualist, in the sense that they 
regarded it as determined not by any human essence, but by social and cultural 
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context, Kropotkin and other theorists seemed to be aware of the pitfalls of assuming 
what Parekh refers to as the dichotomy between culture and nature. In this sense, 
they were indeed far from Rousseau's romanticization of the 'state of nature' and 
indictment of modern civilization. Bakunin's view of human nature was also, as 
both Morland and Ritter note, a contextualist one, in that it rejected essentialistic 
notions of human nature and assumed humans to be at the same time individuals and 
social beings. Which of these two strands of human nature comes to the fore at any 
given time is, they believed, dependent on the social and cultural environment. 
Bakunin puts forth this view as part of his famous critique of the state, implying at the 
same time an outright rejection of the religious notion of original sin, the Rousseauian 
view of pre-social human nature, and the idea of the social contract: 
...Failing to understand the sociability of human nature, 
metaphysics regarded society as a mechanical and purely artificial 
aggregate of individuals, abruptly brought together under the 
blessing of some formal and secret treaty, concluded either freely or 
under the influence of some superior power. Before entering into 
society, these individuals, endowed with some sort of immortal soul, 
enjoyed total freedom... 
(Bakunin, in Woodcock, 1977, p.83) 
Accepting the theoretical assumption that man is born free implies an antithesis 
between the free individual and society - a position which, Bakunin argues, 'utterly 
ignores human society, the real starting point of all human civilization and the only 
medium in which the personality and liberty of man can really be born and grow' 
(Bakunin, in Morris, 1993, pp. 87-88). 
In light of the above analysis, it appears that theorists who argue, with Tony Kemp-
Welch, that the origins of anarchist thought 'can be traced to Rousseau's idea of man 
being born free, and that political institutions have corrupted an otherwise innocent 
and pure human nature' (Kemp-Welch, 1996, p. 26) are clearly mistaken and are 
thereby contributing to the misconceptions surrounding anarchism. 
Human Nature and the Capitalist State 
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The anarchist position, then, does not involve a simple, naive view of human nature 
as essentially altruistic. Kropotkin especially acknowledged, with Darwin, the 
presence of a drive for domination, and the theme constantly running through his 
thought is a dialectic conception of the tension between the principle of the struggle 
for existence and that of mutual aid. Unlike Proudhon and Fourier, whose economic 
theories clearly influenced him, Kropotkin attempts to place his anarchist ideas in a 
broader historical context. He writes: 
All through the history of our civilization two contrary traditions, 
two trends have faced one another; the Roman tradition and the 
national tradition; the imperial and the federal; the authoritarian and 
the libertarian... (quoted in Ward, 1991, p. 85). 
He goes on to identify the state with the coercive, authoritarian tradition, the 
antithesis of which is the kind of voluntary forms of social organization such as 
guilds, workers cooperatives and parishes. Martin Buber, who had considerable 
sympathy for the social philosophy of anarchist thinkers such as Kropotkin and 
Proudhon, developed this implicit distinction between the social and political order, 
believing that the way forward lay in a gradual restructuring of the relationship 
between them (see Chapter Eight). Of course, as Buber acknowledged, Kropotkin's 
conception of the state is too narrow, for 'in history there is not merely the State as a 
clamp that strangles the individuality of small associations; there is also the State as a 
framework within which they may consolidate' (Buber, 1958, p. 39). Given modern 
conceptions such as Nozick's of the minimal, liberal democratic state, the narrowness 
of Kropotkin's definition is even more glaring. Yet, as Buber goes on to argue, 
Kropotkin was right to draw attention to the fact that the historical rise of the 
centralist state signaled a fundamental change in our conception of the nature of 
social relations — the idea of the sovereign state displacing the primacy of the idea of 
the free city or various forms of free contract and confederacy. Buber himself 
remained optimistic as to the possibility of 'a socialist rebuilding of the state as a 
community of communities' (ibid, p. 40), but Kropotkin saw the principle of 
decentralization and voluntary association as fundamental to revolutionary change, 
and any state structure as necessarily antithetical to this principle. 
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Kropotkin's talk of these two contrary historical 'tendencies' is intertwined with his 
talk of the two aspects of human nature, reflecting what Morland describes as a 
`symbiotic relationship' between historical progress and human nature. Yet although, 
as mentioned, the position of Bakunin and Kropotkin on this issue is a contextualist 
one, this does not mean to say that such theorists took a neutral stance towards the 
two opposed aspects of human nature and the way in which they are manifested in a 
social context. As an examination of his arguments shows, Kropotkin assigned 
normative status to the altruistic strand of human nature, and seemed to regard it as in 
some sense dominant. In a particularly powerful piece written for Freedom in 1888, 
entitled 'Are We Good Enough?' Kropotkin sets out to counter the argument often 
made that 'men are not good enough to live under a communist state of things' — or, 
rather, 'they would not submit to a compulsory Communism, but they are not yet ripe 
for free, Anarchistic Communism' (Kropotkin, in Becker and Walter, 1988). To this 
he answers with the question 'but are they good enough for Capitalism?'. His 
argument is that if people were naturally and predominantly kind, altruistic and just, 
there would be no danger of exploitation and oppression. It is precisely because we 
are not so compassionate, just and provident that the present system is intolerable and 
must be changed, for the present institutions allow 'slavishness' and oppression to 
flourish. Obviously, the point is not that people do not have a natural, instinctive 
propensity for justice, altruism and social cooperation, but rather that they do not only 
have such propensities. If not for the opposing, egotistical streak of human nature, 
... the private ownership of capital would be no danger. 
The capitalist would hasten to share his profits with the 
workers, and the best-remunerated workers with those 
suffering from occasional causes. If men were provident 
they would not produce velvet and articles of luxury while 
food is wanted in cottages; they would not build palaces as 
long as there are slums [... ] (Kropotkin, ibid). 
The only way to suppress, or at least diminish, the 'slavish' and competitive instincts 
we are unfortunately endowed with is to change society by means of what Kropotkin 
refers to as 'higher instruction and equality of conditions', thereby eliminating those 
conditions which 'favour the growth of egotism and rapacity, of slavishness and 
ambition' (a state of affairs which, Kropotkin emphasizes, is damaging both to the 
rulers and the ruled). The principal difference, Kropotkin argues in this text, between 
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the anarchists and those who dismiss them as unpractical, utopian dreamers, is that 
`we admit the imperfections of human nature, but we make no exception for the 
rulers. They make it, although sometimes unconsciously...' (ibid). It is this view, 
according to Kropotkin, which is behind the paternalistic justification of the inbuilt 
inequalities of the capitalist state system — i.e. that, if not for a few wise rulers 
keeping them in check, the masses would allow their base, egotistical instincts to get 
out of control, leading to social and moral depravity. It is in this context that one can 
begin to understand the crucial and complex role of education in Kropotkin's thought. 
Nurturing the Propensity for Mutual Aid 
So we see that Kropotkin believes ultimately in the power of the altruistic aspects of 
human nature to prevail. He contends, unlike Rousseau, that even a corrupt society 
cannot crush individual human goodness - that is, even the capitalist state cannot 
`weed out the feeling of human solidarity, deeply lodged in men's understanding and 
heart' (in Becker and Walter, 1988, p.138). Nevertheless, he acknowledges that 
people 'will not turn into anarchists by sudden transformation'. 
	 Thus the 
contextualist account of human nature can go a long way towards answering the 
question of why education, and schools, are necessary both to help bring about and to 
sustain an anarchist society. 
An analysis of Bakunin's work on the subject supports this view, for Bakunin too 
ascribed to a contextualist view of human nature, claiming that morality derived from 
society - and specifically, from education. 'Every child, youth, adult, and even the 
most mature man,' argued Bakunin, 'is wholly the product of the environment that 
nourished and raised him' (Maximoff, 1953, p. 153). Thus, although there are two 
innate sides to human nature, the way in which different propensities develop is a 
function of environmental conditions. This is a key point in grasping the role 
assigned to education by the social anarchists, both in bringing about and in 
maintaining a just society organized on anarchist principles. For even if the social 
revolution is successful, given the contextualist notion of human nature and the 
acknowledgment of its inherent duality, presumably an ongoing process of moral 
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education will be necessary in order to preserve the values on which the anarchist 
society is constituted. 
This point, albeit alongside an undeniable optimism with respect to the educative 
power of the revolutionary society itself in terms of suppressing the selfish aspects of 
human nature, is evident in the following passage from Bakunin: 
There will probably be very little brigandage and robbery in a 
society where each lives in full freedom to enjoy the fruits of his 
labour and where almost all his needs will be abundantly fulfilled. 
Material well-being, as well as the intellectual and moral progress 
which are the products of a truly humane education, available to 
all, will almost eliminate crimes due to perversion, brutality, and 
other infirmities. (Bakunin, in Dolgoff, 1973, p. 371). 
The phrase 'humane education' presumably refers both to procedural aspects of 
education, such as school climate and teacher-student relationships, which anarchists 
insisted should be non-authoritarian and based on mutual respect, as well as to the 
content of education, specifically its moral basis. Both of these aspects will be taken 
up in later chapters. It is interesting, too, to note Bakunin's demand for equal, 
universal educational access - a demand which must have sounded far more radical 
in the nineteenth century context in which these words were written than it does to 
contemporary liberal theorists. 
The social anarchists, then, clearly believed that an education which systematically 
promoted and emphasized cooperation, solidarity and mutual aid, thus undermining 
the values underlying the capitalist state, would both encourage the flourishing of 
these innate human propensities, and inspire people to form social alliances and 
movements aimed at furthering the social revolution. Indeed, Kropotkin often echoes 
(or rather anticipates) the ideas expressed by Berkman and other twentieth century 
anarchists concerning the 'here and now' aspect of anarchist philosophy; in other 
words, that it is by establishing new human values and social relationships (e.g. 
educational relationships) that the true social revolution can be achieved. At the same 
time, Kropotkin's underlying view of human nature also helps to emphasize the 
essentially educative function of the anarchist society, even once the state has been 
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dismantled. For given the inevitable presence of slavish and selfish instincts, the 
opposing instincts need constant reinforcement. Kroptkin sometimes seems to 
suggest that it is social institutions themselves which will do this job — creating 
conditions of social equality and justice under which mutual aid would flourish. But, 
as Morland notes, he did acknowledge that 'egoism and self-assertion survive in 
anarchy as sociability and mutual aid endures in capitalism' (Morland, 1997, p. 170). 
Morland and other critics seem ultimately to regard this point as the downfall of 
Kropotkin's whole philosophical system, arguing that it leads to the inevitable use of 
coercion to maintain the future anarcho-communist society. However, I believe that 
the fact that this question arises, and the disagreements concerning it, do not detract 
from the force of the basic anarchist argument. I shall discuss below the ways in 
which various anarchist thinkers have attempted to come to terms with the problem of 
the inevitable presence of competition, dominance, struggles for power and conflicts 
of interest in the future anarchist society. In this context, meanwhile, there seems to 
be a fairly good case for arguing, on the basis of Kropotkin's work, that it is 
education, and not social and moral sanctions and rules as such, which would 
`provide the glue' to hold the future anarchist society together — reinforcing the moral 
arguments for anarchism, and simultaneously nurturing altruistic and cooperative 
qualities amongst individuals. Of course one could counter to this that education, 
conceived in this way, is merely another form of coercion, and that we are left with 
something very similar to the classic view of education as cultural transmission. I 
will deal with this point below, in the context of the discussion of education as a 
means to social change. 
In light of the above discussion, it is important not to attach too much importance to 
the validity of the evolutionary aspects of the anarchist account of human nature. 
What is relevant, in the present context, is the methodological role which this account 
plays in emphasizing certain human traits deemed desirable and feasible for the 
transition to and maintenance of a non-hierarchical, decentralized form of social 
organization. In fact, many anarchist theorists, writing from an anthropological 
perspective, have tried to defend the feasibility of such a society without recourse to 
an essentialistic view of human nature. Harold Barclay, for example, in People 
Without Government, discusses a wealth of historical anthropological and 
ethnographic data, which, he argues, demonstrates that anarchies — defined as 
governmentless, stateless societies — are possible, albeit on a small scale, and, indeed, 
that from a historical point of view, 
anarchy is by no means unusual[... ]it is a perfectly common form of 
polity or political organization. Not only is it common, but it is 
probably the oldest type of polity and one which has characterized 
most of human history (Barclay, 1990, p.12). 
Colin Ward, the contemporary British anarchist, draws similar conclusions from his 
analysis of contemporary experiments in non-hierarchical social organization. The 
most famous example of such anarchist practice in action is that of the Paris 
Commune of 1871. But Ward also discusses small-scale social experiments -
notably in the areas of education and health care — which support the idea of 
spontaneous organization based on voluntary cooperation. He quotes John 
Comerford, one of the initiators of the Pioneer Health Centre project in Peckam, 
South London, in the 1940's, as concluding that: 
A society, therefore, if left to itself in suitable circumstances to 
express itself spontaneously works out its own salvation and 
achieves a harmony of actions which superimposed leadership 
cannot emulate (in Ward, 1996, p. 33). 
Thus the emphasis on the benevolent potential of human nature goes hand in hand 
with a faith in what Kropotkin called the theory of 'spontaneous order' — which holds 
that 
Given a common need, a collection of people will, by trial and error, 
by improvisation and experiment, evolve order out of the situation —
this order being more durable and more closely related to their needs 
than any kind of externally imposed authority could provide. (Ward, 
1996, p.32) 
The Ideal of Rationality 
Of course, such theoretical positions and principles have to be understood against the 
historical background of the time in which the social anarchists were developing their 
50 
ideas. As is apparent from this overview, this era was, as noted by DeHaan, 'one of 
boundless optimism, the exaltation of science, atheism and rationalism.' (DeHaan, 
1965, p.272). 
Accordingly, the anarchist view of human nature, alongside its emphasis on the 
human capacity for benevolence, cooperation and mutual aid, places great weight on 
the idea of rationality. Indeed this idea is one of the central features of the work of 
William Godwin, commonly regarded as the first anarchist theorist. Godwin, perhaps 
more than any other anarchist thinker, seems to have placed great faith in the human 
potential for rational thinking, believing that it was due to this potential that humans 
could be convinced, by means of rational argument alone, of the ultimate worth of 
anarchism as a superior form of social organization. Ritter has criticized Godwin's 
position as an extreme version of cognitivism (Ritter, 1980, p.92) and in fact later 
anarchists, especially of the socialist school, who were not, like Godwin, utilitarian 
thinkers, were far less dogmatic in their position on human reason, often 
acknowledging the role of emotion in human choice and action. Bakunin, for 
example, would probably have questioned Godwin's argument that 'the mind of men 
cannot choose falsehood and reject the truth when evidence is fairly presented' (in 
Ritter, 1980, p. 95). Nevertheless, as a nineteenth century movement, social anarchist 
thought shared the Enlightenment enthusiasm for scientific method, and the belief in 
`the possibilities for moral and political progress through the growth of knowledge' 
(Crowder, 1991, p. 29). Thus Bakunin, like most anarchists, whether of the 
individualist or communist school, believed that it was through the powers of reason 
that humans could advance to higher, more advanced states of morality and social 
organization. 	 Although Morland argues that Bakunin ultimately rejected 
philosophical idealism in favour of a materialist position, other scholars question this 
view. Miller, for example, argues on the basis of Bakunin's writings that, in the final 
reckoning, he remained a Hegelian idealist in the sense that his view of historical 
progress involved a notion of human consciousness progressing through successive 
stages, each resolving the tensions and contradictions of the previous stages. Human 
history, accordingly, is seen as a process of emergence from 'brutish' conditions and 
progress, through the influence of social relations, to becoming more fully moral 
beings (Miller, 1984, pp. 70-71). Freedom, according to this conception, is a positive 
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concept, involving acting in accordance with laws which one has internalized by 
means of the power of reason. 
Accordingly, many early anarchist experiments in education assigned the concept of 
reason or rationality a central place in their programmes and curricula, and the 
international organization set up by Francisco Ferrer, an early twentieth century 
anarchist educator (see Chapter Six) to coordinate such projects was called 'The 
Society for Rational Education'. 
In their use of the term 'rational', early anarchist thinkers clearly had in mind 
something akin to 'scientific', in the sense of according with the laws of logic, 
empirical observation and deduction. 
It is important to note that Bakunin, with his emphasis on human reason and 
rationality as central to moral progress, makes frequent mention of the 'ignorance of 
the masses'. Yet, as Ritter points out, the anarchist view is nevertheless not an elitist 
one. Anarchists, wary of any political programme which attempted to manipulate the 
masses so as to achieve social change, stressed the essential aspect of spontaneous, 
free choice and experimentation in achieving social progress. Like Godwin, later 
anarchists saw this process of rational education as one 'through which rational 
individuals chose anarchism as the regime they create' (Godwin, quoted in Ritter, 
1980, p. 96). 
From an educational point of view, this position has obvious associations with the 
humanistic, liberal concept of education, according to which the key to a freer society 
is an overall increase in education based on the principles of reason and rationality. 
This, perhaps, reflects a connection between the educational perspective of 
anarchism, as a political ideology, and the liberal, enlightenment tradition which 
underpins the idea of liberal education. 
As mentioned above, most philosophers writing within the liberal education tradition 
place great emphasis on rationality and on the development of the mind as being an 
essential component of the good life (see Hirst, 1972). Likewise, most theorists of 
liberal education assume a form of epistemological realism — a view that, as Hirst 
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puts it, 'education is based on what is true'. These points have obvious connections 
with the Enlightenment belief in progress and human betterment through expanding 
knowledge and rationality — a belief which, as we have just seen, was shared by 
nineteenth century anarchist thinkers. 
Human Nature in Liberalism 
To what extent can the anarchist view of human nature be seen as overlapping with 
the liberal position? Although few contemporary theorists employ the term 'human 
nature', it is nevertheless obvious that liberal theory makes certain assumptions about 
human capabilities or propensities. The question 'what characteristics of the 
individual does the liberal state see as important and worthy of encouragement?' 
(Levinson, 1999, p. 9) is, in an important sense, a question about human nature. 
Anarchist theorists, as discussed above, choose to emphasize the human potential for 
benevolence, sociability and voluntary cooperation, arguing that these virtues are 
important and worthy of encouragement, and that they are most appropriately fostered 
in a stateless, non-hierarchical society. Can liberalism be seen to rely on a similar 
methodological emphasis of particular human traits? 
It is certainly true that in assigning a central position to autonomy, liberals must be 
assuming at the very least a human potential for benevolence, for if such a potential 
did not exist at all, institutions far more coercive than those of the liberal state would 
be needed to guarantee individual freedoms. Although it is difficult to find any 
systematic treatment of this idea, it would seem to be backed up in the literature. 
Leroy S. Rouer, for example, in his book on human nature, has noted that the 
`positive view of human nature' — that is, the idea that humans have an inherent 
capacity for goodness — 'is deep-seated within the liberal tradition with which most of 
us identify ourselves' (Rouner, 1997). Ritter, too, has noted this convergence 
between the liberal and the anarchist view, but he goes further, claiming that the 
liberal outlook is, like that of the anarchists, essentially dualistic, involving a rejection 
of the idea that 'malevolence is always dominant everywhere' and at the same time 
denying that benevolence is the universally dominant motive (Ritter, 1980, p. 118). 
The contextualist view of human nature to which Proudhon, Bakunin and Kropotkin 
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subscribed is, as Ritter puts it, 'clearly within the boundaries of liberal psychology' 
(ibid). 
This discussion of human nature addresses one of the main objections to anarchism 
which I raised in Chapter Two. It thus establishes that to characterize the anarchist 
view on human nature as holding simply that 'people are benign by nature and 
corrupted by government' (Scruton, 1982, p.16) is misleadingly simplistic. 
Accordingly, it shows that while many liberals may be skeptical about anarchism's 
viability, this skepticism cannot be justified on the basis of the claim that the anarchist 
view of human nature is 'utopian' or 'naïve'. 
Nevertheless, one may still feel some cause for skepticism with regard to anarchism's 
feasibility. For, it could be argued, while life without the state may be theoretically 
possible, if we accept something like the above account of human nature, it is still 
dubious whether we could actually achieve and sustain it. What, in short, is to 
replace the state, and what, in the absence of state institutions, is to provide the 'glue' 
to hold such a society together? Addressing these questions means unpacking the 
anarchist objection to the state to see just what it consists in, and trying to ascertain 
what substantive values lie at the heart of the anarchist position, and what role they 
play in the anarchist position on social change and organization. In the course of this 
discussion we will also be able to develop a further understanding of the relationship 
between anarchism and liberalism, and of the nature and role of education in anarchist 
thought. 
54 
Chapter Four 
Which Values? Which State? 
The preceding analysis of the anarchist view of human nature has, I hope, established 
that the anarchist understanding of human nature is not, as often perceived, one-
dimentional or naïve, an impression responsible for much liberal skepticism regarding 
anarchism's viability. 
The fact that the anarchist account of human nature is actually a complex, anti-
essentialist one, rescues anarchism, in my view, from charges of utopianism, at least 
as far is this point is concerned. It also goes some way towards an understanding of 
the role assigned to education in anarchist thought. For the fact that anarchists 
acknowledged human nature to be essentially two-fold and subject to contextual 
influence, explains why they saw a crucial role for education — and specifically moral 
education — to foster the benevolent aspects of human nature and so create and sustain 
stateless societies. This is one obvious implication of the contextualist view of human 
nature discussed above. 
So anarchists are under no illusions about the continual, potentially harmful, presence 
of selfish and competitive aspects of human behaviour and attitudes. This both 
explains the need for an ongoing educational process of some kind, and indicates that 
simply doing away with the state will not suffice to create a new social order. Indeed, 
as Ritter notes, 
Anarchists show an appreciation, with which they are too seldom 
credited, for the insufficiency of statelessness as a setting for their 
system. Statelessness must in their view, be preceded and accompanied 
by conditions which combat the numerous causes of anarchy's internal 
friction that statelessness cannot defeat alone (Ritter, 1980, p.138). 
Education, it seems, is acknowledged by most of the social anarchists to be at least 
one of the major facilitators of such 'conditions'. 
Yet discussion of these issues also leads to more general conclusions regarding 
education. In general, the anarchist view can be seen to be in contrast with the 
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Marxist view, according to which humans attain their true essence in the post-
revolutionary stage. For if one combines the above insights of anarchism regarding 
human nature with the anarchist insistence, discussed in Chapter One, that the final 
form of human society cannot be determined in advance, it seems as if this very 
perspective yields a far more open-ended, creative image of education and its role in 
social change. On the Marxist view, education is seen as primarily the means by 
which the proletarian vanguard is to be educated to true (class) consciousness. Once 
the revolution is over, it seems, there will be no role for education, for, as Lukacs 
writes, scientific socialism will then be established 'in a complete and definite form, 
then we shall see a fundamental transformation of the nature of man'(in Read, 1974, 
p. 150). Anarchism, as discussed, differs from this view in maintaining, firstly, that 
the seeds of the stateless society are already present in human action, made possible 
by existing human moral qualities; and, secondly, that due to the contextualist view of 
human nature and the insistence that there is no one, scientifically correct, form of 
social organization, education is, and must be, constantly ongoing. Education, on 
this understanding, is aimed not at bringing about a fixed end-point, but at 
maintaining an ongoing process of creative experimentation, in keeping with moral 
values and principles, and in which, as Read says, 'the onus is on man to create the 
conditions of freedom' (Read, 1974, p. 146). This point will be taken up again in later 
chapters. 
These points, in turn, lead one to question the exact nature of the anarchists' objection 
to the state. As discussed above, anarchism cannot be reduced to a simple rejection of 
the state. Furthermore, if, as this discussion suggests, the anarchist objection to the 
state is an instrumental one, which cannot be understood without reference to a set of 
substantive values, the question must then be asked: what exactly are these values and 
to what extent are they conceived differently from, for example, those of the liberal 
tradition? 
As the preceding chapter suggests, the anarchist position on human nature, both in its 
emphasis on human rationality and in its contextualist perspective, is remarkably 
close to the underlying assumptions of liberalism, reflecting the common 
Enlightenment spirit of both these ideological movements. This sheds an interesting 
light on the apparent disparity between anarchists and liberals as to the ideal mode of 
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social organization, and prompts the question as to what, then, accounts for this 
disparity, if their assumptions about human potential are so similar. Alan Ritter 
brings out these political distinctions very well: 
The agreement between anarchists and liberals in psychology makes 
the main problem of their politics the same. By denying that 
malevolence is ineradicable, both rule out autocracy as a mode of 
organization. For only if viciousness must be widespread and 
rampant is autocracy needed to safeguard peace. By denying the 
possibility of universal benevolence, they also rule out as unworkable 
modes of organization which exert no cohesive force. For only if 
kindness is the overriding motive, can an utterly spontaneous society 
exist. Thus the problem of politics, for anarchists and liberals alike, is 
to describe a pattern of social relations that, without being autocratic, 
provides the required cohesive force. (Ritter, 1980, p. 120). 
The liberal solution to this problem is, of course, to accept the framework of the 
coercive state, but to limit its power so as to guarantee maximum protection of 
individual liberty. The anarchists reject the state outright as a framework inconsistent 
with their conception of human flourishing, part of which involves a notion of 
individual freedom; nevertheless, they have to rely on a certain amount of public 
censure to ensure the cohesive force and survival of society. As Ritter points out, it is 
because anarchists 'affirm the worth of communal understanding' that they can, 
unlike liberals, regard such censure as having a relatively benign effect on 
individuality. 
However, this point is not as simple as Ritter suggests. For it is true that, for a person 
engaged in the communal project of building a social anarchist society, out of a 
commitment to the values of equality, solidarity and freedom from state control of 
social institutions, accepting a certain degree of restriction on individual freedom —
for example, a demand to share one's income with the community or to take on 
responsibilities connected with public services such as rubbish-collecting or child-
minding — may not be perceived as a great sacrifice. But if life in anarchist 
communities without the state becomes a reality, it is quite possible that individuals 
born into such communities may come to perceive such apparent external restraints, 
which they have not in any way chosen or instituted themselves, as an unacceptable 
imposition. 
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This problem, it seems, is at the crux of the mainstream liberal skepticism regarding 
the feasibility of maintaining an anarchist society. One response to it, of course, is to 
argue that it is precisely because of their awareness of this tension that anarchists 
assigned such a central place to education. In order for a social anarchist society to 
work, in other words, education - both formal and informal - would have to continue 
to promote and support the values on which the society was founded. Furthermore, 
because of the anarchist view of human nature, according to which stateless, social 
anarchist communities would not need to change human nature but merely to draw 
out moral qualities and tendencies already present, this view escapes charges of 
`character moulding' or coercion by means of education — processes which are 
inimical to the anarchist position. 
Another response, however, is to argue that once stateless, decentralized anarchist 
communities have been established on a federalized basis and social practices and 
institutions have been set up to meet the needs of such communities, such institutions, 
and the communities themselves, being qualitatively different from those of the state, 
will have an important educative function. Some contemporary anarchists, such as 
Illich,l have indeed taken this position, yet most of the early social anarchists, as 
discussed above, and as will be explored in the following chapters, explicitly 
acknowledged the need for a formal education system of some kind after the 
revolutionary period. 
There is considerable confusion in the anarchist literature surrounding this point —
confusion which I believe is largely a result of the failure of anarchist theorists to 
distinguish between life within the state and life beyond the state. This issue is 
explored further in the course of the following discussion. 
Autonomy in Anarchism and Liberalism 
Illich, given his concern with poverty and social justice and his arguments for the need to decrease 
the dependency of individuals on corporate and state institutions, is in many ways a part of the social 
anarchist tradition. However, his focus, in addressing chiefly the institutional effects of the modern 
state, is somewhat narrow and leads to an emphasis on individual autonomy rather than an ideal of 
forms of communality, suggesting possible theoretical tensions with the social anarchist position. In 
order to fully address these tensions, Illich should ideally be discussed as an independent thinker. 
However, the complexity of his thought renders such a task beyond the scope of this thesis. 
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A great deal of criticism of the anarchist position hinges on the claim that there is an 
internal inconsistency in the belief that one can sustain a stateless society 
characterized by solidarity, social equality and mutual aid and at the same time 
preserve individual autonomy. In order to understand more fully the anarchist 
response to this criticism, it is important to examine the role assigned to autonomy 
and individual freedom within anarchist thought. Furthermore, a discussion of these 
notions is an essential aspect of the analysis of the anarchist position on education, 
particularly in the context of liberal education, where autonomy plays a central role. 
As mentioned above, most liberal theorists on education cite autonomy as a, if not 
the, central value in education. Indeed, as Carr and Hartnett put it (1996, p. 47), 'in 
many ways, the mobilizing principle behind most theoretical justifications for liberal 
education has been a commitment to the aims and values of "rational autonomy'. 
Some writers in this tradition, like Meira Levinson, specifically link the value of 
autonomy to the goal of sustaining the liberal state. Patricia White, while not 
specifically focusing on the educational implications of liberalism as a political 
doctrine, makes a similar point when she argues that the rationale for our current 
political arrangements (i.e. those of the democratic, liberal state) is 'to provide a 
context in which morally autonomous people can live' (White, 1983, p. 140) and that 
therefore 'educational arrangements must provide the conditions for the development 
and flourishing of autonomous persons' (ibid). Other theorists — most notably Peters 
and Hirst — refer to a supposedly neutral, analytical account of education defined as 
initiation into worthwhile activities, or development of the mind. Yet even in this 
second case, it is liberal values which underly the account. Furthermore, in both 
cases, these theorists usually assume something like a Kantian account of autonomy. 
R.S. Peters, in summing up the notion of autonomy in the context of his discussion on 
education, notes two main factors as central to the Kantian conception of autonomy: 
1. The idea of adopting a 'code or way of life that is one's own as distinct from one 
dictated by others' - this can be understood as the condition of authenticity; 
2. Rational reflection on rules in light of universal principles 
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Another way of grasping this view of autonomy is by means of the idea of the self-
legislating person. This notion, which is central to the Kantian view, is, likewise, 
connected to the idea of the human capacity for reason. Wolff (1970) links this 
account with the similarly Kantian idea of moral responsibility, arguing that 'every 
man who possesses free will and reason has an obligation to take responsibility for 
his actions' (Wolff, p.13), and that it is only the person who acts in this way that can 
be described as an autonomous person. (ibid). 
Peters comments that the idea of autonomy as involving acting in accordance with a 
code which one has adopted as a result of rational reflection on intrinsic 
considerations (as opposed to rewards, punishments, etc) implies that the individual 
be 'sensitive to considerations which are to act as principles to back rules' (Peters, p. 
23) and to regard these considerations as reasons for doing things. Peters leaves the 
question as to how children acquire such sensitivity open, but it is worth noting that 
the original Kantian formulation is even stronger in its emphasis on this idea, 
insisting that for an action to be fully autonomous, it must be done for duty's sake, 
and not from inclination or from any empirical motive such as fear (see Ritter, 1980, 
p. 114). 
Yet even if one accepts the arguments of Levinson and others who identify autonomy 
as a necessary condition for maintaining the liberal state and, therefore, the 
development of autonomy as a central component of liberal education, it does not of 
course follow that the liberal state is the only, or even the best, framework in which to 
realize and promote the value of personal autonomy. 
As suggested here, autonomy can be defended as a value in and of itself, for example 
within a Kantian framework of morality. From an educational perspective, then, the 
question becomes whether, given the value of autonomy (along with other liberal 
ideas), one can in fact support a radically different idea of education and schooling —
one more compatible for example, with the anarchist idea. From a political point of 
view, the anarchist commentator Paul Wolff has argued that, if one takes the value of 
autonomy seriously, 'there can be no resolution of the conflict between the autonomy 
of the individual and the putative authority of the state' and that therefore 'anarchism 
is the only political doctrine consistent with the virtue of autonomy'. (ibid) I shall 
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look at Wolff's argument in greater detail below, but in the present context, it is 
worth noting that if one accepts it, one can then go on to challenge the analogous 
assumption that liberal education, conceived as universal, compulsory education by 
and in a liberal state, is the best educational framework in which to pursue and 
promote the central liberal value of autonomy. 
The question which concerns us in this context is whether the understanding of 
autonomy, and the role assigned to it, within anarchist thought, is similar to that 
within the liberal tradition, and what bearing this has on the anarchist position on 
education. 
There is no doubt that anarchist theorists in the tradition which we have been 
considering here, while not perhaps providing a systematic account of the notion of 
autonomy, nevertheless ascribed to something very like the liberal idea of autonomy 
understood, roughly, as the ability to make and implement choices on the basis of 
rational deliberation. Indeed, one commentator has argued that for many anarchists, 
freedom is conceived of as moral autonomy (De George, 1978, p. 92). 
Of all the anarchist theorists to write on the subject, it is Godwin whose account of 
freedom and autonomy most obviously resembles the liberal, Kantian account 
outlined above. For Godwin, the free person is not simply one whose actions are not 
constrained by external forces, but one who, prior to acting, 'consults his own reason, 
draws his own conclusions and exercises the powers of his understanding' (Godwin, 
in Ritter, 1980, p. 11). Furthermore, this formulation presupposes a faith in the 
human capacity for rationality, which was basic to Godwin's position. As Ritter 
points out, it follows, from this and similar accounts by other anarchist thinkers, that 
the only acceptable restraints on individual liberty are those which are the result of 
rational deliberation. 
Other, later anarchist thinkers also seem often to be subscribing to something like the 
liberal notion of autonomy in their discussions of freedom. Stanley Benn's account 
of the autonomous person as someone who does not simply accept 'the roles society 
thrusts on him, uncritically internalizing the received mores, but is committed to a 
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critical and creative search for coherence' (Benn, 1975, p. 109) seems to be in 
keeping with views expressed by anarchist thinkers such as Bakunin, who states: 
Freedom is the absolute right of every human being to seek no other 
sanction for his actions but his own conscience, to determine these 
actions solely by his own will, and consequently to owe his first 
responsibility to himself alone (in Guerin, 1970, p.31). 
Yet, as Guerin notes, Bakunin held that this individual freedom could be fully 
realized 'only by complementing it through all the individuals around him, and only 
through work and the collective force of society' (ibid). Although insisting that 
membership in society or any of its associations is voluntary, Bakunin was convinced 
that people would chose freely to belong to a society that was organized on the basis 
of equality and social justice. 
So although autonomy is clearly a value within anarchist thought, it would be 
misleading to imply, as De George does, that the anarchist understanding of freedom 
- especially for the social anarchists - can be reduced to something like the liberal 
notion of individual autonomy. Crucially, most of these thinkers tried to develop an 
account of freedom as bound up with a notion of social justice, in the sense that the 
notion of individual freedom which they defended only made sense in the context of 
an account of political and social freedom. This position is particularly evident in the 
work of Bakunin, who argued: 
I can feel free only in the presence of and in relationship with 
other men. In the presence of an inferior species of animal I am 
neither free nor a man, because this animal is incapable of 
conceiving and consequently of recognizing my humanity. I am 
not myself free or human until or unless I recognize the freedom 
and humanity of all my fellow men. 
(Bakunin, in Dolgoff, 1973, p 76). 
Bakunin here seems to be making an anti-metaphysical point about freedom, focusing 
on the subjective experience of individual freedom rather than suggesting any 
essentialist notion. Thus, in a passage clearly intended to contrast with Rousseau's 
famous statement that 'man is born free...', he writes: 
62 
The primitive, natural man becomes a free man, becomes 
humanized, and rises to the status of a moral being [... ] only to the 
degree that he becomes aware of this form and these rights in all 
his fellow-beings. (Bakunin, in Dolgoff, 1973, p. 156). 
For most anarchists, then, autonomy, although an important value within their 
ideology, did not enjoy any privileged status. Furthermore, this notion is, as will be 
discussed below (see Chapter Five), conceptually linked with the equally important 
social values of solidarity and fraternity. This conceptual connection allows anarchist 
theorists to go on to draw further, important connections between freedom and 
equality. 
Reciprocal Awareness 
Some theorists in fact, amongst them Walter and Ritter, have argued that individual 
freedom, or autonomy, is an instrumental value in anarchist theory, the chief goal of 
which is what Ritter calls 'communal individuality'. Ritter bases his account of this 
notion primarily on Godwin's idea of 'reciprocal awareness', which, it is argued, 
provides the moral underpinnings of the social anarchist society. The idea of 
`reciprocal awareness' implies a normative view of social relationships based on 
cooperation and trust, in which each individual perceives her freedom as necessarily 
bound up with the good of the community. Such an awareness, which seems to be 
referring primarily to psychological and emotional processes, is obviously one of the 
qualities to be fostered and encouraged by means of education. This psychological, 
or emotional attitude, in turn, forms the basis for the moral ideal which Ritter refers to 
as 'communal individuality'. 
This view that it is community, or what Ritter calls 'communal individuality', and not 
freedom, which is the main goal of social anarchism, finds further support in 
Bakunin's writings. Bakunin, like other social anarchists, was keen to refute what he 
regarded as the guiding premise of Enlightenment thinkers such as Locke, 
Montesquieu and Rousseau; namely that individuality and the common good 
represent opposing interests. Bakunin writes, 'freedom is not the negation of 
solidarity. Social solidarity is the first human law; freedom is the second law. Both 
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laws interpenetrate each other and, being inseparable, constitute the essence of 
humanity' (Bakunin, in Maximoff, 1953, p. 156). 
This passage is a typically confusing piece of writing on Bakunin's part, and he 
seems to offer no explanation as to what he means by 'the first human law'. 
However, it does seem to be clear that Bakunin, like most social anarchist thinkers, 
regards individual freedom as constituted by and in social interaction. Bakunin 
insisted that it is society which creates individual freedom: 'Society is the root, the 
tree of freedom, and liberty is its fruit.' (ibid, p. 165). 
Significantly, it is this position which enables thinkers like Bakunin to go on to draw 
conceptual connections between freedom, solidarity — or what Ritter calls 'communal 
individuality' — and equality, as follows: 'Since freedom is the result and the clearest 
expression of solidarity, that is of mutuality of interests, it can be realized only under 
conditions of equality' [by which Bakunin means, as discussed below, economic and 
social equality] (ibid). 
Yet it is still not entirely clear what status Bakunin is assigning to the connections 
between freedom and equality. Morland suggests that Bakunin was in fact a Hegelian 
in this respect, and that his arguments that the individual is only truly free when all 
around him are free implies a notion of liberty as omnipresent in a Hegelian sense, in 
which 'all duality between the individual and society, between society and nature, is 
dialectically overcome' (Marshall, quoted in Morland, 1997, p. 81). 
Yet I am inclined to think that the justification for Bakunin's arguments for the 
important connections between social equality and liberty stems more from a 
psychological account than from a Hegelian dialectic. This seems apparent in the 
above-quoted passage from Bakunin, in which he argues that 'The liberty of every 
human individual is only the reflection of his own humanity, or his human right 
through the conscience of all free men, his brothers and his equals. I can feel free 
only in the presence of and in relationship with other men... '(Bakunin,in Dolgoff, 
1973, p. 237). 
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Godwin, too, seems to be making a psychological observation in describing 
individual autonomy as a form of mental and moral independence and noting that 
this kind of freedom 'supports community by drawing people toward each other 
leading to a kind of reciprocal awareness which promotes mutual trust, solidarity, 
and emotional and intellectual growth' (Ritter, 1980, p. 29). 
It sounds as if what Godwin has in mind here is something like the point commonly 
made by individualist anarchists, that 'only he who is strong enough to stand alone is 
capable of forming a genuinely free association with others' (Parker, 1965, p. 3). 
The social anarchists, although explicitly anti-individualistic in their views, seemed to 
subscribe to a similar psychological view of the connections between individual 
freedom and the kinds of social values necessary to ensure life in communities. 
Alongside this position, they invariably tied their discussion of freedom into their 
insistence on the immediate improvement of the material conditions of society. 
As Goodwin and Taylor put it: 
While liberals traditionally see the progress towards greater freedom 
and rationality in terms of 'the progress of the human mind', the early 
socialists conceived of progress as situated in the context of real 
material circumstances (Goodwin And Taylor, 1982, p. 147). 
Of course, in the same way as autonomy is clearly not conceptually prior to other 
values within anarchist thought, it is important here to note that neither are all 
liberals committed to assigning autonomy a position of primary importance. 
Hocking, for example (1926), has argued that anarchist and liberal aims overlap 
because both regard liberty (understood as the absence of coercion by the state) as the 
chief political good. Yet as Ritter (1980) points out, this position is misleading not 
only because it ignores the view that, for many anarchists, individual freedom in this 
sense is actually only a means to the conceptually prior value of communal 
individuality, but because it overlooks strands of liberal thought in which freedom is 
instrumental (for example, utilitarian liberalism). 
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Liberal Paternalism and Libertarianism 
The social anarchists' rejection of the abstract, Rousseauian idea of pre-social 
freedom, and their insistence that autonomy is not a natural, essential aspect of human 
nature, but something to be developed and nurtured within the context of social 
relationships, not only distinguishes them from early Enlightenment liberal thinkers, 
but also partly explains why, from an educational perspective, they do not adopt an 
extreme libertarian position — i.e. a philosophical objection to all educational 
intervention in children's lives. Acknowledging, along with later liberal thinkers 
such as Mill, that individual freedom is restrained by deliberative rationality, and 
ever-conscious of the social context of developing human freedom, most anarchist 
thinkers have no problem in endorsing rational restraints on individual freedom even 
in the context of a post-state, anarchist society. From an educational point of view, 
the implication of this position is that anarchists agree with liberals in accepting 
something like the paternalistic exception to Mill's harm principle in the case of 
children. In other words, they do not take the extreme libertarian position that 
educational intervention constitutes a violation of children's autonomy. 
This position can be seen most clearly in the work of Bakunin who, dealing with the 
question of children's rights and the provision of education, expresses views which 
are strikingly similar to the liberal, humanist tradition. The following passage in 
particular reflects the development of Bakunin's thought from the Enlightenment 
tradition: 
It is the right of every man and woman, from birth to childhood, to 
complete upkeep, clothes, food, shelter, care, guidance, education 
(public schools, primary, secondary, higher education, artistic, 
industrial, and scientific), all at the expense of society [....] 
 
Parents shall have the right to care for and guide the education of 
their children, under the ultimate control of the commune which 
retains the right and the obligation to take children away from 
parents who, by example or by cruel and inhuman treatment, 
demoralize or otherwise hinder the physical and mental 
development of their children (Bakunin, in Dolgoff, 1973, p. 112)2 
2 Bakunin's use of the term 'right' here is particularly interesting given current debates into the 
distinction between 'rights' and 'needs', and the general consensus as to the relative novelty of talk of 
children's rights. 
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Even when he acknowledges that children themselves have rights and can in some 
sense be regarded as moral agents, it is nevertheless quite clear from these writings 
that Bakunin is far from adopting an extreme libertarian view of children as 
autonomous beings, responsible for determining their own educational aims and 
processes: 
We do not claim that the child should be treated as an adult, that 
all his caprices should be respected, that when his childish will 
stubbornly flouts the elementary rules of science and common 
sense we should avoid making him feel that he is wrong. We say, 
on the contrary, that the child must be trained and guided, but that 
the direction of his first years must not be exclusively exercised by 
his parents, who are all too often incompetent and who generally 
abuse their authority. The aim of education is to develop the latent 
capacities of the child to the fullest possible extent and enable him 
to take care of himself as quickly as possible.[... ] 
Today, parents not only support their children [i.e. providing food, 
clothes, ] but also supervise their education. This is a custom 
based on a false principle, a principle that regards the child as the 
personal property of the parents. The child belongs to no one, he 
belongs only to himself; and during the period when he is unable 
to protect himself and is thereby exposed to exploitation, it is 
society that must protect him and guarantee his free development. 
It is society that must support him and supervise his education. In 
supporting him and paying for his education society is only 
making an advance 'loan' which the child will repay when he 
becomes an adult proper (ibid). 
So although one can find some echoes of the liberal ideal of autonomy within the 
anarchist tradition, this notion does not play such a central role within social anarchist 
thought as it does within liberal theory and, connectedly, liberal ideas on education. 
Autonomy and Community: Tensions and Questions 
Nevertheless, even if autonomy is only one of several connected goals within 
anarchist thought, it is still important to try and answer the question of its role within 
the anarchist position on education. Specifically, if education for personal autonomy 
is a common educational goal for both liberal and anarchist theorists, would the same 
liberal restrictions and principles which apply to the state as an educating body, apply 
to the community within the framework of a stateless, anarchist society? For 
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although anarchists reject the state and the associated centralist control of social 
institutions, they do nevertheless acknowledge, as we have seen, the need for some 
kind of educational process which, in the absence of a centralist state, would 
presumably be run on a community level. Thus, given the anarchist acceptance of the 
value of individual autonomy, understood as the ability to make and implement 
choices on the basis of rational deliberation, without external constraints, one could 
still argue, based on the classic liberal argument for neutrality (see Dworkin, 1978), 
that the community has no right to impose particular versions of the good life on any 
of its members. 
For the social anarchists, the basic unit of social organization is the commune, 
association within and amongst communes being conducted on an essentially 
federalist basis. One important element of this federalism is the right to secession —
a point which Bakunin made on several occasions: 
Every individual, every association, every commune, every region, 
every nation has the absolute right to self-determination, to 
associate or not to associate, to ally themselves with whomever 
they wish and repudiate their alliances without regard to so-called 
historic rights... The right of free reunion, as well as the right of 
secession, is the first and most important of all political rights. 
(quoted in Morland, p. 102). 
However, even if secession is a real option, it is quite conceivable that various 
communities would be organized around particular ideologies and would therefore 
choose to educate their members according to a substantive vision of the good life as 
reflected in the organization and ethos of that community. In the absence of any other 
restrictions, it is quite possible that certain such communities would undermine the 
value of autonomy. 
Michael Taylor, in his book Anarchy, Liberty and Community (Taylor, 1982), has 
examined this potential tension within anarchist theory in considerable detail. Taylor 
restates the classic liberal argument that in order for an individual to be autonomous, 
she must be able to critically choose amongst genuinely available values, norms and 
ways of life, and that such possibility for choice only exists within a pluralistic 
society. Thus, in 'primitive and peasant communities', with strong traditions and 
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considerable homogeneity in terms of life-styles and values, individual autonomy 
cannot be said to exist. But Taylor goes on to make the point that, in fact, for 
members of such communities, autonomy is simply not an issue (and, indeed, not the 
problem it often becomes in pluralistic societies) for such people 'feel at home in a 
coherent world' (Taylor, 1982, p. 161). This view seems to support Joseph Raz's 
argument (Raz, 1986) that individual well-being does not depend on the presence of 
autonomy. Nevertheless, given that for anarchist theorists, autonomy, in the sense of 
individual freedom of choice, does seem to have been a central value, one must ask 
whether the types of communities they sought to create were supportive of this value. 
Taylor argues that as utopian communities are always islands within the greater 
society, and as their members are recruited from that society, the values of the 
`outside' world will always, in a sense, be present as real options, as will the 
possibility of leaving the community - thus ensuring the autonomy of the individuals 
within it. But if the anarchist-socialist revolution is successful and the state is 
completely dismantled, the picture one gets is of a future society composed of several 
federated communities which will not be radically different in terms of their values. 
The particular social practices and life-styles may differ from commune to commune, 
but as all practices are expected to conform with principles of 'equality and justice', 
as conceived by theorists such as Bakunin, it is hard to see how any commune could 
present a radically challenging alternative to an individual in another commune. As 
an example, one may cite the kibbutzim in Israel which, although superficially 
different from one another (e.g in terms of the cultural origins and customs of their 
members, their physical characteristics, their main source of livelihood, etc), are 
nevertheless all instantly recognizable as kibbutzim in that they clearly exhibit 
common basic features of social organization and underlying values which 
distinguish them from the surrounding society. 
Can one, then, argue that a child growing up in an anarchist commune after the 
disappearance of the nation state, would be less autonomous than a child growing up 
in a liberal democratic state? I think there are two possible responses to this. One is 
to take the line that children growing up in a pluralistic, democratic society, are not 
genuinely autonomous as their choices are restricted by their environment and 
upbringing. Thus, for example, a child growing up in a thoroughly secular 
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environment could never really have the option of autonomously choosing a religious 
way of life. Yet this argument does not seem very serious to me. The fact is, it does 
sometimes happen that such children break away from their backgrounds and choose 
radically different life-styles, adopting values which are completely at odds with 
those of their upbringing. And there seems to be some grounds for the claim that it is 
the very presence of the alternative, 'somewhere out there' that creates this possibility 
of choice. 
A more promising line of argument is that which connects the discussion to the idea 
of the conditions of freedom. It makes no sense to talk of someone being able to 
exercise freedom, either in the sense of negative liberty, or in the sense of autonomy, 
without the satisfaction of basic material conditions. It seems to me that this is the 
key to understanding the apparent problem of autonomy within anarchist communes. 
For, as argued above, the autonomy of individual members of a commune may seem 
to be severely restricted by the absence of genuine alternative versions of the good 
life from which to choose, either within the commune or amongst other communes. 
Yet the very values which create a high degree of similarity between communes and 
amongst members of the same commune — i.e. values of economic and social equality 
— are those very values that constitute prerequisites for the exercise of any form of 
freedom. Thus although one could argue that the autonomy of a particular individual 
may be limited in a commune, as opposed to in a pluralist, democratic state, there 
would be fewer members of society lacking in effective freedom than there would, on 
this view, in less equitable societies. This seems to support the essentially anti-
individualistic tendencies . of the social anarchists, as well as their insistence on 
immediate improvement of the material conditions of society. As Goodwin and 
Taylor emphasize, for the anarchists, 
[...] the values of harmony, association, community and co-operation 
were not vague ethical ideals to be realized at some indeterminate 
point in the future through the loosening of legal restraints, the 
establishing of declarations of the rights of man, and the winning of 
constitutional-institutional reforms. Rather the future utopia required 
quite specific — objective rather than subjective - changes in the 
material basis of society, changes which could only be brought about 
through the implementation of an overall, collective plan — a fairly 
detailed blueprint — of some description. It was in this respect that the 
very term 'socialism' emerged in the 1830's as the antithesis of 
liberal `individualism'(Godwin and Taylor, 1982, p. 147) 
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All the same, I am inclined to agree with those critics of anarchism who argue that 
this tension between personal autonomy and the possibly coercive effects of public 
censure is the most worrying aspect of anarchist ideology, and one to which most 
anarchists have not provided a very satisfactory answer, other than the faith that such 
conflicts can and simply will be resolved justly in the moral climate and free 
experimentation that will prevail in the stateless society. 
Robert Wolff and the Argument from Autonomy 
It is important to understand that, in advocating autonomy as a central value - albeit 
with different emphases than those of the liberal tradition - anarchists are not simply 
going one step further than liberals in objecting to all forms of coercion. It is not a 
variant of this position which constitutes the philosophical explanation for their 
principled objection to the state. It is, in fact, this mistaken interpretation of 
anarchism that, I would argue, lies behind Robert Wolff's philosophical attempt to 
defend the anarchist position (Wolff, 1998). 
It is worth looking into Wolff's argument here, for I believe its very construction 
helps to highlight some of the points I want to make in this discussion about the 
difference in perspective between anarchism and liberalism. 
Wolff sets out to establish that there is a philosophical contradiction between 
individual autonomy and the de jure state — defined as an entity instantiating de jure 
authority — and that anarchism is thus the only political position compatible with the 
value of personal autonomy. The anarchist understanding of authority also has 
bearings on Wolff s argument, as will be discussed below. But the essential point 
here is that, as Miller notes, Wolff's argument rests on the premise that 'autonomy is 
the primary moral desideratum' (Miller, 1984, p.27). Yet, as the foregoing discussion 
suggests, this premise is questionable, not only within liberalism, but also within 
anarchist theory itself. However, most commentators on Wolff have not questioned 
this premise, but have tried, instead, to find fault in his argument (see, for example, 
the discussions in American Philosophical Quarterly, 1972). Without going into the 
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philosophical details of Wolff's argument, the point 1 wish to make here is that 
whether or not it is valid, it suggests a misleading interpretation of anarchism and, in 
fact, obscures the difference of perspective which distinguishes anarchists from 
liberals. 
In a sense, Wolff's argument, if valid, proves too much. Anarchists are not concerned 
with refuting the validity of the de jure state from a philosophical point of view; their 
objection to the state, as will be discussed below, is based on a more complex and 
concrete analysis than the conceptual argument that it conflicts with individual 
autonomy. Similarly, many anarchists — particularly the social anarchists - would not 
agree with Wolff that 'the defining mark of the state is authority, the right to rule' 
(Wolff, 1998, p.18). I shall discuss the anarchist objection to the state in greater detail 
below. However, at this point, it is important to understand how Wolff's apparent 
attempt to reduce anarchism to a defensible philosophical argument is connected to 
the above discussion of the multiplicity of values within anarchist thought. 
While attempting to reduce any ideology to a single, logically prior value is, of 
course, problematic, in the case of anarchism this would seem especially so, for 
anarchism is in principle opposed to hierarchical thinking. As Todd May points out, 
anarchist thought involves a 'rejection of strategic political philosophy', and the 
social anarchist struggle is conceived 'in terms of getting rid of hierarchic thinking 
and action altogether'. (May, 1994, p. 51). Thus, the anarchist vision of the future 
ideal society as a decentralized network, in which 'certain points and certain lines 
may be bolder than others, but none of them functions as a center from which the 
others emerge or to which they return' (May, 1994, p. 53) is, I would suggest, 
reflected in the philosophical position that no one value or goal can be regarded as 
logically prior or ultimate. This is not to claim that there is no conflict between 
values within anarchist thought; indeed, as we have seen above, the two interrelated 
anarchist goals of individual freedom and communality may well be in tension under 
certain circumstances. But these conflicts are not conceptual dilemmas to be resolved 
by philosophical arguments, but concrete social problems to be creatively solved as 
the situation demands. It seems to me that Bakunin's attempts to paint a picture of 
such a network of interconnected values as one coherent whole could be read not just 
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as a philosophically confused argument, but as a reflection of this anti-hierarchical 
stance. 
Interestingly, after claiming that personal autonomy is logically incompatible with the 
de jure state, Wolff then goes on to suggest that unanimous direct democracy 'is a 
genuine solution to the problem of autonomy and authority'. (Wolff, 1998, p.27). As 
Grenville Wall points out (Wall, 1978, p. 276), this move in itself is puzzling as it 
seems to contradict the premise that this conflict is logically irreconcilable. Yet, apart 
from this methodological problem, this aspect of Wolff's argument also reveals a 
similar misconception of anarchism. Wolff describes the ideal of unanimous direct 
democracy as one in which 'every member of the society wills freely every law which 
is actually passed'. (Wolff, 1998, p. 23). As the autonomous person, on both the 
liberal and the anarchist understanding, is one whose actions are restrained only by 
the dictates of his own will and reason, it follows that in a direct democracy, there 
need be no conflict between 'the duty of autonomy' and the 'commands of authority'. 
(Wolff, ibid). Wolff's use of the phrase 'the duty of autonomy' reveals his strong 
Kantian orientation and, again, is an inaccurate representation of the anarchist view, 
according to which autonomy is less a 'duty' than a quality of life to be created, 
aspired to and dynamically forged in a social context along with other social values. 
Wolff's picture of a unanimous direct democracy, although described in purely 
procedural terms, may be quite in keeping with the social anarchist ideal. Yet 
interestingly, when discussing the possibility of this theoretical solution to his 
proposed dilemma (a solution which, as Wall remarks, Wolff seems to regard as 
unworkable for empirical, rather than philosophical reasons), the basic unit under 
consideration, for Wolff, is still that of the state. He acknowledges, apparently, the 
assumption that unanimous democracy 'creates a de jure state'. But the point is that 
anarchists object to the state for other reasons than that it embodies de jure authority, 
so even a state founded on unanimous direct democracy, in which personal autonomy, 
if we accept Wolff's argument, could flourish, would still be a slate and would be 
objectionable for other important reasons. In addition to their positive commitment to 
specific values, to be discussed below, crucially, the anarchists' objection to the state 
stems, in large part, from their anti-hierarchical stance. Basic to this stance is the view 
that, as Woodcock puts it, 
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What characterizes the State, apart from its foundation on 
authority and coercion, is the way in which it cumulatively 
centralizes all social and political functions, and in doing so puts 
them out of the reach of the citizens whose lives they shape 
(Woodcock, 1977, p. 21). 
Accordingly, all anarchists refer in their discussion of social organization to a basic 
unit of direct cooperation. This unit, whether a commune, a workshop or a school, 
is, crucially, something qualitatively distinct from, and inevitably far smaller than, 
the state. 
It is for this same reason that Wolff's creative suggestions towards overcoming the 
practical obstacles in the way of direct democracy in contemporary societies 
undermine the very anarchist idea that his argument is ostensibly intended to support. 
Wolff's picture of a society the size of the United States equipped with 'in-the-home 
voting machines' transmitted `to a computer in Washington', 'committees of experts' 
gathering data, and the establishment of a position of 'Public Dissenter in order to 
guarantee that dissident and unusual points of view were heard' (Wolff, 1998, pp.34- 
35) could not be further removed from the social anarchist ideal in which social 
functions are organized from the bottom up, in cooperative networks based at the 
level of the smallest possible scale, and where 'face-to-face contacts can take the 
place of remote commands' (Woodcock, 1977, p. 21). 
To sum up the discussion so far, it seems that anarchism overlaps with liberalism in 
its emphasis on personal autonomy - although it does not assign the value of personal 
autonomy any priority - and in its acknowledgement of the benevolent potential of 
human beings; furthermore, it shares the essentially rationalistic stance of liberal 
education, and the faith in human reason as the key to progress. Although several 
commentators (for example, Bellamy, Ritter and Walter) have argued that anarchism 
cannot be regarded as an extension of liberalism due to its emphasis on community, 
this point could be countered with the argument that an emphasis on the value of 
community is perfectly consistent with the brand of liberalism defended by theorists 
such as Kymlica and Raz. 
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The essential points on which anarchism and liberal aims diverge seem to be firstly in 
anarchism's rejection of the framework of the state and, connectedly, in its 
perspective on the possibility of achieving the desired social change. The essence of 
this distinct perspective is, it seems to me, captured in Ritter's remark that: 
To redeem society on the strength of rational, spontaneous 
relations, while slaying the leviathan who offers minimal 
protection - this is the anarchists' daring choice. (Ritter, 1980, p. 
133). 
Educational Implications 
From an educational perspective, does the insight that anarchism and liberalism share 
certain important underlying values support the idea that the philosophical and moral 
underpinnings of the anarchist conception of education are not essentially different 
from those that form the basis of the idea of liberal education? 
Once again, the difference would seem to turn not on the question of the adherence to 
certain values and virtues, such as autonomy, rationality or equality, but on the 
different scope and perspective on social change within which such values are 
understood, and the role of education in achieving this change. 
Crucially, in spite of their emphasis on the inherent human propensity for 
benevolence and voluntary cooperation, and in spite of their rationalist convictions, it 
would appear that the social anarchists, with their critical analysis of capitalist society 
and its social institutions, alongside their pragmatic view of the innate lust for power 
potentially present in everyone, could not, like Mill, or indeed Godwin, put all their 
faith in the Enlightenment ideal of the ultimate triumph of human reason over 
oppressive forms of social organization. 
Thus Bakunin, a thinker typical of this tradition, did not stop at the liberal idea of 
achieving social change — or even the overthrow of oppressive regimes — by means of 
rational education. 	 As a revolutionary thinker, he insisted on the ultimate 
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abolishment of all structural forms of authority which he saw as hostile to individual 
freedom. 
The revolution, instead of modifying institutions, will do away 
with them altogether. Therefore, the government will be uprooted, 
along with the church, the army, the courts, the schools, the banks 
and all their subservient institutions. (Bakunin, in Dolgoff, 1973, 
p.358). 
Yet as we shall see, experiments in implementing social anarchist principles on a 
community level did not involve abolishing schools altogether, but, on the contrary, 
often centred around the establishment of schools — albeit schools which were 
radically different from the typical public schools of the time. Crucially, these 
schools were seen not just as a means for promoting rational education and thus 
encouraging children to develop a critical attitude to the capitalist state, and, 
hopefully, to eventually undermine it; rather, the schools themselves were regarded as 
experimental instances of the social-anarchist society in action. They were, then, not 
merely a means to social revolution, but a crucial part of the revolutionary process 
itself. 
So Bakunin and other nineteenth century social anarchist thinkers shared certain 
liberal assumptions about human nature, and a liberal faith in the educative power of 
social institutions, as reflected in Bakunin's claim that: 'it is certain that in a society 
based on reason, justice, and freedom, on respect for humanity and on complete 
equality, the good will prevail and the evil will be a morbid exception...' ( Bakunin, 
in Dolgoff, 1973, p.95). Yet such thinkers did not believe that such a society was 
possible within the framework of the state — however liberal. The focus of their 
educational thought and experimentation, therefore, was on developing active forms 
of social interaction which would constitute an alternative to the state. In so doing, 
however, the conceptualization of education which informed their views, as I shall 
argue further below, was not one of education as a means to an end, but a more 
complex one of education as one of the many aspects of social interaction which, if 
engaged in in a certain spirit, could itself be part of the revolutionary process of 
undermining the state and reforming society on a communal basis. 
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This reflects the crucial aspect of social anarchism expressed by Paul Goodman as 
follows: 
A free society cannot be the substitution of a 'new order' for the old 
order; it is the extension of spheres of free action until they make up 
most of social life (quoted in Ward, 1973, p. 18). 
The Anarchist Objection to the State 
The above discussion notwithstanding, the anarchists' rejection of the state as a mode 
of social organization which they regarded as inimical to human freedom and 
flourishing raises two important questions: Firstly, is the anarchist rejection of the 
state a principled rejection of states qua states, or is it a contingent rejection, based on 
the fact that the modern nation state typically has properties which the anarchists 
regard as objectionable? Secondly, even if Wolff and other commentators are 
mistaken in implying that it is the notion of authority which constitutes the core of the 
anarchist objection to the state as a form of social organization, suspicion of authority 
is nevertheless a central aspect of all anarchist thought. It is important, then, to 
ascertain what anarchists understand by the notion of authority and connected 
notions, and whether their objection to it is philosophically coherent and defensible. 
Although certain commentators, such as Miller and Reichert, talk of anarchism's 
`hostility to the state' (Miller, 1984, p. 5) as its defining characteristic, often implying 
that this hostility is a principled one towards the state as such, many theorists have 
acknowledged the nuances involved in this hostility. Thus, Richard Sylvan notes 
(Sylvan, 1993, p. 216), that although it may be true that anarchists oppose all existing 
systems of government, this is 'crucially contingent upon the character of prevailing 
state systems.' One can in fact find support for this interpretation of the writings of 
the social anarchists themselves. Kropotkin, for example, made the claim, late in his 
life (quoted in Buber, 1958), that what the anarchists were calling for was 'less 
representation and more self-government' - suggesting a willingness to compromise 
with certain elements of the democratic state. 
Bakunin, too, devoted much of his writings against the state to a detailed account of 
what he regarded as the characteristics of the modern state. In 'The Modern State 
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Surveyed' (in Dolgoff, 1973, pp. 210-217), which very title lends itself to the 
interpretation suggested by Sylvan, Bakunin outlines a list of what he regards as the 
principal faults of the state. Chief amongst these are capitalism, militarism and 
bureaucratic centralization. This analysis, along with the considerable space Bakunin 
and other nineteenth century anarchists devoted to attacking the association between 
the state and the Church, suggests that their objection to the state was, indeed, an 
objection to particular features which they regarded as inherent properties of the state. 
Yet most of these features are, arguably, contingent on particular historical forms of 
the state — and were particularly salient in the evolving nineteenth century model of 
the powerful nation state in the context of which the social anarchists were 
developing their position. 
It is therefore apparently not logically inconceivable that a political system calling 
itself a state could be compatible with anarchist principles. Some contemporary 
anarchists, in fact, have suggested that the Swiss cantons are a close approximation of 
anarchist political principles (Colin Ward, personal communication, 2001), although 
the social anarchists would probably have criticized them for their inequitable 
economic policies. The point that Sylvan is making is that the modem state as we 
know it has come to constitute 'the paradigmatic archist form' (Sylvan, 1993, p. 217), 
and as such, it is incompatible with anarchist principles. 
I would therefore disagree with the argument made by Miller and others that perhaps 
the central defining feature of anarchism is its 'hostility to the state'. This hostility, in 
fact, as discussed above, and as I shall argue further in what follows, is an 
instrumental one; the crucial core of anarchism is, rather, the positive values which it 
espouses, and it is the state as inimical to these values, not the state as such, which 
they object to. Miller argues that anarchists 'make two charges against the state —
they claim that it has no right to exist, and they also claim that it brings a whole series 
of social evils in its train' (Miller, 1984, p.5) But I would argue that this formulation 
is misleading: the claim that the state has no right to exist is not an independent, a 
priori claim. It is because of its 'social evils' that the state, under a particular 
definition, has no right to exist. These are, then, not two charges, but one and the 
same charge. 
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Nevertheless, even if anarchism's hostility to the state is 'contingent and 
consequential [.. ], derived from the conjunction of anarchism's defining features 
together with a particular standard theoretical characterization of "the state"' 
(Sylvan, 1993, p.218), one must ask what exactly this characterization consists in. 
Most political theorists writing on this topic accept something like Weber's classic 
definition of the state as an association that 'successfully claims the monopoly of 
legitimate use of physical force within a given territory' (see Taylor, 1982, pp. 4-5). 
Many social anarchists seem to have had something like this notion in mind in 
formulating their rejection of the state. However, as suggested here, this rejection 
derived more from what Sylvan refers to as 'anarchism's defining features' than from 
any coherent theoretical characterization. This point is perhaps most apparent in the 
writings of Bakunin, who devoted considerable space (see Dolgoff, 1973, pp. 206-
208) to a rejection of what he calls the 'theology of the state' — namely, the defence of 
the idea of the state by social contract theorists such as Rousseau. Yet in fact, most of 
Bakunin's objection centres on specific features which he claims to be logically 
associated with the state. Firstly, he argues, the state 'could not exist without a 
privileged body' (ibid, p. 208). Here, Bakunin's objection stems from his socialist-
egalitarian commitments, his conviction being that the state 'has always been the 
patrimony of some privileged class' (ibid). Yet this, of course, is an empirical point. 
Furthermore, he argues, the modern state is 'necessarily a military state', and thus 'if 
it does not conquer it will be conquered by others' (ibid). Yet this, again, seems to be 
an empirical point and, as cases like Switzerland suggest, it is highly contentious. 
In short, it seems to be modern capitalism and its resulting inequalities which 
constitutes the basis for Bakunin's objection to the state. Although there are obvious 
connections between capitalist production and the structure of the nation state, it is 
arguable whether the former is a necessary feature of the latter. Thus, once again, it 
would seem that the anarchist objection to the state, on this point, is an instrumental 
one. 
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Authority 
Of course, as Taylor notes, even if anarchists implicitly accepted something like 
Weber's (albeit problematic) definition of the state, there is no logical reason why 
rejecting the state should entail a complete rejection of authority or censure. Yet the 
idea of authority is clearly conceptually linked to this idea of the state. Wolff, for 
example, suggests a revision of Weber's definition as follows: 'The state is a group 
of persons who have and exercise supreme authority within a given territory or over a 
certain population', arguing that 'the defining mark of the state is authority, the right 
to rule' (Wolff, 1998, p.18). 
Indeed, the impression that what the anarchists object to in the state is the idea of 
authority itself, is reinforced by some early anarchist writers. Sebastien Faure, for 
example, writing in the nineteenth century Encyclopedie Anarchist (quoted in 
Woodcock, 1977, p. 62) claimed that what unites anarchists of all varieties is 'the 
negation of the principle of authority in social organizations and the hatred of all 
constraints that originate in institutions founded on this principle.' 
Yet although individualist anarchists such as Stirner do at times seem to be defending 
a philosophical objection to authority per se, a reading of the social anarchists, along 
with other anarchist theorists who developed a more careful account of authority, 
suggests that it is not authority per se but certain kinds of authority which the 
anarchists object to, and which they regard as instantiated in the modern state and its 
institutions. 
One of the most comprehensive philosophical accounts of the anarchist position on 
authority is that provided by De George (1978). De George argues that most 
anarchist theorists were well aware of the fact that some kind of authority is necessary 
for social organization to function. 	 But in rejecting the type of authority 
characteristic of the state and its institutions, what the anarchists were asserting, 
according to De George, was that 
The only justifiable form of authority comes ultimately from 
below, not from above. The autonomy of each individual and 
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lower group should be respected by each higher group. The 
higher groups are formed to achieve the will of the lower 
groups and remain responsible to them and responsive to their 
will. (De George, 1978, p. 97). 
De George's choice of imagery here may look odd in light of the anarchist opposition 
to hierarchies. But I think that the use of the terms 'higher' and 'lower' in the above 
passage serves to illustrate the purely functional nature of authority in a social 
anarchist society. A more appropriate image, in fact, may be that of concentric 
circles; the 'lower' group, in other words, would be the most basic, inner circle — that 
of the self-governing, face-to-face community, where social arrangements would be 
established to meet the needs of this community. In the event of needs arising which 
could not be met by the community itself, an outer circle would come into being, 
representing the federated coordination with another community — for purposes of 
trade, for example, or common interests such as transport. This outer circle would 
then have functional authority, purely for the purposes of the function it was set up to 
fulfil, towards those in the inner circle. There could, in theory, be an infinite, 
elaborate network of such circles, the crucial point being that none of them would 
have absolute authority, all could be dismantled or rearranged if they failed to 
perform their functions, and all would be ultimately justifiable in terms of the needs 
of the basic unit of community. 
The point De George is leading up to in his analysis is that, in fact, what the 
anarchists were rejecting was not authority but authoritarianism which, as De George 
points out, 'starts at the top and directs those below for the benefit of those above' 
(De George, 1978, p. 98). 
In short, the anarchist, De George argues, `... is a skeptic in the political arena. He 
insists on the complete justification for any political or legal system prior to accepting 
it.' (De George, 1978, p. 91). This demand for 'justification' is in fact a demand for 
accountability to the smallest possible unit of social organization, to whom any such 
system of moral or legal rules must be responsive. 
This analysis is supported by Richard Sennett's discussion of nineteenth century 
anarchist thinkers who, he says, 'recognized the positive value of authority' (Sennett, 
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1980, p. 187). In fact, argues Sennett, what thinkers like Kropotkin and Bakunin were 
aiming at was to create 'the conditions of power in which it was possible for a person 
in authority to be made fallible' (Sennett, 1980, p. 188). 
The above points also illustrate how the anarchist understanding of what constitutes 
legitimate authority is linked to the anarchist faith in human rationality — a faith 
which, in turn, is reflected in the call for 'rational education'; in other words, an 
education which was not only anti-authoritarian, but which encouraged children to 
accept the kind of authority which was rational in nature (see Chapter Six). Perhaps 
the philosophical account of authority which comes closest to what the social 
anarchists had in mind in this context is that suggested by Gerald Dworkin in his 
notion of 'epistemological authority' (Dworkin, 1988, p. 45), namely, the practice of 
accepting or consulting the authority of others in non-moral matters. This practice, 
Dworkin explains, is essentially rational, for a variety of practical and social reasons. 
In light of the above discussion, one can begin to understand the role of authority 
within anarchist thought, and to appreciate the claim that anarchists are not, in fact, 
opposed to authority per se, but to 'any exercise of authority which carries with it the 
right to require individuals to do what they do not choose to do' (Wasserstrom, 1978 
p.113). In fact, even this formulation is unnecessarily strong from an anarchist point 
of view. As we have seen, what the anarchists objected to was the idea of an absolute 
right to command authority. They have no problem acknowledging that individuals 
or organizations may have a right to command others, but such a right must always be 
temporary, and always justifiable in terms of the needs of the community in question. 
So as anarchists recognize that some form of social organization will always be 
necessary, so they recognize that some form of authority must be accepted in order 
for social arrangements to function. The types of authority which would be 
acceptable - and perhaps necessary - in an anarchist society are what De George calls 
`the authority of competence', or `epistemic authority', and 'operative authority'. 
Miller makes a similar distinction in discussing the anarchist acknowledgement of 
what he calls 'authority in matters of belief, and indeed this point is reflected in the 
analytic literature on the subject, namely in the distinction, noted by Peters, between 
authority de jure and authority de facto. The point of this distinction is that a person 
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can possess authority by virtue of 'personal history, personal credentials and personal 
achievements,' (Peters, 1959, p. 15) including, in certain cases, the kind of charisma 
associated with authoritative figures. However this is different from having or 
claiming authority by virtue of one's position within a recognized normative 
structure. The anarchists, of course, reject the kind of authority that is derived solely 
from one's position in a preordained social system — this is the kind of authority 
which they refer to as 'irrational'. However, if De George is right in emphasizing 
that the anarchists' chief problem was with authority imposed from above, 
presumably anarchists would have to acknowledge that certain forms of authority 
which are determined by defined roles within social or political systems would be 
legitimate, provided the system in question was one which had developed organically, 
in other words, from below, in response to and in accordance with the needs of people 
and communities. Indeed, most anarchists recognize that there can be people who are 
authorities in various realms and are accepted as such. To connect this point back to 
the previous discussion of rationality as a key aspect of moral autonomy, it seems that 
rationality is the overriding criterion for the anarchists in judging which types and 
instances of authority are legitimate. Bakunin expressed this idea when he stated: 
We recognize, then, the absolute authority of science...Outside of 
this only legitimate authority, legitimate because it is rational and 
is in harmony with human liberty, we declare all other authorities 
false, arbitrary and fatal. 
One might well question this idea, however, as it is all to obvious that it could lead 
one to the dangerous position of blindly revering everything 'scientific', thereby 
elevating science, qua science, to the position of an unquestionable authority. 
However Bakunin himself seems to have been well aware of this danger, and 
explicitly warned against the idea of what he referred to as 'dictatorship by scientists' 
(Bakunin, in Maximoff, 1953, p. 250), in which all legislation would be entrusted to 
learned academy of scientists. 	 Such systems would, Bakunin argues, be 
`monstrosities' (ibid), firstly due to the to the fact that 'human science is always and 
necessarily imperfect', and secondly because 
a society obeying legislation emanating from a scientific 
academy, not because it understood the reasonableness of this 
legislation (in which case the existence of that academy would 
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become useless) but because the legislation emanated from the 
academy and was imposed in the name of science, which was 
venerated without being understood — that society would be a 
society of brutes and not of men (ibid). 
Furthermore, a scientific academy, like any similar body invested with 'absolute, 
sovereign power', would inevitably become 'morally and intellectually corrupted' 
(ibid). 
These remarks of Bakunin's are indicative of the essence of the anarchist objection to 
certain kinds of authority, which has echoes in Erich Fromm's distinction between 
`rational' and 'irrational' authority. The key feature of rational authority is that, while 
it is based on competence, it must be subjected to constant scrutiny and criticism and, 
above all, is always temporary. 
This notion is particularly salient in Bakunin's critique of Marx, and has important 
connections with the anarchist insistence on the commensurability of the means and 
the ends of the revolution. For if the ultimate objective is a society free from 
authoritarian, hierarchical structures, then, as Bakunin argued, the revolutionary 
movement itself has to avoid such structures and processes. Indeed, it was this point 
that led to the bitter dispute between the anarchists and the Marxists after the First 
International. Bakunin argued, with a depressing accuracy, that the Marxist idea of 
the working class seizing political power would lead to a dictatorship of the 
proletariat which would be only superficially different from that of the state, and was 
skeptical regarding the Marxist claim that such an arrangement would be only 
transitional. In Bakunin's view, the International as an 'embryo of future society' 
must, according to the anarchist position, reject all principles associated with 
authoritarianism and dictatorship. Bakunin, as Morland notes, was not so naive as to 
overlook the natural tendency of people in revolutionary movements to take on 
different roles according to different propensities and talents, some inevitably 
commanding, initiating and leading, while others follow. But the crucial point in 
anarchist thought is that 
no function must be allowed to petrify and become fixed, and it 
will not remain irrevocably attached to any one person. 
Hierarchical order and promotion do not exist, so that the 
commander of yesterday can become a subordinate tomorrow. No- 
84 
one rises above the others, or if he does rise, it is only to fall back 
a moment later, like the waves of the sea forever returning to the 
salutary level of equality. (P. 85). 
It is, then, this notion of what Miller refers to as 'functionally specific authority' 
(Miller, 1984, p. 57), that underlies most anarchist thinking on social structures. 
This acceptance, by anarchist thinkers, of certain kinds of rational authority explains 
how they can, while rejecting the state, nevertheless coherently acknowledge the 
legitimacy of certain rules of social organization. The members of an anarchist 
community may well, on this view, come to accept the need for social rules of some 
kind, but such rules or sanctions would not constitute an infringement of one's 
personal freedom, for this freedom, as Bakunin puts it, 'consists precisely in this: he 
does what is good not because he is commanded to, but because he understands it, 
wants it and loves it' (Ritter, 1980, p.23). This distinction which Bakunin makes 
between social sanctions — which may have a legitimate role in the stateless society 
— and government, which 'coerces its subjects with commands instead of persuading 
them with reasons' (ibid) is arguably, as Ritter suggests, the only plausible defence of 
the reconciliation between freedom and censure. 
There are obviously several ways in which the anarchist position on authority, and the 
connected ideas discussed here, can have bearings on educational issues. In the 
present context, the important point to note is that the anarchist acceptance of certain 
kinds of authority as legitimate is sufficient to reject the extreme libertarian claim that 
education per se, as conceived as a form of human interaction necessarily involving 
some kind of authority, is morally illegitimate. 
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Chapter Five 
The Positive Core of Anarchism 
The discussion in Chapter Five suggests the following conclusions: 
Firstly, what the social anarchists object to is not the state as such but the state as 
instantiating a number of features which they regard as objectionable because of their 
infringement on human development and flourishing, understood as involving 
freedom, solidarity and reciprocal awareness — which values are inherently 
interconnected and interdependent. 
Secondly, and connectedly, the anarchist stance is, above all, not anti-state or anti-
authority, but anti-hierarchy, in the sense that all centralized, top-down structures are 
to be regarded with suspicion, and small communities favoured as basic units of 
social organization. As Woodcock remarks: 
Instead of attempting to concentrate social functions on the 
largest possible scale,which progressively increases the distance 
between the individual and the source of responsiblity even in 
modem democracies, we should begin again from the smallest 
possible unit of organization, so that face-to-face contacts can 
take the place of remote commands, and everyone involved in 
an operation can not only know how and why it is going on, but 
can also share directly in decisions regarding anything that 
affects him directly, either as a worker or as a citizen 
(Woodcock, 1977, p. 21). 
This perspective is supported by J.P. Clark who, in his analysis (Clark, 1978, p. 6) 
argues that 'anarchism might also be defined as a theory of decentralization'. One of 
the implications of these points is that the normative core of anarchism is not a 
negative one but a positive one. I have already discussed (see Chapter Four) to some 
extent the anarchist conception of mutual aid, which is essential for the flourishing of 
the kind of communities envisaged by social anarchists. This notion is, perhaps, the 
most important element of this positive core. As Ritter points out, for the social 
anarchists, notably Kropotkin, who developed the theory of mutual aid from a 
historical and anthropological perspective, benevolence, understood as a generous 
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reciprocity that makes us one with each other, sharing and equal' (Ritter, 1980, p. 57) 
is the 'mediating attitude of anarchy' (ibid). 
Ritter notes that the notion of mutual aid - a notion to some extent anticipated by 
Godwin's ideal of 'reciprocal awareness' - supports not only the ideal of the 
equitable, cooperative society so central to the social anarchists, but also the notion 
of creative individualism which is a common theme in anarchist literature, most 
notably - although not exclusively — amongst the more individualist anarchist 
thinkers. The attempt to combine, in an educational setting, attitudes of mutual 
respect and cooperation, with the pursuit of individual creativity and freedom of 
expression, is apparent in the American anarchist educational experiments discussed 
in Chapter Six. The theoretical basis for this connection between the notion of 
mutual aid and that of creative individualism is summed up by Ritter in his argument 
that 'the knowledge that one can rely on this reciprocal support from others gives one 
courage to pursue unique and creative paths in self-becoming' (Ritter, ibid) -
suggesting a primarily psychological basis for this connection. 
But, as Bakunin's instrumental rejection of the state suggests, there are other 
connected, substantive values which form the positive core of the anarchist positon, 
and which have not been discussed in detail in the preceding analysis. The central 
such values are: equality and fraternity. 
Equality 
In general, most anarchist thinkers seem to have understood the notion of equality in 
terms of distributive social justice, emphasizing the social economic implications of 
this notion, rather than the legalistic aspects. Indeed, the nineteenth century social 
anarchists - like all early socialists - were highly critical of the theorists of the French 
Revolution who, they argued, promised equal rights in terms of equality before the 
law, but neglected to deal with the material aspects of social inequality. 
Even Godwin, who, as discussed above, was an anarchist thinker closer to the 
individualist than the socialist end of the spectrum, was adamant on the evils of social 
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and economic inequality. As Ritter explains, Godwin saw unequal distribution of 
wealth, and its negative effects on human character and communal relations, as the 
principal reason for the imposition of legal government and the establishment of the 
state (Ritter, 1980, p. 76). Alongside the fundamental argument that economic 
inequality is unjust because it denies some people the means of a happy and 
respectable life (ibid, p. 77) and gives the advantaged 'a hundred times more food 
than you can eat and a hundred times more clothes than you can wear' (ibid), Godwin 
also argues that inequality damages human character, particularly from the point of 
view of the rational independence which he regarded as a supreme value. Both the 
poor and the rich, in a stratified society, have their rational capacities sapped by 
servility on the one hand and arrogance on the other (ibid). 
Godwin talks in terms of a floor of basic goods to which all members of society are 
entitled on the basis of a conception of the basic needs of individuals. Beyond this, 
he is prepared to accept a certain amount of inequality, based on merit. 'The thing 
really to be desired is the removing as much as possible of arbitrary distinctions, and 
leaving to talents and virtue the field of exertion unimpaired' (in Ritter, 1980, p. 78). 
Thus Godwin, while aware of the damaging effects of inequality for the ideal of 
communal individuality, was far from endorsing the social anarchists' ideal of 'to 
each according to his need' - which, according to Guerin (1970, p. 50) 'should be the 
motto of libertarian communism'. 
As Ritter notes, the social anarchists who succeeded Godwin gradually tried to rid 
anarchism of its 'anti-egalitarian, meritocratic elements' (Ritter, 1980, p. 79). 
Kropotkin went furthest in this respect, advocating a redistribution of wealth based 
entirely on the conception of needs, and not contribution or merit. Indeed, in arguing 
for a floor of basic needs as the basis for social-economic policy, the social anarchists 
were clearly closer to Marxism than to classical liberalism. Kropotkin's form of 
communal anarchism demanded 'the right of all to wealth — whatever share they may 
have taken in producing it' (Ritter, 1980, p. 81). Similarly, twentieth century social 
anarchists were highly critical of the Bolshevik revolution precisely concerning this 
issue. One of the greatest mistakes of the Bolsheviks, argued Alexander I3erkman, in 
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An ABC of Anarchism, in 1929, was to introduce a differential scale of rationing in 
the immediate post-revolutionary period. 'At one time', Berkman claims, 'They had 
as many as fourteen different food rations' (Berkman, 1995, p. 89), the best rations 
being for Party members and officials. The inevitable material inequality and 
political tensions that this situation created were, according to anarchist critics, just 
one symptom of the Bolshevik failure to base their political programme on an 
understanding of 'the needs of the situation' (ibid). Berkman, like Guerin, argues that 
the principle of 'to each according to his needs' must be the guiding principle behind 
socio-economic organization in the anarchist society. 
In this context, it is important to keep in mind, as Ritter points out, that none of the 
anarchists can be seen to hold the radical egalitarian thesis — i.e. the thesis that 
everybody should be treated alike. Ritter cites Kropotkin's commitment to need as the 
criterion of distribution as an example of this: 'needs,' the argument goes, 'cannot be 
satisfied without treating people differently' (Ritter, 1980, p. 82). Thus, as Ritter 
argues, while the social anarchists seek to eliminate inequalities of rank and 
hierarchy, they seek to increase those of kind, which support the kind of social 
diversity which they regard as highly valuable and desirable. 
It seems, then, that the anarchist understanding of equality is fairly close to that 
developed within egalitarian liberalism. Specifically, Bakunin and other social 
anarchists seem to have adopted a view akin to Rawls' notion of 'primary social 
goods'. Bakunin talks of the need 
to organize society in such a manner that every individual, man 
or woman, should, at birth, find almost equal means for the 
development of his or her various faculties and the full 
utilization of his or her work (Bakunin, in Maximoff, 1953, 
p.156) 
Although the emphasis in this conception may be different from that of Rawls, the 
basic perspective on social justice makes the anarchists far closer, here, to egalitarian 
liberals than, say, to utilitarians, although the social anarchists may interpret Rawls' 
notion of 'primary social goods' somewhat differently. 
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Some theorists have criticized Rawlsian liberalism for failing to offer guidelines for 
moral and just action on an inter-personal level. Thus G.A. Cohen, for example, 
argues that Rawls' contention that he has provided, in A Theory of Justice, a 
comprehensive conception of justice, is questionable, for ' a society that is just within 
the terms of the difference principle [...] requires not simply just coercive rules, but 
also an ethos of justice that informs individual choices...' (Cohen, 2000, p. 128). It is 
thus questionable, Cohen argues, whether 'the ideals of dignity, fraternity, and full 
realization of people's moral natures' are actually delivered by the Rawlsian account 
of justice (ibid, p. 136). This point has important connections with the anarchist 
perspective, as will be discussed below. However, it seems an unfair criticism of 
Rawls who, in Justice as Fairness, a Restatement, clearly states that his theory of 
justice is intended 'not as a comprehensive moral doctrine but as a political 
conception to apply to that structure of political and social institutions' (Rawls, 2001, 
p.12). Crucial, indeed, to Rawls' argument, is the distinction between the political 
and the moral. He insists on preserving the narrow focus of his conception of justice 
which, although it will hopefully gain the support of a broad overlapping consensus, 
cannot, on this understanding, have anything to say about the 'transcendent values —
religious, philosophical or moral' with which it may conflict. It cannot, in other 
words, 'go beyond the political' (Rawls, 2001, p. 37). 
The anarchists, however, would, I believe, reject this distinction between the political 
and the moral, partly because they do not start from an acceptance of an institutional 
framework - that of the constitutional democracy — as Rawls and many other liberal 
theorists do. Furthermore, most anarchists, as May notes (May, 1994, p. 85), 'regard 
the political as investing the entire field of social relationships' — in other words, they 
would not accept Rawls' focus on the 'basic structure' of society as the sole subject 
for political deliberation. 
The anarchist account, which can by no means be regarded as a comprehensive 
account of distributive justice, does seem to place less emphasis on procedural rules 
and principles for the just management of social affairs, and more on the moral 
qualities needed, as Cohen suggests, to sustain human relationships conducive to 
90 
social justice. It is indeed partly for this reason that education plays such an 
important role in anarchist thought. 
The anarchist conception of the value of equality has obvious conceptual connections 
both with the idea of community and with the view of human nature. Michael Taylor 
(1982) argues that equality is perceived as an important value for the anarchists, but is 
secondary to the basic good of community. Following on from his central argument 
that it is only in community that social order without the state can be maintained, 
Taylor points out that community requires a considerable degree of basic material 
equality in order to flourish. For 'as the gap increases between rich and poor, so their 
values diverge, relations between them are likely to become less direct and many-
sided, and the sense of interdependence which supports a system of reciprocity is 
weakened' (Taylor, 1982, p. 95). Yet, as he points out — and this seems to be 
supported by the writings of the social anarchists — it is only gross inequality which 
undermines community. 
As Taylor notes, this argument runs counter to the prevailing liberal argument that the 
state is necessary to ensure even approximate equality — specifically, that as 'the 
voluntary actions of individuals' inevitably disrupt material equality, even 
approximate equality can only be maintained by 'continuous interference by the state 
in people's lives' (Taylor, 1982, p.96). The neo-liberal development of this argument 
is the claim that, as such interference is clearly in violation of individual rights 
(primarily property rights), then any pursuit of economic equality must be secondary 
to the defence of the basic value of individual liberty. But as Taylor argues, this 
argument rests on certain assumptions about human nature, or at the very least, about 
what people will voluntarily do in a given kind of society. The anarchist position on 
human nature, combined with their faith in the potential of rational education in a 
climate of solidarity and mutual aid, leads to far less pessimistic conclusions 
regarding the possibility of maintaining relatively equitable socio-economic 
arrangements in a stateless, self-governing community, than those, for example, of 
Nozick, in his famous 'Wilt Chamberlain' thought experiment. Furthermore, as 
Taylor points out, in a society unlike the modern, industrialized one which Nozick 
assumes, 'where wealth and power are already unevenly distributed', people may 
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voluntarily chose to act in ways which maintain equal distribution of wealth (ibid, p. 
100). Taylor acknowledges that even in equality-valuing communties, no actions 
undertaken to maintain equality can be described as absolutely 'voluntary', for, in the 
absence of interference by the state, there are always some kind of sanctions in place 
to ensure the survival of relative equality and, therefore, of the community. In short, 
although he agrees that approximate economic equality is unlikely to last without 
some form of counteractive influence, this does not necessarily have to be provided 
by the state. 
The social anarchists, in conclusion, seem to have genuinely believed that the natural 
human propensity for mutual aid and benevolence, if encouraged and promoted by 
social relationships and institutions, would go a long way towards ensuring the 
survival of a relative degree of material equality. Both this argument and Taylor's 
moderate version of it reveal, once again, the important role for education in anarchist 
society. For education must systematically promote the values which support the 
flourishing of community, and, as Taylor argues, community both needs equality and 
provides the conditions for it to survive. 
It is important to keep in mind here the point which I made earlier in discussing the 
multiplicity of values within anarchist thought. It is in keeping with anarchism's anti-
hierarchical stance that no single value can be regarded as conceptually prior within 
this system of thought - in spite of attempts by theorists, both within and outside the 
anarchist radition, to defend such accounts. Thus while equality plays an important 
role in the social critique of the social anarchists, its full significance cannot be 
grasped without an understanding of its conceptual links with other, equally 
important values, notably that of fraternity. Thus while many social anarchists talk of 
needs as a basis for distributive justice, it would be misleading to conclude that their 
conception of the just society or human flourishing is basically a needs-based one. 
In this, perhaps, they would have agreed with Michael Ignatieff s comment that: 
To define what it means to be human in terms of needs is to begin, 
neither with the best, nor with the worst, but only with the body and 
what it lacks. It is to define what we have in common, not by what 
we have, but by what we are missing. A language of human needs 
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understands human beings as being naturally insufficient, incomplete, 
at the mercy of nature and of each other. It is an account that begins 
with what is absent. (Ignatieff, 1994, p. 57) 
Far from assuming that something was absent, the social anarchists, as is apparent 
from the above discussion of human nature, worked on the assumption that human 
beings have a great capacity for fraternal, benevolent sensibilities and action, and that 
the just society must be — and can be - underpinned by such values. 
Fraternity 
The relatively under-theorized concept of fraternity — a concept which Adam Swift 
describes as 'quaint and politically incorrect' (Swift, 2001, p. 133) has, of course, 
conceptual links with that of equality. In fact Swift himself acknowledges that 
`economic inequality may be inimical to fraternal relations in a society' due to the 
fragmentation and stratification associated with high levels of socio-economic 
inequality (Swift, pp. 113-114). As Patricia White defines it in Beyond Domination, 
fraternity consists in 'feeling a bond between oneself and others as equals, as moral 
beings with the same basic needs and an interest in leading a life of one's own' 
(White, 1983, p.72). White argues that this attitude is necessary amongst citizens of a 
participatory democracy (contrasted with servility and patronage), but she also goes 
further than this and makes the educationally important point that the attitude of 
fraternity can be a motivating force. 
If one adopts the view that fraternity is an 'attitude', then presumably, like other 
moral dispositions such as gratitude, it is something which can be learned. White 
indeed seems to take this view. In other words, people develop fraternal feelings by 
coming to hold certain beliefs and attitudes about others. Developing such beliefs 
and attitudes, then, is clearly a task for education. Furthermore, as White notes, 
in a fully-fledged participatory democracy, fraternal attitudes will 
both underpin the institutions of the society and also be themselves 
undergirded by the social structure which does not permit gross 
discrepancies in the share of primary goods between citizens. 
(ibid) 
93 
This suggests that the conceptual connection between fraternity and equality can 
work both ways: not only does a relatively high degree of socio-economic equality 
foster and support fraternal attitudes, but the institutional maintanance of such 
equality may depend on a degree of fraternal feeling. Some social anarchist theorists 
may well have endorsed this view, although they would obviously understand the 
notion of 'participatory democracy' in a narrower sense than that in which White 
seems to be using it. For the anarchists, any form of participatory democracy which 
was institutionally dependent on a centralized, hierarchical state, was to be viewed 
with suspicion. A 'fully-fledged' participatory democracy could only, so the social 
anarchist view seems to imply, exist at the level of the workshop, the community, or 
the school. It is at these levels, in fact, as the foregoing discussion suggests, that we 
should focus our analysis of desirable educational qualities. And indeed, the 
anarchist insistence that the schools they founded be run as communities (see Chapter 
Six), in which solidarity and mutual respect prevailed, supports the view that fraternal 
attitudes were both 'taught', in such educational settings, by means of the prevailing 
climate, and helped to sustain and foster the kinds of experimental communities that 
were being created as an alternative to the state. 
But White's comments also draw attention to another important aspect of fraternity in 
an educational context. Part of the anarchist objection to the state is precisely that, as 
Kropotkin argues in his discussion of mutual aid (see Chapter Three), the capitalist 
state system undermines precisely those fraternal attitudes which should ideally 
underpin social institutions. Thus, in disagreeing with White that the state itself could 
underpin the kinds of fraternal attitudes essential to a genuine democracy, the 
anarchists are tacitly admitting that social processes at the community level —
primarily education — must take on even more of a responsibility for promoting these 
attitudes. 
White also notes, in reply to critiques from the individualistic liberal tradition, that 
this notion of fraternity is in no way a threat to individuality and freedom, as it goes 
hand in hand with a tolerance for diversity (something much championed by 
anarchists), and 'carries no demands that people should engage in communal projects 
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or should enjoy spending the major part of their time in the company of their fellows' 
(White, 1983, p.74). 
Another interesting theoretical perspective on the notion of fraternity comes from the 
work of Eric Hobsbawm. In his article 'Fraternity' (Hobsbawm, 1975), Hobsbawm 
argues that the reason fraternity has been the most neglected by theorists of the 
revolutionary triad, is largely due to the fact that 'While parts of what may be defined 
as liberty [.. ] and parts of equality may be achieved by means of laws or other 
specific measures of political reform, fraternity cannot be so conveniently translated 
into even partial practice,' (Hobsbawm, 1975, p 471), being rather 'a function of 
certain types of society or movement' (ibid). 
Hobsbawm argues that the notion of fraternity implies both 'an ideal of society as a 
whole, and an ideal relationship between people for particular purposes: a programme 
and a technique' (ibid, p. 472). Yet this distinction between the 'programme' and the 
`technique' reflects precisely the kind of crude distinction between 'means' and 
`ends' which the anarchists were so opposed to, as is evident in their critique of 
Marxism (see Chapter Four). For the social anarchists, in conceptualizing 
revolutionary social change, the 'programme' and the 'technique' were one and the 
same thing. The social anarchist vision of the good society is, then, arguably 
precisely the conjunction of both aspects of fraternity which Hobsbawm mentions —
the social ideal and the ideal form of relationships - and, perhaps, the insistence that 
they are one and the same: the fraternal relationships which are so essential to 
building functional communities for a common purpose, are exactly those which 
should underpin the ideal of the good society, on the social anarchist view. It is in this 
respect, indeed, that fraternity can be regarded as a core educational value — implying 
both the ideal and the practice necessary to promote and underpin it. 
Hobsbawm offers a historical account of the development of the notion of fraternity, 
suggesting that 'middle—class liberal political thought has always been essentially 
individualist', regarding fraternity therefore as only 'a by-product of individual 
impulses' or the result of functionalist systems. 
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Furthermore, he argues, 'The people who have used and needed fraternity most in 
modern societies, are least likely to write books about it; or if they do, they tend to be 
esoteric, like most Masonic literature' (ibid). Illustrative of this point is the fact that 
fraternity has always been regarded as a basic value of the labour movement, but is 
not, as such, an articulated aspect of political theory. 
Hobsbawm in fact makes the claim that the revolutionary triad - 'Equality, Liberty, 
Fraternity' — was almost certainly historically derived from the Freemasons. The 
Masonic notion of fraternity embodied, according to Hobsbawm, the idea of 'a 
relation of voluntary mutual aid and dependence, which implies that each member 
can expect the unlimited help of every other when in need' (Hobsbawm, 1975, p. 
472), and thus implied a 'certain type of social cooperation' (ibid). This notion is 
remarkably close to Kropotkin's notion of mutual aid, although without Kropotkin's 
historical perspective on its political manifestations and its conceptual connections to 
different types of social organization. As Hobsbawm points out, it is essential to this 
idea of mutual help that it is 'not measured in terms of money or mechanical equality 
or reciprocal exchange' (ibid) — and thus has the notion of kinship built into it. More 
pertinently, he argues that this notion invariably has 'overtones of communism', as 
`the obligations of artificial brotherhood frequently implied the sharing, or at least the 
free use of, all property between "brothers"' (ibid). 
Both White's and Hobsbawm's analyses draw attention to the strong ethical aspect of 
fraternity, and also to its emotional aspect - an aspect which seems somewhat 
neglected in the anarchist treatment of the notion. 
Hobsbawm notes that, although theoretically neglected, the fraternal code has 
survived to some extent in revolutionary organizations, unions, and some political 
parties, where it has an essential function. As part of a political programme, however, 
it is, as he remarks, 'less clear and codified', and has played a generally minor role in 
political programmes, where it is most often used to propogate the idea of the 
`brotherhood of man' as opposed to the narrower bonds of nationalism and 
patriotism. Interestingly, Hobsbawm barely mentions social anarchist progammes in 
his historical account. This omission is particularly surprising given Hobsbawm's 
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general remarks on the role played by the notion of fraternity after the French 
Revolution, when it expressed, as he puts it, 'part of what men expected to find in a 
new society' (Hobsbawm, 1975, p.4'72). A fraternal society, Hobsbawm writes, in a 
description which sounds like a paraphrase of Kropotkin, 
was not merely one in which men treated each other as friends, but 
one which excluded exploitation and rivalry; which did not organize 
human relations through the mechanism of a market — or perhaps of 
superior authorities. Just as slavery is the opposite of liberty, and 
inequality of equality, so the competitive system of capitalism was the 
opposite of fraternity (ibid). 
So for the social anarchists, fraternity and the connected notions of mutual aid, 
benevolence and solidarity, were not only argued to be real and salient features of 
human life in society (see Chapter Three), but were assigned normative status as the 
basis for the ideal, stateless society. In this context one can also see the further 
significance of the anarchist insistence on small, face-to-face communities as the 
basic units of social organization. Keeping social units and institutions as small as 
possible not only has the function of facilitating non-hierarchical, decentralized forms 
of social organization and avoiding oppressive bureaucratic structures, but is also 
clearly essential to ensure the flourishing of fraternity. For only in small communities 
can the basic sense of solidarity with and fraternity towards others be maintained. It 
is anonymity and lack of inter-personal understanding which not only exacerbates 
socio-economic injustice, but also facilitates the phenomenon of free-riders which 
many theorists cite as an inevitable problem of stateless societies. 
Interestingly, in this connection, many liberal theorists — most notably Rawls — seem 
to start from the assumption of a community of rational individuals not characterized 
by fraternal feelings. Rawls' circumstances of justice', in fact, are necessarily 
defined in this way, leading some critics like Sandel to point out that justice only 
becomes relevant in the absence of feelings such as fraternity and benevolence. 
Sandel quotes Hume, who remarked: 
Increase to a sufficient degree the benevolence of men, or the bounty 
of nature, and you render justice useless, by supplying in its place 
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much nobler virtues, and more favourable blessings (in Sandel, 1982, 
p. 32). 
Perhaps the most outspoken exponent of the view that such 'nobler virtues' have a 
basis in human nature and, accordingly, can underpin a well-functioning, equitable 
stateless society, was Joseph Proudhon, who anticipated Kropotkin in arguing for a 
`social instinct' which is prior to any formal account of social justice: 
To practise justice is to obey the social instinct; to do an act of justice is 
to do a social act... man is moved by an internal attraction towards his 
fellow, by a secret sympathy which causes him to love, congratulate, 
condole; so that, to resist this attraction, his will must struggle against his 
nature (Proudhon,in Edwards, 1969, pp. 226-7). 
This sense of the social virtues as constituting the foundation for social organization 
and, if not undermining the priority of justice altogether, at least giving rise to a 
different understanding of what justice may mean, is captured by Kropotkin in the 
following passage: 
It is the unconscious recognition of the force that is borrowed by each 
man from the practice of mutual aid; of the close dependency of 
everyone's happiness upon the happiness of all; and of the sense of 
justice, or equity, which brings the individual to consider the rights of 
every other individual as equal to his own. Upon this broad and 
necessary foundation the still higher moral feelings are developed. 
(Kropotkin, in Read, 1974, p. 155). 
This passage also reflects the anarchist view that life in cooperative communities is 
not only underpinned by the social virtues, but itself constitutes an important 
educative force in fostering and maintaining these virtues. 
Sandel, in his critique of Rawls, provides further support for the argument that the 
anarchist insistence on small communties implies normative moral, as well as 
functional considerations pertaining to the priority of social values. As he notes, we 
can easily imagine large-scale organizations like the modern state meeting the 
requirements of the circumstances of justice, but 'we can readily imagine a range of 
more intimate or solidaristic associations in which the values and aims of the 
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participants coincide closely enough that the circumstances of justice prevail to a 
relatively small degree' (Sande], 1982, pp. 30-31). 
Although Rawls, of course, acknowledges the social significance of interpersonal ties 
and sentiments of affection, solidarity, and so on, he does not include such 
sentiments as part of the motivations of the people in the original position, who are, 
as Sandel remarks, 'theoretically defined individuals' (Sande], 1982, p. 147). One 
would expect to find people with a sense of justice acting in accordance with such 
sentiments 'once the veil of ignorance is lifted', as Sandel comments, but they cannot 
form part of the theoretical foundations on which the just society is constructed. Yet 
as Hume has noted, the 'nobler virtues' of benevolence and fraternity, if increased, 
would render justice, if not totally irrelevant, at least theoretically less central. 
On the anarchist view, fraternity and the connected social virtues are not just fostered 
by life in small, face-to-face communities, but are at the same time necessary for the 
stability of such communities, as Michael Taylor has discussed. Obviously, as 
McKenna points out, 'one is less likely to fight within a community, or to wage war 
with another community, if they view people of that community as connected to 
themselves' (McKenna, 2002, p. 61). Similarly, it makes no sense, as the member of 
such a community, to undermine other people's projects, or to produce something of 
inferior quality, because 'at some point the inferior product will come back to you' 
(ibid). 
Liberal Values? Anarchist Values? 
Both the discussion of human nature and the above discussion of the core values of 
social anarchism seem to suggest that anarchism, as an ideology, is not as far 
removed from liberalism as may have first appeared, and in fact overlaps with liberal 
values in important respects. The difference seems to lie primarily in what Ritter 
refers to as the anarchists' daring leap' of supposing that a society which embodies, 
as fully as possible, the virtues of individual autonomy, social equality and mutual 
aid, can be sustained without the institutional mediation of the state. 
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Yet another, important, conclusion is also emerging from this discussion. Namely, if 
the stability of a social-anarchist society rests so clearly on the presence of these 
social virtues, and if there is to be no state structure to maintain it, it seems as if 
education, and particularly moral education, has an important role to play. What 
form, then, is such an education to take in an anarchist society? There are two ways 
of approaching this question. One is to construct, on the basis of anarchist theory, a 
philosophical argument for an educational process designed to foster and maintain the 
types of ideal communities envisaged by the social anarchists. Another approach is to 
look at actual accounts of educational experiments conducted by anarchists over the 
years, and to ascertain whether such practice is consistent with anarchist principles 
and in what way - if at all — it was conceived as playing a role in achieving the 
desired social change. In the following chapters, I shall employ both these 
approaches in an attempt both to illustrate instances of educational practice by 
anarchists, and to discuss the philosophical perspective on education behind such 
practice. 
Education for the Social Virtues 
Given the central importance assigned to the social virtues in sustaining an anarchist 
society, it follows that a moral education which fosters this attitude must surely form 
the basis of all anarchist education. I suspect, too, that most anarchist thinkers were 
aware of the fact, mentioned in the preceding chapter, that the problem of how to 
maintain a stateless, decentralized community without resorting to a certain degree of 
public censure, remains one of anarchism's chief theoretical stumbling blocks. The 
central role played by educational programmes in so much of the anarchist literature 
seems to be, amongst other things, an implicit acknowledgement of the need to 
surmount this problem, although it also, of course, results from the anarchists' 
contextualist perspective on human nature, as discussed in Chapter Three. And of 
course, as Goodwin and Taylor note, ideals such as the social anarchists' ideal of a 
society based on the principles of self-government and participatory democracy, in 
which there were very few rules for adults, often rested on the assumption of there 
being 'massive moral education of children' (Goodwin and Taylor, 1982, p.45). 
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The clearest expression of this idea in the anarchist literature is in Kropotkin's essay, 
`Anarchism; Its Philosophy and Ideal' (Kropotkin, 1897), in which he states (p. 23); 
When we ask ourselves by what means a certain moral level can be 
maintained in a human or animal society, we find only such means: the 
repression of anti-social acts; moral teaching, and the practice of mutual 
help itself. 
Following a similar line of thought, Kropotkin goes on to write of the importance of 
`moral teaching' - 
...especially that which is unconsciously transmitted in society and 
results from the whole of the ideas and comments emitted by each of us 
on facts and events of everyday life. But this force can only act on 
society under one condition: that of not being crossed by a mass of 
contradictory immoral teachings resulting from the practice of 
institutions (ibid). 
These passsages reveal both the central role assigned to moral education in anarchist 
thought and the anarchist view that if social institutions are to fulfil their educative 
role both before and after the dismantling of the state, they must themselves embody 
anarchist principles. On a more sinister note, the above passage also hints, in its 
reference to 'the repression of anti-social acts' at an acknowledgement of the need 
for some form of what Ritter refers to as 'public censure'. Of course, one can 
imagine certain relatively benign versions of 'public censure', such as the practice of 
`shaming' — which has of course aroused renewed theoretical interest through the 
development of theories of reintegrative justice. Nevertheless, one cannot help 
feeling that, given this choice of phrase, Ritter and others may be justified in fearing 
that the value of individual autonomy may be under serious threat in a social-
anarchist community. 
I have argued here that not only does an attempt to take the anarchist perspective on 
social change seriously prod us to think about education in a different way, but also 
that there is a substantive, primarily moral core to educational programmes conceived 
from a specifically anarchist position. Of course, education is only one of the 
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channels through which anarchists sought to create an alternative social reality to that 
which, they believed, was characteristic of social relations constituted by the state. 
As Bookchin notes: 
Sensibility, ethics, ways of building reality, and selfhood have to 
be changed by educational means, by a politics of reasoned 
discourse, experimentation and the expectation of repeated failures 
from which we have to learn, if humanity is to achieve the self-
consciousness it needs to finally engage in self-management. 
(Bookchin, 1990, p.189). 
The questions to be addressed now are how this perspective might be translated into 
educational policy and practice, and how might the normative core of anarchist values 
discussed here be reflected in the content of specific educational programmes. This is 
the task of the next two chapters. 
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Chapter Six 
Anarchism Goes to School 
In light of the above outline of anarchism, the role of education in anarchist thought 
may seem more confusing than ever. On the one hand, given the anarchist aversion 
to blueprints, and the demand for constant experimentation in the endeavour to 
improve society, it may seem quite reasonable to argue that doing away with schools 
and formal education altogether would be a crucial step towards the creation of an 
anarchist society. Indeed, the anarchists' insistence that individuals be 'active agents 
creating the possibilities of their own future' (McKenna, 2001, p. 52) seems to 
demand that any education be broadly libertarian — allowing, as far as possible, 
freedom for creative experimentation, critical thought and active problem-solving. 
This view is also, of course, a consequence of the anarchist insistence that the means 
for achieving social revolution be consistent with its ends. 
Yet on the other hand, the discussion of the substantive core of anarchism suggests 
that any educational practice consistent with these values cannot coherently adopt a 
libertarian position, in the sense of a laissez-faire attitude to children's upbringing. 
Although the terms 'anarchist education' and 'libertarian education' are often 
conflated (not least by writers themselves sympathetic to the anarchist tradition, such 
as Michael Smith, whose book on the subject is titled The Libertarians and 
Education), it is important to clarify to what extent, if at all, the social anarchists were 
libertarians when it came to education. 
It has of course been argued by certain theorists within the libertarian tradition, for 
example, Stephen Cullen (Cullen 1991), and to a certain extent A.S. Neill (see below) 
- certainly with regard to moral education - that any form of education is a kind of 
coercion, and as such has no place in a truly free society. The alternative could be 
something like Ivan Illich's 'learning webs' (see Illich, 1971), educational 
relationships entered into on a contractual basis, or a reconception along the lines 
suggested by Carl Bereiter's vision, where, although society may not undergo any 
radical structural changes, all pretence at 'educating' people has been abandoned as 
morally unacceptable (Bereiter, 1974). In both these cases, what effectively happens 
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is that society itself becomes the educating force. In Bereiter's case, it is not clear 
how this is going to happen, as he makes no explicit commitment to particular 
political principles, whereas in Illich's case, there is more of a clue as to the kind of 
society he would like to see — one in which 'convivial' institutions replace the 
coercive institutions of the state - a vision similar to the original social anarchist one, 
but without the egalitarian commitment or the working out of economic principles. 
However, as evidenced by the sheer volume of anarchist literature devoted to 
educational issues, and the efforts invested by anarchist activists in educational 
projects, the social anarchists, unlike the above theorists, seemed to agree that 
schools, and education in general, are a valuable aspect of the project for social 
change, rather than proposing to do away with them altogether along with the other 
machinery of state bureaucracy. 
Of course, to a certain extent, this point is a logical conclusion from the anarchist 
conception of human nature. If, as has been often contended, the anarchists believe 
that human nature is naturally benevolent, that children have in some sense an innate 
capacity for altruism and mutual aid - the virtues deemed necessary to sustain a 
social anarchist society - then, one could argue, it would be enough to do away with 
the repressive institutions of the state; in the absence of such coercive and 
hierarchical structures, these positive human qualities would flourish, without any 
need for further intervention. Any learning necessary for practical purposes could be 
accomplished by some sort of informal network like that proposed by Illich. 
Such a perspective sometimes seems to be suggested by certain anarchist writers, for 
example, Emma Goldman who, upon visiting Sebastian Faure's libertarian anarchist 
school in France at the beginning of the last century, commented, 
If education should really mean anything at all, it must insist upon the 
free growth and development of the innate forces and tendencies of the 
child. In this way alone can we hope for the free individual and 
eventually also for a free community which shall make interference and 
coercion of human growth impossible. 
(Goldman, 1906) 
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Without an understanding of the ideological context of anarchism, and particularly 
the contextualist anarchist view of human nature, these remarks by Emma Goldman 
could be construed as calling for a reconceptualization of education; a perspective 
which would replace the narrow understanding of education as a formal system that 
goes on in institutions, with a broader view of how society should educate its 
members. Yet, as discussed above, the contextualist view of human nature goes a 
long way towards explaining the need for a substantive programme of education. And 
indeed, what Goldman and the many other anarchists involved with educational 
theories and experiments over the years had in mind was a consciously planned 
process of education which was to occur in places which, although perhaps very 
different from the traditional schools of the time, were nevertheless undoubtedly 
kinds of schools. 
Just what, though, did such schools look like? What, in other words, is 'anarchist 
education', in its practical manifestation? In posing this question, I cannot help 
recalling a conversation I had some time ago with Colin Ward, the contemporary 
British anarchist, who commented, perhaps with a touch of irony, 'There is no such 
thing as "anarchist education". There are just different kinds of educational 
experiments which anarchists have supported and been involved in'. This comment 
is important in that it reminds us of one of the essential principles of anarchism, 
namely, that there is no single theory or doctrine as to the correct form of social 
organization, including education. It also indicates the need to answer the question of 
why it is that anarchists have always been sympathetic to particular kinds of 
educational practice. 
Nevertheless, there is, I believe, a particular anarchist perspective on education, and 
the educational experiments which have been conducted over the years by people 
aligning themselves with this perspective share, in spite of their differences, 
important and fundamental features. These features, in turn, need to be understood in 
the context of anarchism as a political ideology. Thus, to answer the question 'what 
is anarchist education?', while keeping in mind the above reservation, it is necessary 
to examine both the educational experiments undertaken over the years by individuals 
committed to anarchist principles, and the theoretical ideas behind these experiments. 
The aim of this chapter is to describe some typical educational projects, initiated in 
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various different historical, cultural and political contexts, and with varying degrees 
of success, which share key features that, as I shall argue later, are unique in the sense 
that they are logically connected to a set of specifically anarchist beliefs. The 
question of the logic of this connection, and the possible tensions between the theory 
and the practice, will be discussed later on. Similarly, I shall not enter into a 
discussion, at present, about the nature of the association between 'anarchist' ideas 
and 'libertarian' ideas on education. The term 'libertarian' is usually used to refer, 
broadly, to all educational approaches which reject traditional models of teacher 
authority and hierarchical school structure, and which advocate maximum freedom 
for the individual child within the educational process — including, in its extreme 
version, the option to opt out of this process altogether. In the following discussion, I 
shall use the term 'anarchist education' to refer specifically to a tradition of 
educational practice and theory which, I shall argue, although it appears to overlap 
with libertarian ideas in certain respects, is significantly different from the 
mainstream libertarian tradition. 
This chapter is not intended to provide a complete historical account of the 
development of the movement for anarchist education. This has already been done, 
in admirable detail, by Paul Avrich in his fascinating study of the Modern School 
Movement in the United States, (Avrich, 1980), and by Michael Smith in his study of 
libertarian educational ideas, to name two central works in the field. I rely heavily 
on these works in what follows, with the aim of painting a picture of what a typical 
anarchist school would look like, as a basis for the ensuing philosophical discussion. 
In addition, I draw on first-hand accounts by pupils and teachers of life in anarchist 
schools and communities. As, apart from the above-mentioned books, the available 
documentation on such projects is often sketchy, the educational experiments 
described here have been selected largely on the basis of the wealth and quality of 
such first- and second-hand accounts that are readily available to the English reader. 
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The Escuela Moderna, Barcelona 1904-1907 
One of the first systematic attempts to translate anarchist ideas into educational 
practice took place in Spain at the beginning of the twentieth century, amidst a 
climate of severe social unrest, high illiteracy levels, and a public school system 
completely in the grip of the Catholic Church. The anarchist movement was 
relatively strong in Spain at the time, and Francisco Ferrer, a long-time political 
radical, was active in anarchist circles both in France, where he lived in exile for 
several years, and on his return to his native Barcelona. While in France, Ferrer had 
become interested in experiments in libertarian education, particularly those of Paul 
Robin and Jean Grave, both influential theorists of libertarian education, and was 
familiar with the educational ideas of the utopian socialist Fourier. He became 
convinced that 'a new society can be the product only of men and women whose 
whole mental and social training has made them embodiments of new social ideals 
and conceptions' (Kelly, 1916). On September 8th, 1901, Ferrer, with the generous 
financial support of a sympathetic patron, opened The Escuela Moderna. By the end 
of the first year, the number of pupils had grown from 30 to 70, and by 1905, 126 
pupils were enrolled. 
In his prospectus, Ferrer declared: 
I will teach them only the simple truth. I will not ram a dogma into their 
heads. I will not conceal from them one iota of fact. I will teach them 
not what to think but how to think (Avrich, 1980, p.20). 
This attitude was typical of early anarchist educators, who emphasized the 'rational' 
nature of the education they were proposing — which they contrasted to the dogmatic 
teaching of the Church, on the one hand, and the nationalistic 'political' education of 
the capitalist state, on the other. Indeed, Ferrer later established the League for the 
Rational Education of Children, which became an important forum for the exchange 
of anarchist-libertarian ideas on education. 
The Escuela Moderna was co-educational — a fact which seems to have been 
perceived by the authorities as more of a threat than any of its other features — and 
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was also quite heterogeneous in terms of the socio-economic backgrounds of its 
pupils. 
Another important aspect of the school was the absence of grades, prizes and 
punishments. 'Having admitted and practiced', wrote Ferrer, 'the coeducation of 
boys and girls, of rich and poor — having, that is to say, started from the principle of 
solidarity and equality — we are not prepared to create a new inequality. Hence in the 
Modern School there will be no rewards and no punishments; there will be no 
examinations to puff up some children with the flattering title of "excellent", to give 
others the vulgar title of "good", and make others unhappy with a consciousness of 
incapacity and failure' (Ferrer, 1913, p. 55). Although Ferrer acknowledged that in 
the case of teaching a trade or specific skills requiring special conditions it may be 
useful to the teacher to employ tests or exams in order to monitor a pupil's progress, 
he made it clear that, if not conducive to the pupils' personal development, such 
devices had no part to play in the kind of education he was advocating. In one of the 
first Bulletins issued by the school, Ferrer noted that, in spite of some initial 
hesitation, the parents of children at the school gradually came to accept and value 
this approach, and he went on to point out that 'the rituals and accompanying 
solemnities of conventional examinations in schools' seemed indeed to serve the sole 
purpose 'of satisfying the vanity of parents and the selfish interests of many teachers, 
and in order to put the children to torture before the exam and make them ill 
afterwards' (ibid). 
There was no rigid timetable at the school, and pupils were allowed to come and go 
as they wished and to organize their own work schedules. Although sympathetic to 
the anti-intellectualism of Rousseau, Ferrer did not scorn 'book-learning' altogether, 
but a great emphasis was placed on 'learning by doing', and accordingly, much of the 
curriculum of the school consisted in practical training, visits to museums, factories 
and laboratories, or field-trips to study physical geography, geology and botanics. 
`Let us suppose ourselves', Ferrer writes, 'in a village. A few yards from the 
threshold of the school, the grass is springing, the flowers are blooming; insects hum 
against the classroom window-panes; but the pupils are studying natural history out 
of books!' (Ferrer, 1909, p. 2). 
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This insistence on the role of practical training and experience in the curriculum also 
reflected a central anarchist educational idea which Ferrer was keen to put into 
practice, namely the idea of 'integral education'. This concept essentially involved 
an understanding of the class structure of capitalist society as being reflected in the 
distinction between manual labour and intellectual work. It received considerable 
theoretical treatment at the hands of several social anarchist theorists, notably 
Kropotkin, and was a crucial element of the anarchist perspective on education. I 
shall offer a more detailed discussion of this notion and its theoretical underpinnings 
in Chapter Seven, below. 
Ferrer was also adamant about the need for teachers to have complete 'professional 
independence'. Criticizing the system by which the educator is regarded as a public 
official, an 'official servant, narrowly enslaved to minute regulations, inexorable 
programmes' (ibid) he proclaimed that the principle of free, spontaneous learning 
should apply not only to the pupil, but to the teacher. 'He who has charge of a group 
of children, and is responsible for them, should alone be qualified to decide what to 
do and what not to do' (ibid). 
The avowedly anti-dogmatic principles behind Ferrer's curriculum, and his apparent 
faith in his ability to create a curriculum which reflected nothing but rational, 
scientific truth, is revealed in the story of the school library. On the eve of the 
school's opening, Ferrer scoured the libraries of France and Spain in search of 
suitable textbooks for his school. To his horror, he reports, he found not a single one. 
The religious dogma of the church on the one hand was matched by the 'political' 
(i.e. patriotic) dogma of the state on the other. He thus opened the school without a 
single book in the library, and sent out a call to leading intellectuals across Europe, 
commissioning textbooks which would reflect the latest scientific discoveries. To 
this end, he installed a printing press on the school premises and enlisted a team of 
translators. The works eventually approved for inclusion in the school library 
included, to quote Avrich, texts on 'the injustices connected with patriotism, the 
horrors of war, and the iniquity of conquest' (Avrich, 1980, p. 23). Alongside titles 
such as The Compendium of Universal History, The Origins of Christianity and 
Poverty; Its Cause and Cure, the children regularly read a utopian fairy tale by Jean 
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Grave, The Adventures of Nono in which, as Ferrer puts it, 'the happier future is 
ingeniously and dramatically contrasted with the sordid realities of the present order' 
(ibid). 
Thus, it would be wrong to assume that Ferrer naively believed that he could provide 
an education which, as opposed to that of the Church and the state, was politically 
neutral. As he said in his prospectus, 'It must be the aim of the rationalist school to 
show the children that there will be tyranny and slavery as long as one man depends 
on another' (Avrich, 1980, p. 24). Accordingly, the children were encouraged to 
value brotherhood and cooperation, and to develop a keen sense of social justice, and 
the curriculum carried a clear anti-capitalist, antistatist and antimilitarist message. 
Another example of this is the teaching of Esperanto, which was seen as a way to 
promote international solidarity. 
In short, Ferrer saw his school as an embryo of the future, anarchist society; as proof 
that, even within the authoritarian society surrounding it, an alternative was possible. 
He hoped that the school would be nothing less than the vanguard of the social-
anarchist revolution. His emphasis on 'rational' and 'scientific' education reflected 
the Enlightenment ideal of progress which, as discussed above, underpinned much of 
anarchist thought. Yet at the same time, his insistence that the school itself be a 
microcosm of anarchist society, in the sense of constituting a community based on 
solidarity and equality, seems to go one step further than the liberal humanist ideal 
that the way to moral progress lies in gradual intellectual enlightenment. While 
obviously allowing both children and teachers a great deal more freedom than was 
common in schools at the time, Ferrer was clearly no libertarian — as the substantive 
agenda of the school illustrates. This reflects the theoretical point made earlier (see 
Chapter Four) that the anarchist stance involves more than just doing away with the 
state by establishing alternative means of social organization; it involves a normative, 
substantive and ongoing commitment to a set of values and principles. The 
educational implication of this point is that an implicit or explicit form of moral 
education underpins all aspects of the anarchist educational process and curriculum. 
Under these circumstances, it is no wonder that the Spanish authorities saw the 
Escuela Moderna, and Ferrer himself, as a threat. Although Ferrer was not directly 
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involved in anarchist activity during the years of the school, and indeed saw himself 
first and foremost as an educator, his anarchist sympathies were obvious, and the 
school was constantly under surveillance and was frequently denounced by the 
clerical authorities as a nest of subversion. In 1906, after years of official harassment, 
it was closed down. Ferrer himself was arrested in August 1909 on false charges of 
instigating the mass uprising, anti-war riots and general strike which had plunged 
Barcelona into violence following Spain's colonial war in Morocco. In spite of 
attempts by the international liberal community to intervene, Ferrer was found guilty 
at a mock trial, and condemned to death by firing squad. 
Ferrer's death, on October 13th 1909, predictably sparked of a wave of international 
protest, and is probably as Avrich notes, the reason why he, rather than Robin or 
Faure, became the most famous representative of libertarian education. The most 
extensive and long-lived Ferrer movement, set up to continue Ferrer's educational 
ideas, arose in the United States, and it is to a study of a typical school of the 
movement that I now turn. 
The Ferrer School; New York and Stelton, 1911-1953 
The Ferrer School in New York (or, as it later came to be known, the Modern School) 
obviously took Ferrer's educational creed as its inspiration, its founding members 
being convinced that rational, libertarian educational practice was that most likely to 
advance anarchist ideas. Thus the 1914-15 prospectus for the school states: 'The 
Modern School has been established by men and women who believe that a child 
educated in a natural way, unspoiled by the dogmas and conventionalities of the 
adult, may be trusted in later life to set his face against injustice and oppression' 
(Kelly, 1916). 
Accordingly, the basic organizational principles of the school were very similar to 
those of the Barcelona school, namely, coeducation, an emphasis on 'learning by 
doing', an anti-authoritarian pedagogy, and a heavily anti-capitalistic, anti-statist and 
anti-religious tone throughout the curriculum. However, the New York group seems 
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to have taken the idea of the school as a vanguard of the socialist-anarchist 
revolution, and as a microcosm of an alternative society organized on non-
hierarchical, cooperative grounds, further than Ferrer did. They believed that in order 
for the children to develop an adequate understanding of ideas such as justice, 
equality and cooperation, they must experience these first-hand in the fullest possible 
way. Thus: 
We hold that children do not and cannot learn the meaning of duties or 
rights in an economic system composed of masters and slaves. That is 
why the children of the public schools and the vast majority of children 
who are pampered and petted by their ignorant or blinded parents know 
nothing clearly of either rights or duties. Where alone can children, or 
any others, learn the meaning of rights and duties? In a mode of life 
which is genuinely cooperative. A life whose products all justly share 
and whose labour all justly share. This points inevitably to a school 
which is based upon complete and inclusive cooperation (Kelly, 1916, 
pp. 4-5). 
Accordingly, a key feature of the New York school was the communal garden, where 
children learned to plan, plant, care for and gather plants communally. In addition, all 
maintenance and domestic work on the school premises was shared cooperatively by 
the children and staff. In fact, the New York school also served as a kind of 
community centre, offering a wide range of adult education courses, public lectures 
and social gatherings, and as a centre for political activity. In 1915, pursuing their 
ideal of communal life even further, the New York anarchist group purchased a tract 
of farming land at Stelton, New Jersey, where they set about founding an anarchist 
colony. The school, which moved there, became a focal point of the colony. Here 
the community attempted to put their social anarchist ideals into practice, working the 
land and sharing administration of community matters. A key element of their 
ideology, which was reflected in the school, was the idea of breaking down the 
distinction between 'brain-work' and 'manual-work' - a theme which, as mentioned 
above, was repeatedly taken up by anarchist theorists (see Chapter Seven, below), and 
which can be seen in Ferrer's insistence on integral education. The justification for 
this approach was, first and foremost, a political one: as Harry Kelly writes (Kelly, 
1916, p. 5) 'The curse of existing capitalist society is its parasitism. It permits idle 
and useless people to live on the products of its useful members. No society is 
tolerable in which all are not workers. In the Modern School, all are workers.' 
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The anarchist ideal of a socialist, communal society also stressed the need for a 
natural continuity between the world of the school and that of the community. This 
ideal was more practically feasible once the school moved to Stelton, where many of 
the teachers and parents involved in the school were also active members of the 
colony, and the children naturally combined schoolwork with work in the community. 
The educators involved in the experiment saw their creation of the community around 
the school as naturally connected to the libertarian call for a more spontaneous, child-
centred pedagogy. Thus, in an argument which anticipates the critique of the 
institutionalization of education by the capitalist state voiced by the de-schoolers 
some fifty years on, Elizabeth Ferm, an influential teacher at Stelton, states: 
Herding children in child centers has made it necessary to control 
and regulate their activities. As the child does not understand the 
reason for his being gathered in with so many strange children and 
strange adults, one of the first problems of the teacher is how to 
adjust him as quickly and as pleasantly as possible into a grade or 
group where he seems to fit. There is no time to let the child 
adjust himself slowly and to find his own place (Ferm, 1949, 
p.11.) 
However, it would appear that the enthusiasm of these and other anarchist educators 
for child-centred pedagogy stemmed more out of a general sympathy for any calls for 
radically challenging mainstream educational practice and therefore constituting an 
alternative to state-controlled schools, than out of any carefully worked-out 
theoretical arguments. Furthermore, at the beginning of the twentieth century, the 
child-centred, or progressive education movement was heralded as the most 
`scientific' approach to education, which partly explains its appeal for anarchist 
educators. Like the European anarchists, the American anarchists associated with the 
founding of the Ferrer school (amongst them leading activists such as Emma 
Goldman, Alexander Berkman and Harry Kelly) saw themselves and the education 
they were promoting as essentially 'rational' and 'scientific' — in contrast with what 
they saw as the dogmatic, superstitious beliefs which prevailed in the state system. 
Thus, Kelly stated, in an editorial entitled 'The Meaning of Libertarian Education', 
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Our aim in the Ferrer School is to free both the child and the adult 
from the false conventionalities and superstitions which now hinder 
the progress of the race. We believe that these superstitions operate 
chiefly in the fields of industry, religion and sex, so that we 
especially direct attention to those three subjects. [... ] We are not 
dogmatics in the sense that we teach any one ism or point of view to 
the exclusion of others. We believe that every human being has the 
right to make his or her choice of life philosophy (Kelly, 1913). 
Indeed, the anarchist suspicion of anything highly systemized and prescriptive, along 
with their revolutionary social outlook, led the New York group to be highly critical 
even of some progressive educational theorists, such as Montessori and Pestalozzi. 
Emphasizing the difference between the anarchist-libertarian approach and that of the 
Montessori system, a further editorial in the Modern School journal states: 
Ferrer, a freethinker and social revolutionist, treats of the school as an 
essential factor in the struggle for a new society; Montessori, a Roman 
Catholic and social reformer, regards the school as a means to prepare 
the child for the present society — admittedly an imperfect society, but 
one gradually improving [... ] Montessori's work indicates that she 
desires not much more for society than remedial measures for its ills. 
Several times in her book she writes of the yoke of slavery growing 
easier from century to century. It is the voice of the conservative 
shrinking at the thought of the larger scheme, and regarding the 
prolonged existence of things as they are with complete equanimity. 
Not so Ferrer. It is not enough for him to lighten the yoke from 
century to century. He demands its utter removal. (Kerr, 1913). 
The author goes on to conclude that in order to develop in children such an objective, 
enlightened view of society and a commitment to the desired social change, it is 
essential to remove all 'political' (a term seen as equivalent to 'patriotic') or religious 
education from the curriculum. The ideal was that 'every pupil shall go forth from it 
into social life with the ability to be his own master, and guide his life in all things' 
(Avrich, 1980, p. 75). In theory, then, the curriculum of the Modern School in New 
York and Stelton was to be less prescriptive than that offered by Ferrer, which, as 
discussed, contained explicitly anti-statist and anti-capitalist messages. In practice, 
however, the American Modern School was far from a-political, both in terms of the 
formal study programme and in terms of the inter-connectedness between the school 
and the community, which led to participation by pupils and teachers in workers' 
rallies, political meetings, and so on. In short, there seems to have been some 
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confusion amongst these anarchist educators as to the extent to which a libertarian 
pedagogy could be combined with a substantive curriculum and school ethos. In 
spite of their general sympathy for the idea of child-centred education, their 
reservations about this approach clearly reflect their belief in the necessity of radical 
social change, and their conviction that such change could only be achieved by people 
`whose education has trained them [... ] to cherish and practice the ideas of liberty, 
equality, and fraternity' (Kelly, 1916, p. 51). It is a serious failing of the work of 
anarchist educators that they made little systematic attempt to provide a theoretical 
account of the relationship between child-centred pedagogical practice and their own 
anarchist goals and values. Nevertheless, I would suggest that the emphasis, in their 
writing and practice, on expressions of the basic idea formulated in the above quote, 
reinforces the impression that what gave these projects their distinct identity was not 
their espousal of particular educational practices, but their underlying moral and 
political vision. 
So although the educational philosophy of the Ferrer schools in New York and 
Stelton was, in some sense, child-centred, this was understood in a far looser sense 
than that developed in the work of Dewey and Montessori. Indeed, the founders of 
the school claimed (Kelly, 1914) that the idea of highly-trained teachers 
implementing the Montessori method with the appropriate apparatus was nothing less 
than 'a contradiction of the rational idea of education', which they saw as essentially 
concerned with the spontaneous development of the child: 
A normal child is capricious, whimsical and spasmodic in 
activity. Unless he is under control he will not persist in the use 
of didactic toys or any set apparatus for play [... ] The Montessori 
method presupposes that children are interested in building 
correct staircases, in discriminating among shades of a colour. It 
takes for granted that little folks should learn to be economical in 
movements; that they should be quiet and orderly; that they 
should persist, that they should learn to endure. 
Although acknowledging that this inhibition of the child's instincts may often not be 
conscious on the part of Montessori educators, the author cites the physical and 
psychological dangers of such practice — which, he argues, hinder emotional growth 
and independent thought. 
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In comparison, the Modern School had no rigid structure, curriculum or schedules, 
but maintained 'what order we feel necessary', relying on the anarchist principle of 
natural order — i.e. an order evolved from below, as opposed to imposed from above. 
In this, they were primarily taking a stand against what they regarded as the 
essentially authoritarian order of the conventional school — an authoritarianism which 
is reflected and reinforced throughout the social practices of the capitalist state. This 
stance also reflects the basic anarchist insight that the ideal mode of social 
organization is a non-hierachical, decentralized one, in which any system of authority 
and rules is functional and temporary. 
The insistence of the educators involved in the Ferrer School, and later at Stelton, that 
what they were doing was providing an education that was above all rational and 
scientific, is witnessed by several amusing anecdotes about interaction with the 
children. On one occasion, for example (described in Ferm, 1949), a teacher reports a 
small child running up to her from the kitchen to say that 'The potatoes are ready!' 
At which, the child is confronted with a series of interrogations — 'How do you 
know?' Did you test them?' What makes you think so?' — all designed to encourage 
children to appreciate the difference between facts and judgements, to develop their 
abilities to think in a rational fashion, to rely on observation and empirical 
verification — in short, to make them 'scientific.' 
Although there was no formal timetable at the Modern School, lessons were offered 
along the lines of fairly traditional academic subjects, and children were free to attend 
them if and when they wished. The classes on offer are listed in the prospectus as 
follows: 
English, History, Geography, Physiology, Biology, Astronomy.... Big 
words, these, but we have no others to use and to employ them here 
means that normal young people want to know what the stars are, how 
the earth and the soil and the sea and themselves were made. (Kelly, 
1916) 
For most of these classes, the children did group work, with very little frontal 
teaching by the teacher. Yet one teacher described how, in the case of arithmetic, 'the 
individual system of research' seemed to prevail, as opposed to the other classes, 
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where group work was the norm. Apparently, the pupils, by mutual consent, had hit 
on an arrangement whereby they began 'doing sums' individually on coming into 
class in the mornings. 'In an extreme emergency', writes the author, 'or if his faculty 
of perseverance is not working as well as usual, one calls on the teacher or some other 
pupil to help him out of a tight place. But the general feeling is that it is much better 
to "get stuck", to turn back and see where the difficulty is. Whatever may be said 
against this lonely struggle in the arithmetic field, it certainly develops powers of 
initiative and perseverance' (ibid). 
In short, the founders and, to a large extent the administrators, of the Ferrer School in 
New York and later at Stelton, like Ferrer himself, made no pretense at political 
neutrality in education. They saw what they were doing as an important attempt to 
challenge what they regarded as the conservative forces at work in all aspects of the 
state system, and to further the development of a radically different kind of society. 
Like the Escuela Moderna in Barcelona, the New York school appealed primarily to 
working-class parents, many of whom were already involved in radical social 
movements, and who objected to the values being promoted in the public schools. 
Defending the need for the Modern School in a country like the United States, where 
there is free public schooling, Stewart Kerr puts forth the classic anarchist argument 
against state schooling: 'The ruling classes everywhere [...] use the school, often 
unconsciously, as a means to keep themselves in power, to maintain things as they 
are'. The Modern School, in contrast, 'is consciously dynamic, aims to cultivate the 
critical attitude of mind, the indispensable factor in every step forward the world has 
ever made [... ]. The avowed purpose of the public school is to equip the child for his 
environment. The order of the environment is not questioned [...]. It is the function 
of the modern school to strip the social system of its economic fallacies and expose 
its sordid selfishness' (Kerr, 1913). 
Although longer-lived than most experiments in communal living, the Stelton colony, 
and with it the school, was in decline from the late 1920's onwards, and finally 
disintegrated in 1953. Avrich cites both the impact of the Depression and the rift 
created in the community between the anarchists and communists during the First 
World War as the main reasons for its demise. 'Before the war, radicals of different 
stripes could still argue about their differences, could still have their different groups 
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and theories and yet agree about a common enemy, capitalism, and be friends — could 
even start colonies together. But after the war and the Russian Revolution, this 
became more and more difficult' (interview with Ben Liberman, in Avrich, 1980, p. 
327). Ben Lieberman, a former colonist, pinpoints the final rift at a somewhat later 
date, citing Stalinism as the decisive reason for the break-up of the community (see 
Avrich, 1980). 
Walden School, Berkeley, 1956 - 
The idea of setting up the Walden Center and School grew out of the long 
association and friendship of a group of committed anarchists, communists and 
pacifists, most of whom had been active in anti-conscription movements, workers' 
union struggles and various other social causes. On becoming parents, several of the 
group, unwilling to send their children to the available state schools, which they 
regarded as reflecting a cultural conflict 'between human needs and social 
structures', and attracted by the idea of community life (many of them had already 
been part of experiments in communal living) developed the idea of founding and 
running their own school, which was to be not only 'a means of educating children 
in a freer environment, but also a centre for education and action in the adult 
community we were a part of(Walden Foundation, 1996, p. 25). Although not all 
founding members belonged to the anarchist movement, they all, according to the 
testimony of several members of the group, 'shared the anarchist-pacifist philosophy 
that shaped the school' (ibid, p.65). 
As political activists throughout the nineteen-forties and fifties, many of the 
founding group had experienced marked changes in their political thinking, which 
evolved, according to one testimony, 'from the nineteenth century belief that 
revolutionary change was possible in our lifetime, to our taking a long view of the 
role of anarchism in society' (ibid, p. 21). Thus their agenda, and their political 
activities, were somewhat less revolutionary than those of the anarchists involved in 
the Modern School at the beginning of the twentieth century. Of course, this had to 
do largely with the changed political context within which they were operating —
both at the macro level, and at the level of what was actually going on in public 
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schools at the time (for a further discussion of this, see below). Nevertheless, most 
of the group still regarded themselves as continuing a line of anarchist thought, and 
felt, in keeping with this tradition, that 'if revolutionary change wasn't imminent, 
there must be action we could take that would point to the possibilities inherent in 
anarchistic relationships' (ibid). Some of the founding members had in fact, before 
moving to California, had some contact with teachers and colonists at Stelton. 
The process of agreeing, jointly, on the school's programme and structure, was 
regarded as an experimental, philosophical exercise through which the group tested 
their educational ideas in light of their philosophy, and ' strove to build a form, both 
functional and educational, that most reflected our anarchist/pacifist views' (ibid, 
p.24). 
The form which this initial process took is in itself an example of anarchist 
principles put into practice: wary of the tendency of ideas to turn into ideology, 
principles into dogma, and 'carefully wrought attitudes' into slogans, the founders 
were reluctant to document the countless discussions and debates which preceded 
and accompanied the initial years of the school, and avoided creating a written 
programme or prospectus. This suspicion of constitutions, dogmas and blueprints 
for institutions and practices is, of course, a basic thread common to all anarchists, 
who believe that to lay down such blueprints would undermine the commitment to 
human freedom, progress and perfectibility. 
Another political principle of anarchism put into practice in these founding sessions, 
as well as in regular parent-teacher meetings throughout the years, was the rejection 
of the democratic belief in majority rule — the adherence to which had, according to 
David Koven, destroyed parent/teacher coalitions in other independent schools 
where the founders of the cooperatives had used it to 'push their Marxist bias' (ibid, 
p. 28). What Koven and his colleagues sought, in contrast, was a form and day-to-
day management practice that would 'prevent the creation of a bureaucracy that 
could dictate life at the school' (ibid, p. 27). All decision making, therefore, took 
place only after the group had reached consensus. Furthermore, in order to prevent 
the founding group from becoming 'stodgy and self-satisfied', it was agreed that 
every new teacher or family was entitled to join in the decision-making process after 
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having been at the school for an initial period of one to two years. This commitment 
to consensus meant that no proposed new action or policy to which any member of 
the school community objected could be carried out until the principled objection 
had been heard and discussed and a workable compromise had been reached. Of 
course, the insistence on consensus by no means rules out the possibility of power 
struggles and, furthermore, as testified by the founders, running the school this way 
meant that the process of decision-making was slow and painstaking. However, they 
felt it was an essential element of their anarchist commitments and seemed 
convinced that it ensured the community, to a considerable degree, against power-
struggles over the control of the school and the development of an ambitious, power-
seeking minority. 
What is of particular interest in this context is that all the founders were adamant that 
the school was not to be a 'parent-teacher cooperative'. Although the founding 
parents outlined the basic philosophy of the school, they felt very strongly that on a 
day-to-day basis, the teachers needed to be in charge, as the ongoing continuity 
essential to good education could not occur if the teachers were constantly at the 
whim of the parents. Ultimately, the founders believed, education was the concern 
of teachers and children, and thus, 'parents could raise hell, but in the end, decisions 
were made at the teacher-child level' (ibid, p. 79), with many decisions made by the 
children themselves. 
As the Fourth Draft of the Philosophy Statement (the only surviving document from 
the early years of the school) states: 
`We do not visualize the teacher as a technician, mass-producing according to 
someone else's plan, but as a sensitive, creative force at innumerable moments in the 
learning experience'(ibid, p. 10). 
Another basic anarchist tenet which was translated into educational practice at 
Walden is the belief in small communities as the optimal units of social organization. 
This belief is reflected not only in the organization of the community around the 
school — which relied heavily on personal contacts, mutual support and friendship as 
a basis for commitment to this and other projects — but in the pedagogical principle 
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that class size should be limited (fifteen was eventually agreed upon as the maximum 
number of children per class) in order to promote an ideal learning environment for 
children - one in which the teacher could be responsive and sensitive to individual 
needs and could relate to the children on a personal basis. 
In keeping with these anarchist principles of social organization, the school in effect 
had no central authority, and thus each teacher was autonomous and was responsible 
for determining procedures, developing curricula and planning programmes — aided 
in this process, of course, by the ongoing discussions with other members of the staff 
and the board. 
What is surprising, however, in the context of this emphasis on freedom, is that, in 
contrast to many accounts of experiments in anarchist education (notably those 
discussed above), there is very little mention in the accounts of Walden of the notion 
of the freedom of the individual child. Of course, there is frequent mention of 
general principles designed to promote the child's freedom — for example, 'We do 
not believe in simple indoctrination, even for the sake of the good' (ibid), and of the 
vision of a school that would help children to 'think independently, would give them 
all the tools for creative existence, [... ] would be secular, would have no heroes, no 
presidents, no icons' (ibid, p. 40). Likewise, several of the founders point to an 
explicit connection between anarchist principles and pedagogic practice in the notion 
that 'the needs of children rather than the needs of the state' should be the driving 
motives behind educational practice. However, there is very little mention of the 
way these ideas were reflected in the day-to-day life of the school. It is not at all 
clear, for example, what Walden's position was on the issue of compulsory 
attendance — abolishment of which is commonly a central principle of anarchist 
educational initiatives. Denny Wilcher, one of the original founders, testifies that 
`no teacher ever forced a child to attend structured classes' (ibid, p. 79), but the 
emphasis in the school's philosophy seems to be more on a commitment to the 
individual development and emotional and intellectual needs of the child, rather than 
to the principle of non-coercion per se. In fact, the school's apparent reluctance to 
make non-attendance a central and viable option for children is suggested by the fact 
that, from the beginning, they attempted to deal with this issue by carving out spaces 
in the curriculum in which such practice was legitimated. 'On Wednesdays', as 
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Wilcher describes, 'there was no school at all and groups and individuals did 
whatever interested them' (ibid, p. 78), and another founding parent and teacher, 
Alan MacRae, is credited with having invented `Hookey Day', held on the first day 
of Spring, when the entire school, parents included, went to the park and played. 
Another point on which Walden seems to differ from the anarchist educational 
initiatives of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, is in its emphasis on the 
arts and creativity in general. In contrast to schools such as the Ferrer School in 
New York or the Modern School at Stelton, where great emphasis was placed on 
rationality and 'scientific' approaches, the first few years at Walden were 
characterized by an emphasis on dance, music and plastic arts, and the high points of 
the school year were always lavish productions of various musical dramas on which 
the parents, teacher and children collaborated. This emphasis could have been due in 
part to the fact that many of the founders were themselves professional dancers, 
musicians or skilled craftspeople, and brought their skills in these fields to the school 
when they became involved as teachers. But there does also seem to have been an 
explicit commitment to the role of artistic creativity in creating the kind of 
educational environment and, indeed, the kind of society envisioned by the founders. 
The classes at the school took the form of a confederation of groups, each new child 
being admitted not to the school but to a particular group, and each group made a 
commitment to engage in a significant amount of music, dance and arts and craft, 
which, according to Wilcher, 'were seen as basics, not luxuries' (ibid, p. 79). 
Most of the above principles, adopted by the founders of the school, have endured 
over the years and are clearly an essential element of the school's identity. 
However, several founding members, reflecting, in the mid-nineteen-eighties, on the 
development of the school over the years, expressed the view that the political ethos 
of the school community had changed considerably. The current parent body 
seemed, in the word of one of the founding members, to be 'more interested in 
success' and less open to radical ideas on education and society. The principle 
characteristics of the school today would appear to be an emphasis on creativity, a 
commitment to collective decision-making, and an atmosphere of mutual respect 
between teachers and children. Nevertheless, Koven concludes, in 1987, (ibid, p. 
33), 'When I think of Walden functioning for almost thirty years without a director 
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or central authority, I'm filled with both awe and joy. Here is real affirmation of our 
anarchist insight.' 
In short, Walden seems to have differed from earlier anarchist educational 
experiments primarily in that it saw itself not so much as a vanguard of the anarchist 
revolution, or a step towards developing the kind of people capable of bringing about 
and sustaining the free society of the future, but, above all, as an experiment in 
human living. The underlying idea seems to be a commitment to anarchism as 'a 
way of life'. As such, the Walden school would seem to be less clearly a reflection 
of the political ideology of the social anarchists discussed in the preceding chapters, 
although it echoes many central anarchist ideas. One way of bringing out these 
differences between Walden and the experiments set up by nineteenth century and 
early twentieth century anarchists is in terms of how the school community 
perceived the relationship between the school and the wider society. In the case of 
the early social anarchists, it is quite clear that the school was intended to be not only 
a microcosm of a society perceived as an alternative to the state, but also a vanguard 
of the social anarchist revolution. The school, in other words, had two revolutionary 
functions: creating a generation of people capable of laying the basis for the future 
anarchist society, through a process of moral education and engagement in critical 
social and political activism; and serving as an example to the surrounding society of 
how such an alternative future was possible. In the case of Walden in contrast, one 
gets the impression that the school founders saw their school less as a revolutionary 
vanguard, and more simply as a social experiment, serving primarily to remind the 
outside world that alternatives are possible. 
Summerhill - A Non-Anarchist Experiment 
The above description may suggest that the famous Summerhill School, the longest-
lived libertarian educational project, founded in Leiston, Suffolk in 1921 by the late 
A.S. Neill, is a natural candidate for inclusion in this account. Indeed, from a 
structural point of view, there are many similarities between day-to-day practice at 
Summerhill and that at the anarchist schools described here. Summerhill, like 
anarchist schools, has no rigid time-table or curriculum, teaching is informal, children 
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are free to come and go as they like (provided they remain within the school grounds 
— a compromise Neill was forced to make in order to comply with the Compulsory 
Education Law), and Neill always rejected traditional roles of teacher authority. 
Similarly, Neill's writings, which continue to inform the school's policies and 
practice, are full of references to the freedom of the individual child, and damning 
descriptions of authoritarian child-rearing practice. 
One of the few differences which are immediately apparent on the structural level has 
to do with the avowedly democratic principles involved in the administration of 
Summerhill. In contrast to the anarchist suspicion of majority rule as a political 
system (as evidenced by the example of Walden, above), Summerhill has always 
stressed its democratic character, both at the level of policy and day-to-day running of 
the school. In the context of Summerhill and similar schools (such as the Israeli 
Democratic School in Hadera, which is modeled on Summerhill), the notion of 
democracy seems to have been given a very narrow interpretation, emphasizing above 
all the principle of majority rule. The school meeting, for example, one of the key 
features of life at Summerhill, is an assembly where every member of the school 
community — staff and children alike — have equal voice, and where all decisions are 
reached by democratic voting. 
Apart from this obvious example, however, the differences between Summerhill and 
similar libertarian or 'free' schools, on the one hand, and anarchist schools on the 
other, may not be immediately apparent. Yet they are, I believe, crucial. In order to 
understand their significance, one has to examine the philosophical and ideological 
commitments which informed the educational theory of each of these initiatives. A 
consideration of the philosophical background of anarchist educational ideas, as 
discussed in the preceding chapters, shows that these two apparently similar types of 
school in fact reflect very different positions. 
Firstly, and perhaps crucially, Neill conceived of freedom in a primarily individual, 
psychological sense. 	 His chief intellectual influences were those of the 
psychoanalytical tradition — especially the work of Wilhelm Reich and, later, Homer 
Lane. Thus, although critical of existing society, he believed that the way forward to a 
better world lay in gradual reform at the individual level — a sort of mass therapy, in a 
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sense, by which we would gradually achieve a society of self-aware, uninhibited, 
emotionally stable and happy individuals. In contrast, the notion of freedom behind 
the anarchist position is, along with other concepts such as those of freedom and 
cooperation, not, as Smith puts it, 'an abstract, context-free concept', but one which 
carries 'concrete political connotations' (Smith, 1983, p.17). 	 The anarchist 
understanding of freedom in the context of education involves, as discussed in 
Chapter Four, not only a clear sense of, as Smith notes, 'what pupils are to be freed 
from' (Smith, 1983, p. 87), but also a carefully thought-out positive ideal. 
In contrast, in A Dominie Dismissed, one of Neill's early books, which is a semi-
autobiographical story based on his years as a young teacher in rural Scotland, he 
describes his dissatisfaction with the current state of society: 'Obviously present day 
civilization is all wrong'. But, a dominie might cry, 'can you definitely blame 
elementary education for that?' I answer 'Yes, yes, Yes!' Neill, quoted in 
Hemmings, 1972, p. 24). Thus Neill, unlike the anarchists, did not seem to believe 
that broad, structural social change was the main goal of social reform. Rather, he 
envisioned a process of social transformation whereby educational practice, reformed 
along the lines he suggested, could remedy the ills of society. Interestingly, Neill 
echoed many anarchist ideas in his emphasis on the need to remove authority as a 
basis for relations in the family, the school, and the work-place. He was greatly 
impressed by the work of Homer Lane, at the Little Commonwealth, the experimental 
self-governing community for young delinquents. Self-government, Neill argued, not 
only serves to remove the negative effects of authority, but also 'breeds altruism', as, 
witnessed by the experiments of Homer Lane and others (Hemmings, 1972, p.30). 
Yet Neill was adamant on his non-political - one may even argue, value-relative —
position as an educator. 'Life is so difficult to understand', he remarked in an 
interview for the The New Era (quoted in Hemmings, 1972, p. 35), 'that I personally 
cannot claim to settle the relative educational values of anyone.' As Hemmings 
comments, Neill seemed genuinely to believe that 'children must determine their own 
values, in culture as in morality' (ibid). This is a far cry from the committed political 
stance of anarchist educators who, though they may have believed in the educational 
value of allowing free, critical dialogue and encouraging creative independent 
thinking on the part of pupils, had no qualms about stating their own ideological 
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convictions, and indeed designed a curriculum and a school climate which would 
reflect the values implicit in these convictions. For 'neutrality in the school', the 
anarchist founders of the Modern School declared, 'can be nothing but hypocrisy', 
and they went on to state: 'We should not, in the school, hide the fact that we would 
awaken in the children a desire for a society of men truly free and truly equal [...], a 
society without violence, without hierarchies, and without privilege of any sort' 
(Ferrer, 1909, p.6). 
Neill, although he began his professional life as a teacher, developed a growing 
fascination with Freudian psychology early on in his career, and in fact described 
himself on several occasions as a psychologist rather than an educationalist - his 
preface to The Problem Child (Neill, 1926) begins with the words: 'Since I left 
education and took up child psychology...' and, as early as 1922, in A Dominie 
Abroad, he states 'It has come to me as something of a sudden shock that I am no 
longer interested in teaching. Teaching English bores me stiff. All my interest is in 
psychology' (Hemmings, 1972, p. 48). 
As Hemmings notes, Neill's agreement with Homer Lane's idea of 'original virtue' —
reflected in his insistence that all moral instruction perverts the innate goodness of the 
child — entails certain philosophical difficulties when placed alongside his apparent 
moral relativism. 
A more explicit statement of his views on society and the individual can be found in 
his comment, in The Problem Child, that 'When the individual and the social interests 
clash, the individual interests should be allowed to take precedence' (Neill, 1926, p. 
216). This suggests that Neill did not share the anarchist view of humans as 
essentially social by nature, and of the impossibility of talking about individual self-
fulfillment in isolation from the social context. 
Hemmings goes as far as to suggest, based on Neill's comments about the primacy of 
individual interests and the need for the child to create his own culture and values, 
that 
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Such insistence on individual freedom led Neill to avoid serious 
consideration of the social consequences of his education: he was 
prepared to let these evolve their own way. On the individual level, 
he was saying that if the emotions were right the intellect would look 
after itself, and as regards social structure he seemed to be assuming 
that, given emotionally healthy individuals, their culture could safely 
be left to develop. (Hemmings, 1972, p. 109). 
Smith, too, notes that at Summerhill, there is 'no systematic attempt to introduce the 
discussion of political values [... ] and no real attempt to promote cooperative values' 
(Smith, 1983, p.100). 
This view is in fact backed up by my own impressions of visits to Summerhill today. 
One has the impression of a lively group of self-confident, happy children, who may, 
one imagines, very well grow up to be happy, but completely self-centred individuals. 
As witnessed by the account by a new teacher of the opposition he encountered from 
the school staff to his proposal to develop a P.S.E. project involving children from the 
local town, there is little attempt to engage with broader social issues, or to confront 
present socio-political reality. Indeed, there is very much a sense (again, this is 
supported by comments of parents at the school) of the school having created a little 
island, in which Summerhill, and the superior kind of education which it represents, 
is regarded as being against the rest of the world, with its misguided ideas. Whereas 
the anarchists associated with the schools described above were always deeply 
involved in the social and political environment in which they lived, and seemed to 
feel themselves to be in some sense a part of something greater, in contrast, as 
Hemmings notes (Hemmings, 1972, p. 174), for the children and teachers at 
Summerhill, the school itself represents the 'real, present society — the conflicts and 
demands of the 'outside' society being somewhat removed from experience'. 
This contrast is reflected, too, in the way in which Summerhill recently conducted its 
battle against the threat of closure from the current government, following a damning 
OFSTED inspection. Instead of addressing the broader social implications of the 
threat by a centralist government to an alternative school, and broadening support for 
their campaign by engaging with other groups (such as struggling comprehensive 
schools in deprived areas, frustrated teachers and parents) who felt their autonomy 
and rights to make educational choices similarly threatened — the school community 
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chose to focus their campaign on the particular validity of Neill's educational 
philosophy, and their right to defend this philosophy against that of the mainstream 
educational establishment. For the anarchists, although they did indeed aim to create 
a community that represented a particular way of social organization, a way of life 
different from that typical of surrounding society, nevertheless they saw themselves 
as constantly engaging in the outside world — as, indeed, involved in an ongoing 
process of interaction with it in their efforts to bring about the social change they saw 
as so essential. As Hemmings suggests, what Neill was really after was an 
appreciation of freedom for its own sake (Hemmings, 1972, p.73) — a far cry from the 
anarchists, who viewed freedom, in the sense described here, as an inherent aspect of 
creating a society based on mutual aid, socio-economic equality and cooperation. 
Anarchist Schools Versus Libertarian Education 
In short, although many writers, Smith among them, include Summerhill and similar 
schools under the broad heading of 'libertarian education', I believe there is a 
significant difference between the philosophical and political outlook behind these 
experiments in alternative education, and that of the anarchist schools discussed 
above. It would appear that the anarchist educational experiments are unique in the 
world of 'progressive', 'libertarian' or 'free' education not in terms of their 
pedagogical practice, but in terms of the substantive ideas and motivations behind 
them. These ideas can only be grasped in the context of the anarchist commitment to 
undermining the state by creating alternative forms of social organization and 
relationships. 
As discussed above, the anarchist view of human nature as not predominately or 
innately 'good' or 'evil', but as determined largely by social context, goes a long way 
towards explaining the central role anarchist thinkers over the ages have assigned to 
educational experiments, and particularly to the moral content and form of these 
experiments. In contrast, it is in fact the libertarian position associated with 
educational experiments such as Summerhill (for an account of similar educational 
projects, see Shotton, 1993) which makes the type of optimistic or naïve assumptions 
about human nature often wrongly attributed to anarchism. John Darling notes this 
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point in his discussion of 'growth theorists' (Darling, 1982), where he quotes Neill as 
assuming that children are 'naturally good' and will turn out to be 'good human 
beings if [they are] not crippled and thwarted in [their] natural development by 
interference' (Neill, quoted in Darling, 1982, p. 68).  
The picture of typical anarchist schools outlined above, then, serves two purposes: 
Firstly, it makes it abundantly clear that anarchists did not subscribe to the view that 
one can do away with education, or even with schools, altogether, but seemed to 
agree that schools, and education in general, are a valuable aspect of the project for 
social change, rather than simply another objectionable aspect of the machinery of 
state bureaucracy. 
Secondly, it distinguishes the anarchist view from the extreme libertarian view that 
there is something morally objectionable in the very attempt by educators to pass on 
any substantial beliefs or moral principles to children. 
Although, as Ehrlich puts it, 'In an anarchist society, the social function of schools 
and the potential of education would be quite different' (Ehrlich, 1996, p.15), I think 
the point made by Morland about Bakunin's thought, namely, that 'some form of 
schooling will exist after the abolition of state mechanisms' (Morland, 1997, p.113), 
generally holds true for the social anarchists. 
How such schools would be run, and by whom is, in keeping with the anarchists' 
commitment to free experimentation and their aversion to blueprints, to be left to the 
discretion of individual communes. The following passage from Bakunin provides 
further illustration of this idea, along with support for the point, made above, that the 
social anarchists, unlike many libertarian educators or individualist anarchists, 
regarded education as an important social good, and were reluctant to leave it in the 
hands of parents. 
It is society not the parents who will be responsible for the upkeep of 
the child. This principle once established we believe that we should 
abstain from specifying the exact manner in which this principle should 
be applied; to do otherwise would risk trying to achieve a Utopia. 
Therefore the application must be left to free experimentation and we 
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must await the lessons of practical experience. We say only that vis a 
vis the child, society is represented by the commune, and that each 
commune will have to determine what would best for the upbringing of 
the child; here they would have life in common; there they would leave 
children in care of the mother, at least up to a certain age, etc. 
(Bakunin, in Dolgoff, 1973, p.372). 
However, this passage by Bakunin clearly refers to education in the post-state reality, 
i.e., once the social-anarchist society has been established. Although, as discussed 
above, the anarchist view of human nature explains the need for an ongoing process 
of moral education alongside the educative function of social insitutions run on 
anarchist principles, many anarchists were theoretically vague on the question of the 
role of education in bringing about the transition to the anarchist society. 
Most anarchist writers on education in fact completely fail to distinguish between the 
stage of life within the state and the — theoretical - stage of life beyond the state. 
Such a failure is responsible for a great deal of confusion and, indeed, largely 
explains the enthusiasm of many anarchist sympathizers for educational experiments 
such as Summerhill which, while arguably in keeping with Bakunin's vague remarks 
about the forms of education acceptable in the future anarchist society, do not, as 
discussed, provide the substantive moral core necessary to further and sutain such a 
society. However, in another sense, this very failure to distinguish between these two 
theoretical stages in itself reflects an important aspect of the anarchist perspective on 
education and one in which, I suggest, it differs from the mainstream liberal, as well 
as the Marxist, view. 
Means and Ends in Education 
The picture of education that emerges from this discussion then is a complex, 
dialectical one, in which education for social virtues is both necessary to sustain 
stateless, cooperative communities, and is itself reinforced by the day-to-day 
experience of life in such communities. Yet how, one may still insist, are we to get 
from a to b? Given that we are faced, today, with the all-pervasive and, to all intents 
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and purposes, permanent reality of the liberal state and its institutions, how are 
educators with anarchist sympathies expected to use education as one amongst the 
many means to further their goals? 
This question has both a theoretical and a practical aspect. On the theoretical level, it 
has to do with how we conceptualize the relationship between means and ends. 
The means-ends distinction has received considerable attention in the tradition of 
liberal-analytic philosophy of education. Richard Peters famously argued, in 'Must an 
Educator Have an Aim' (Peters, 1959), that the inherently normative aspect of the 
concept 'education' should not mislead us into thinking of education in terms of a 
model 'like building a bridge or going on a journey' (Peters, 1959, p.123), where all 
experiences and processes leading up to the stated end are regarded as means to 
achieving it. So although talk of education inevitably involves judgements of value, 
the simple ends-means model, according to Peters, can give us 'the wrong picture of 
the way in which values must enter education'. 
Yet what Peters is anxious to avoid here is a notion of aims which implies a simple 
ends-means model and thus an apparent willingness to employ any means necessary 
in order to achieve the stated end. He gives as an example of what he calls a 'very 
general aim', the political aim of equality, arguing that the type of people who regard 
this as an important aim, lured by the picture of a society without inequalities, often 
advocate all sorts of drastic structural measures in order to achieve it. The notion of 
equality, when employed as a 'principle of procedure', on the other hand, would, 
according to Peters, yield far more moderate, liberal measures — for example, the 
insistence that 'whatever schemes were put forward must not be introduced in a way 
which would infringe his procedural principle' (ibid, p. 127). The second type of 
reformer would, as Peters notes, not have any 'concrete picture to lure him on his 
journey' (ibid). 
However, I would criticize Peters on this point, for 'aims' of the kind he has in mind 
are often important in providing what Noam Chomsky has called an 'animating 
vision' (Chomsky, 1996, p. 70) for human activity, particularly education. It is the 
way one thinks of such an aim, and the imaginative use one makes of it, rather than 
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its general nature, that determines whether or not it can become a constructive factor 
in one's educational endeavours, or a restrictive, potentially dangerous one. Positive, 
substantive 'pictures' — of a world without povery, of a society without distinctions 
of class and wealth - are often valuable in inspiring people to act positively to 
improve their lives and those of others. The fact that there is always a risk of aims 
being interpreted rigidly is not an argument against having 'concrete aims' as such, 
but against trying to impose them without any critical evaluation or sensitivity to 
existing conditions. As Dewey notes, it is when aims are 'regarded as literally end to 
action rather than as directive stimuli to present choice' that they become 'frozen and 
isolated'. (Dewey, 1964, p. 73). 
Crucially, for Dewey, the means cannot be determined in advance, and they are in 
constant interplay with the aim which, far from being a fixed point in the distance, is 
constantly a part of present activity; not 'an end or terminus of action' but something 
which directs one's thoughts and deliberations, and stimulates action; 'Ends are 
foreseen consequences which arise in the course of activity and which are employed 
to give activity added meaning and to direct its further course.' (ibid p.'72) 
Furthermore, the original 'aim' is constantly being revised and new aims are 'forever 
coming into existence as new activities occasion new consequences' (ibid, p. 76). 
This Deweyan idea goes somewhat towards capturing what I believe is the anarchist 
perspective on the relationship between education and social change. Crucial to this 
perspective is the insight that while aims and goals play an important role in the 
educational process, they do so not in the sense of ends and means. Thus criticisms 
such as Erin McKenna's, that 'the anarchist vision lacks a developed method of 
change' (McKenna, 2001, p. 65) seems to me to fall into the trap of assuming a 
simplistic ends/means model. This model, whereby educational processes are 
regarded merely as a means to achieving social or political ends, is an inadequate tool 
for understanding the anarchist position. 
I said, above, that the question of how to get from a to b has both a theoretical and a 
practical aspect. I hope these remarks on the conceptualization of ends and means go 
some way towards addressing the theoretical aspect. I shall take up these themes 
again in the ensuing discussion. As far as the practical aspect goes, it may be helpful 
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to examine this question by looking, in the next chapter, at a specific issue of 
educational policy. Contrasting the liberal treatment of a particular policy issue with 
the anarchist treatment of it will, I hope, illustrate these theoretical points about the 
way in which anarchist goals and visions can be reflected in educational processes, 
and about the general differences in perspective between anarchism and liberalism. 
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Chapter Seven 
Education for an Anarchist Society: Vocational Training 
and Political Visions 
As the preceding discussion suggests, many anarchist ideas and experiments in 
education stemmed from the belief, informed by the anarchist view of human nature, 
that a key aspect of the revolutionary process involved nurturing and developing 
those moral qualities deemed necessary to create and sustain a social-anarchist 
society. In other words, the emphasis in anarchist educational programmes was not 
so much on attempting to bring about a pre-conceived alternative model of social 
organization, but on laying the ground for the natural evolution of such a model by 
means of fostering the attitudes that underpin it, alongside the experiment of creating 
a microcosm of anarchist society. This perspective underpins the experiments in 
anarchist education described in Chapter Six, but it is often unarticulated. It is only 
by unpacking the philosophical and ideological insights of anarchism as a theory that 
one can appreciate the uniqueness of such experiments in the world of libertarian 
education. 
As suggested above, the means-ends model is insufficient to capture the relationship 
between education and social change within anarchist thought. Nevertheless, the 
picture painted in the preceding chapter of some typical anarchist schools, alongside 
the suggestion for a more fully developed account of moral education, answers, to 
some extent, the practical question of 'What should an anarchist educator do in order 
to bring the possiblity of an anarchist society a little closer'? The present chapter 
attempts to answer this question from a different, but related, angle, namely: 'What 
should the anarchist policy-maker or educational theorist do — in keeping with 
anarchist theory - in order to bring the possibility of an anarchist society a little 
closer?' 
By focusing on a particular educational question with important policy implications, 
I hope to draw out what I have described as the anarchist perspective a little more 
clearly, and to contrast it with other perspectives — notably, the Marxist and the 
Liberal ones. With this aim in mind, I shall discuss the issue of vocational education, 
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which is especially pertinent given the important anarchist idea of integral education. 
As the following discussion will reveal, the question of the role of vocational training 
within the school curriculum, like other educational questions, can, from an anarchist 
point of view, only be understood within a broad political context. Therefore, this 
discussion will lead into a further development of the idea of the moral and political 
content of anarchist education, and will tie this in with the general theme of the 
anarchist perspective on the relationship between education and social change. 
Accordingly, this chapter consists of two interelated parts. In Part I, I discuss the way 
the notion of vocational education is understood both within the anarchist tradition 
and in the work of two contemporary philosophers of education, Christopher Winch 
and Richard Pring, who have developed in-depth philosophical accounts of this 
notion and its connections with the liberal educational ideal. In Part II I examine the 
moral and political content which, I argue, plays a crucial role in the anarchist 
educational endeavour and which accordingly underlines the distinct perspective 
offered by the anarchist position. 
Part I. Vocational Education: Theory and Practice 
Integral Education 
The anarchist notion of integral education — i.e. an education which combined 
intellectual and manual training - was an important feature of all anarchist schools, 
notably the Escuela Moderna in Barcelona (see Chapter Six), and Paul Robin's 
educational experiments in France (see Smith, 1983, pp.18-61). But the chief 
theoretical exponent of this idea was Kropotkin who, in 'Brain Work and Manual 
Work' (Kropotkin, 1890) and in Fields, Factories and Workshops Tomorrow 
(Kropotkin, 1974), set forth the ideal of a society in which, instead of the current 
`pernicious distinction' between 'brain work' and 'manual work', reflecting 
divisions between a 'labouring' and an 'educated' class, all girls and boys, 
`without distinction of birth', should receive a 'complete education'. Kropotkin's 
theory was informed by the assumption, shared by Marxist theory, that labour — as 
a central aspect of human life and an element in personal well-being — is to be 
distinguished from work — which, in capitalist society, becomes merely a 
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commodity, to be sold for a wage. Yet, perhaps more importantly, Kropotkin's 
views were guided by the belief in social equality as a valuable and attainable goal, 
and the ideal of a society based on mutual cooperation and fraternity. 
From this perspective, Kropotkin's analysis of capitalist, industrialized states, and 
their inherent inequalities, convinced him that it is the capitalist system itself which 
divorces manual work from mental work and thus creates the false dichotomy between 
the two, and the associated inequalities in social status. The only way to break down 
these divisions was to provide an education in which, in the words of Proudhon, 'the 
industrial worker, the man of action and the intellectual will all be rolled into one', 
(Edwards, 1969, p.80). In fact, by the late nineteenth century, this idea had become an 
established tenet of revolutionary socialist educational thinking. This is reflected in 
the fact that one of the first acts of the Paris Commune was to establish an Educational 
Commission committed to providing all the children of the community with integral 
education. The idea, as described by Edwards in his account of the commune, 
`expressed the desire both to learn a useful trade and at the same time escape from the 
specialization caused by division of labour and the consequent separation into 
educated and uneducated classes' (Edwards, quoted in Smith, 1983, pp. 31-32). 
Thus the notion of integral education involves more than just a breaking-down, at the 
practical level, of the traditional liberal-vocational distinctions; it does not propose, 
that is, merely to ensure that all children leave school with a useful trade and 
appropriate theoretical knowledge, so that they may become fully participating 
members in the productive economy. The theoretical assumptions behind this notion 
are, first and foremost, political. Integral education programmes along these lines 
were seen as an essential element of educational experiments such as those of Paul 
Robin, in France, where the school was intended to create an environment embodying 
a commitment to social equality and the belief that communities run on the principles 
of co-education, freedom from coercion, respect for the individual child and self-
government could form the vanguard for the Socialist revolution. Thus, at Paul 
Robin's school for orphans, Cempuis, intellectual education was seen 
as essentially complementary to manual and physical training. 
Questions, problems, needs, arose out of the day-to-day practice of 
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the workshops, but not in a mechanical, over-programmed way 
[... If manual training was carried out in the right way, the child 
would want to know more of the principles behind it (Smith, 1983, 
p. 34). 
The political motivation behind this approach, then, was explicit and was an intrinsic 
part of the project of laying the foundations for the social-anarchist revolution. 
Similarly to the theoretical defence of polytechnical education systems established in 
the Soviet Union immediately after the revolution, and in Communist China, one of 
the main reasons for believing in the value of an education which involved real 
encounters with the world of work was that distancing children from this world in an 
academic environment would cut them off from the experience which lay at the basis 
of social and political consciousness. Both Marx and Mao explicitly defended the 
view that 'combining work with study would keep the young in touch with those 
moral and political truths which were part of the consciousness of the working class' 
(Smith, 1983, p. 52). Although Kropotkin was less focused on the struggle of the 
working class, and emphasized instead the needs of a complex industrial society and 
the value of cooperative social organization, this theme can nevertheless be found in 
much anarchist writing on the content of the school curriculum, as illustrated, for 
example, in the educational writings of Francisco Ferrer (see Chapter Six). 
The early social anarchist thinkers were only too aware of the realities of the growing 
industrialization they were witnessing, and of the fact that they were educating 
workers. They held, with Proudhon, that 'the work a man did was something to be 
proud of, it was what gave interest, value and dignity to his life. (Smith, 1983, p. 25). 
Thus, 
An education that was divorced from the world of work, that is, an 
education that was entirely bookish or grammar-schoolish in 
conception, was valueless from the point of view of ordinary 
working-class children. Of course, an education that went too far 
in the other direction, which brought up children merely to be 
fodder for factories, was equally unacceptable. What was required 
was an education which would equip a child for the work-place but 
would also give him a degree of independence in the labour 
market. (ibid). 
Furthermore, the anarchist concept of integral education, apart from reflecting the 
anarchist social ideal, also involved an important notion of personal well-being. 
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The social-anarchist challenge to the typical division of labour in society would, it 
was hoped, help to avoid the sense of monotony involved in working in one 
occupation throughout life. This was regarded as reflecting what the anarchists 
called the 'fundamental organizational principle of diversification' (Smith, 1985, p. 
19), which itself was seen as a consequence of the essential human need for 
diversity. 
But, crucially, anarchist educational programmes also involved a commitment to 
political and moral education, in the sense of challenging the dominant values of the 
capitalist system — for example, the wage system, the competitive market-place, the 
control of means of production, and so on — as well as fostering the social virtues. 
Thus, while challenging the existing system and trying to minimize its damaging 
effects on future workers, social anarchist educators never lost sight of the radical 
new reality which they wanted to create — and which, they believed, was fully within 
the scope of human capabilities and aspirations. It is in this sense that they represent 
a shift in perspective from main-stream thinking on these issues. 
The social anarchist perspective on vocational education can be interestingly 
contrasted with both the Marxist and the liberal one. It is of course because Marxists 
focus on the class dimension as basic to all notions of social struggle and resistence, 
that they see the necessity of educating a proletarian revolutionary vanguard. They 
are traditionally, then, concerned with the education of workers. Specifically, the role 
of education from a Marxist perspective is, above all, to bring class political 
consciousness to the worker; a role which, according to Lenin, could only be done 
from the outside, by an enlightened educator (see Bantock, 1984, p. 242). 
Bantock suggests that the Marxist enthusiasm for comprehensive education (i.e. an 
education which combined academic and vocational training) was a result first and 
foremost of the Marxists' environmentalist position — i.e. the fact that it is 
environmental influences —amongst them education — and not natural capacities 
which influence human potential. They therefore rejected as bourgeois ideas such as 
intelligence-testing and streaming. The Marxist attitude to vocational education is 
also informed by the critique of labour as a commodity in the capitalist system, and 
the conviction that the labour process should be 'a purposive activity carried on for 
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the production of use-values, for the fitting of natural substances to human wants- . 
(Bantock, 1984, p. 229). 
While anarchists share with Marxists many assumptions regarding the nature of 
labour in capitalist society, the anarchist perspective on social change and the role of 
the state leads to a very different conception of vocational education, as the 
following discussion will show. Similarly, this distinct anarchist perspective can be 
illustrated by a contrast with common perceptions of vocational education within the 
liberal tradition. 
Integral Education and Fraternity 
As mentioned in Chapter One, certain commentators have suggested that it is in fact 
fraternity, rather than freedom or equality, which should be regarded as the chief goal 
of social anarchism. However, as the preceding discussion suggests, I believe that 
such philosophical exercises in establishing the theoretical priority of any one goal or 
value within anarchist thought are misconceived. Of course, one could make a 
general point about the incommensurability of values within political theories, as 
Isaiah Berlin has discussed with reference to liberalism. However, in the case of 
anarchism, this general philosophical point is particularly salient as it is, I believe, 
partly a reflection of the anti-hierarchical stance of anarchist thinkers. Thus the 
anarchist antipathy to structural and permanent hierarchies in social and political 
organization could be read as analogous to a general suspicion of hierarchical 
thinking when it comes to concepts and values. 
The above remarks notwithstanding, it is certainly true that, as discussed in the 
previous chapter, fraternity can be regarded as an important educational goal for 
anarchists. 
As the educational experiments discussed in Chapter Six illustrate, the moral qualities 
involved in the attitude of fraternity, which are an essential requisite for the creation 
and maintenance of social anarchist communities, were promoted largely through 
what we would refer to as 'school climate' — in other words, through the fact that the 
school itself was run as a microcosm of a social-anarchist community in the making. 
Geoffrey Fidler, on the basis of research into the work of late nineteenth and early 
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twentieth century French anarchist-libertarian educators, has argued for a conceptual 
connection between fraternity and the anarchist idea of integral education. 
The notion of integral education, as described above, developed primarily out of the 
anarchist aim of breaking down the class divisions of capitalist society by doing away 
with the distinction beween intellectual and manual labour. But, Fidler argues, in his 
analysis of early nineteenth century French experiments in anarchist education, 
`At the heart of libertarian as "complete" education lay the urge to realize an equal, 
voluntary and "right" espousal of the mutual arrangements of the fraternal 
community. This was construed as "natural" and "spontaneous" in the particular 
sense of self-realization succinctly expressed by Les Temps Nouveaux [the journal of 
Libertarian education, edited by Sebastian Faure]'. (Fidler, 1989, p. 46) 
What Fidler seems to be suggesting here is that the anarchist critique of capitalist 
society hinged primarily on their objection to the socio-economic inequalities created 
by the division of labour in such a society. In positing an ideal society, therefore, 
they regarded it as crucial that no such division should obtain, both out of a 
commitment to social equality, and a notion of individual well-being as conceptually 
and psychologically connected to the well-being of the community (see the discussion 
on Bakunin and freedom, in Chapter Four). Yet such a society could not be created 
or maintained without promoting and nurturing the human propensity (already 
present, but often suppressed by capitalist institutions and values) for benevolence, 
mutual aid and fraternity. 
Fidler, in fact, in a passage reminiscent of Ritter's discussion of 'reciprocal 
awareness' as the moral underpinning of social anarchist society, talks of anarchist 
education as being, at heart, an endeavour to 'awaken the social instinct'. This was to 
be achieved, as illustrated by the educational projects discussed in Chapter Six, 
largely through the climate of the school and the moral example of teachers who were 
expected to exhibit what Kropotkin regarded as the ultimate moral principle of 
anarchism, namely, 'treating others as one wishes to be treated oneself.' (Fidler, 
1989, p. 37). 
140 
Fidler argues that this anarchist perspective, best reflected in the work of Kropotkin 
and Reclus, makes a distinctive addition to the world of libertarian education, in that 
the notion of integral education was regarded, above all, in an essentially moral light, 
as 'a means of achieving the conscious or ethical form of fraternity' (Fidler, 1989, p. 
35). The social anarchists involved in such educational experiments, according to 
Fidler, 'enunciate a practical utopianism by affirming their commitment to apparently 
unrealistic moral principles as a vehicle for the realistic purposes of persuasion, 
education and guidance in present conduct (ibid)' 
The anarchist emphasis on the moral qualities necessary to sustain a society 
characterized by a break-down of the manual-intellectual distinctions and their 
resulting inequalities, then, is part of their radical vision of the possibility of a 
stateless society. As such, it seems more linked to a specific political vision than the 
general idea of polytechnic education. However, many theorists within the liberal 
tradition have also dealt with the conceptual problems involved in the traditional 
liberal/vocational distinction, and it is important to understand how the anarchist 
treatment of this distinction differs from the liberal one. 
Winch and Pring: A Philosophical Perspective 
Reconceptualizing the Liberal-Vocational Distinction  
In recent years, many philosophers of education have raised philosophical challenges 
to the apparent dichotomy between liberal and vocational education. Notably, 
Richard Pring has argued for a broadening and reformulating of the liberal ideal so 
as to embrace the idea of vocational relevance, along with 'practical intelligence, 
personal development [and] social and community relevance' (Pring, 1995, p. 195). 
Similarly, Christopher Winch has developed a detailed and rich conception of 
vocational education, embracing concerns about 'moral and spiritual well-being' 
alongside notions of economic and political goods (Winch, 2000).1 Pring's 
motivation for this reconceptualization seems to be primarily the recent attacks that 
the traditional liberal view has come under — notably the claim that it excludes many 
people from the 'liberal conversation' — and the threat to liberal educational values 
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from those who, in response to such attacks, reduce educational goals to the 
language of 'efficiency' or to narrow economic ends. In contrast, Winch's chief 
motivation seems to be a sense that the issue of vocational education has not been 
given the serious philosophical treatment it deserves — presumably partly because of 
the dominance of the traditional liberal conception. 
Richard Pring is rightly critical of the tendency to talk of liberal education as if it 
were, conceptually, diametrically opposed to vocational education. Yet his chief 
criticism is the point that this implies that 'the vocational, properly taught, cannot 
itself be liberating — a way into those forms of knowledge through which a person is 
freed from ignorance, and opened to new imaginings, new possibilities: the 
craftsman who finds aesthetic delight in the object of his craft, the technician who 
sees the science behind the artefact, the reflective teacher making theoretical sense of 
practice.' (Pring, 1995, p. 189). 
Pring's criticism, in other words, is not an external critique from a socio-political 
perspective (a perspective which, as the foregoing discussion shows, characterizes 
all anarchist thought on education), but comes from within the educational sphere 
itself. He argues that vocational education, just like the traditional conception of 
liberal education, can be intrinsically valuable, and connected to a sense of personal 
well-being, and therefore should not be so rigidly conceptually separated . 
Education as Liberation 
The conception of freedom which Pring appeals to here is the very conception which 
lies at the core of the classic liberal account of education, from Plato onwards, 
namely the idea of education as liberating in the sense of freeing the mind. This 
impression is strengthened by the role Pring assigns to the work of Oakeshott in his 
discussion of the model of education which forms the background of his analysis. In 
Oakeshott's idea of education as conversation, freedom is conceived as a freeing of 
the mind from everyday, concrete concerns; liberal education, on this account, 
involves an 'invitation to disentangle oneself from the here and now of current 
Although other philosophers of education have addressed these issues (for example Williams, 1994 
and White, 1997) these two works by Pring and Winch represent the most substantial philosophical 
treatment of the field of vocational education in recent years. 
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happenings and engagements, to detach oneself from the urgencies of the local and 
the contemporary....' (Oakeshott, quoted in Pring, 1995, p. 186). As Pring notes, 
this particular conception of liberal education, in focusing upon the world of ideas, 
`ignores the world of practice — the world of industry, of commerce, of earning a 
living...' (ibid). Yet in arguing that, in our reconceptualizing of the liberal ideal, it 
is this 'art of reflection' that we must preserve, Pring, it seems, is still subscribing to 
a basically liberal notion of what it means to be free. 
Challenging the Framework 
In anarchist thought, in contrast, the concern with the concrete aspects of social 
justice, distribution of goods, and the material well-being of the community are 
always at the forefront of educational thought and practice. Freedom is understood as, 
first and foremost, effective freedom from all forms of oppression. Thus the 
emphasis, for the anarchists, in breaking down the liberal-vocational distinction, is not 
on encouraging critical, detached reflection in the sphere of vocational training in 
order to create more reflective, more intellectually developed craftsmen, but on paving 
the way for the concrete freedom of the worker from the restrictions of the capitalist 
state by, amongst other things, abolishing the division into manual and non-manual 
labourers. 
Of course, at the time at which Kropotkin was writing, the social divisions into 'brain-
workers' and 'manual workers' of which he speaks were far more apparent and clear-
cut than they are today. Early socialist thinkers could not have predicted the socio-
economic developments of late capitalism, in which the traditional category of 
`workers' is no longer such a clearly demarcated social class. Yet the important point 
to understand in this context concerns precisely this relationship between educational 
goals and existing economic and social reality. For Pring, Winch, and many other 
writers in this field, the structure of the economy, the labour market, and the social 
and political institutions in which such educational debates takes place are obviously 
acknowledged to be subject to critical appraisal by active citizens, but it is not the 
aspiration to radically reform them which forms the basis for educational philosophy 
and theory. This may appear to be a subtle difference, and, indeed, it is important not 
to understate the presence, within liberal theory, of a tradition of critical enquiry and 
reform, and of the idea of citizens as actively shaping society. But, especially within 
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the context of liberal philosophy of education which, over the years, has increasingly 
become concerned with education in the liberal state, this assumption of the liberal 
state's inevitability as a basic framework, sets thinkers in this tradition apart from the 
radical social anarchists, in spite of their agreement on certain underlying values. 
Even theorists like Winch and Pring, whose analyses present a radical challenge to the 
traditional conceptual parameters of liberal education, still operate within these basic 
assumptions regarding the inevitability of the liberal state. 
As argued above, although the aspiration to radically restructure social and political 
organization lies at the heart of anarchist thought, the chief concern of anarchist 
educators is not to directly promote a specific model of the good society, but to 
create an environment which will foster and encourage the development of the 
human propensities and virtues necessary to create and sustain new forms of social 
organization without the state. Thus the school, for anarchist educators, is seen 
primarily as a microcosm of one of the many possible forms of anarchist society; an 
experiment in non-hierarchical, communal forms of human interaction where, 
crucially, alongside a rigorous critique of existing capitalist society, the interpersonal 
relationships which constitute educational interaction are based on the normative 
role assigned to the human qualities of benevolence, mutual aid and social 
cooperation. 
Pring and other writers in the liberal tradition note the importance of fostering critical 
attitudes in pupils, but because of the liberal-state perspective which informs their 
work, their discussion seems to lack the normative vision which guides anarchist 
educators. Indeed, whether out of an explicit commitment to autonomy or an 
endorsement of some version of liberal neutrality, liberal educators are often reluctant 
to speak in anything other than general terms of providing pupils with the tools needed 
to make critical judgements and life-choices. In arguing, for example, for a 
breakdown of the distinction between education and training, Pring makes the point 
that one and the same activity could be both 'educational' and 'training' (ibid). But, 
again, the political, moral aspect is entirely absent from this discussion. One can, as 
Pring says, change vocational approaches to education so as to aim to educate 
`broadly liberal, critical' people through the activity of training them; but this in itself 
144 
does not challenge the way we conceptualise society; the basic socio-economic 
distinctions would still hold, even if one aspires to have educated workers. 
All this is not to suggest that theorists like Pring and Winch overlook the political and 
economic context of educational policy. Indeed one important contribution of such 
critiques of the traditional ideal of liberal education is the claim that it does not fully 
take into account the importance of addressing, at the level of educational goals, the 
needs of society and the economy. As Pring puts it, 'there is a political and economic 
context to education that we need to take seriously' (Pring, 1995, p.22). 
Much of Winch's work has been devoted to developing a detailed account of this 
point, drawing on the notion of social capital. Starting from the assumption that all 
education aims at personal development and fulfilment, Winch develops the idea of 
`liberal vocationalism', which embraces civic and vocational education, entailing a 
concept of vocational education which is at once far richer and broader than the 
instrumentalist conception and also, in drawing on social capital theory, implies a far 
wider definition of productive labour than the influential one developed by Adam 
Smith and later by Marx. 
In thereby insisting that vocational education should by no means be conceptually 
confined to 'preparation for producing commodities, or even necessarily for paid 
employment', but that it involves such aspects as civic responsibility, cognitive skills, 
social practices and spiritual development, Winch's analysis may, at first glance, seem 
to be completely in tune with the anarchist aspiration to break down the narrow 
delineation of vocational, as opposed to academic, education. 
However, in social anarchist theory, the political and economic context is defined by a 
normative set of values, the concrete implications of which demand a radical 
restructuring of our social arrangements and institutions. 
Writers within the liberal tradition commonly refer to the 'liberal traditions of 
education' (Pring, 1995, p. 9) as opposed to the 'utilitarian ones of training' (ibid) The 
point of both Winch's and Pring's analyses is to break down these distinctions so as 
to provide a broader conception of what it means, within a liberal conception of the 
145 
good society, to be educated. Yet the conflict to be resolved, for the anarchist, is not 
that between 'Those who see the aim of education to be intellectual excellence 
(accessible to the few) and those who see its aim to be social utility (and thus 
accessible to the many)' (Pring, 1995, p. 114) — a conflict which Pring regards as 'the 
most important and most difficult to resolve' (ibid) - but that between our vision of 
what kind of society we want, and what kind of society we have. Education, on this 
view, is an inherently normative process, and, crucially, a form of human interaction 
and relationship. Yet as such, it is not merely a means for achieving our political 
ideals, but part of the process for discovering, articulating, and constantly 
experimenting with these ideals, in the course of which those particular human 
qualities assigned a normative role in our concept of the good society, need to be 
continually reinforced, articulated and translated into educational practice. 
Thus, while most social anarchists would probably agree with Winch that 'it is 
important to maintain a very broad vision of "preparation for work"' (Winch, 2000, 
p. 163), they would go further than his conceptual point that 'a society that sees the 
development of individuals, of economic strength and of civil institutions as closely 
connected, would find it natural to attempt to achieve a balance in combining liberal, 
vocational and civic education' (ibid, p. 191). For social anarchists are not concerned 
merely with insisting that any discussion of education in society must take these 
issues into account, but are motivated by the belief that there is something radically 
wrong with current society, and that reconceptualizing education and engaging in 
specific, normative educational practices, is one way to go about changing it. 
Challenges Within the Framework 
It would be misleading to characterize either the traditional liberal view or the kind of 
liberal vocationalism promoted by Winch as views lacking in aspirations for 
improvement or for social reform. It does however, seem true to say that both these 
views — as evident in the work of the authors cited here — assume that the way 
forward lies in a broadening and deepening of the democratic aspects of our social 
institutions, out of a belief that this will both contribute to personal well-being and 
strengthen the moral fabric of society. The unwritten assumption behind much of this 
work is that the basic structure of the liberal state is not itself subject to debate. Thus 
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Winch, while clearly committed to democracy and to further democratization of 
social institutions, carefully avoids making any normative pronouncements as to the 
preferred mode of social organization. He attests to this position early on in the book, 
defining the brand of liberalism to which he subscribes as 'the contingent and non-
foundational kind described by Gray as "agnostic" or "contested"' (Winch, 2000, p. 
2). 
Likewise, liberal theorists of vocational education cannot be accused of insensitivity 
to the moral and political aspects of the kind of educational values being promoted. 
Pring, for example, mentions the moral aspect of the social utility conception. 
However he discusses this in the narrow sense of the promotion of virtues (such as 
enterprise) seen to be essential for helping learners function more positively (i.e. 
morally) in the world of work and business. 
Similarly, in arguing for a broadening and elaboration of the often vague concepts of 
personal development and flourishing employed in educational policy documents, 
Pring outlines a philosophical concept of what it means to be a person. In discussing 
the moral aspects of this concept, he refers to two senses in which it is a moral one: 
a) 'It implies the capacity to take responsibility for one's own actions and one's own 
life. On the other hand, it indicates the desirability of being so treated — of being 
given the opportunity for taking on that responsibility and of respecting it in others' 
(Pring, 1995, p. 126-127). This seems, in contrast to the anarchist perspective, to 
shift the emphasis away from the idea of the subject as creator of social reality, or as 
engaged in the ongoing project of making the world a better place. It is true that 
Pring, in the course of his discussion, does emphasize the notion of the person as a 
`social animal' (Pring, 1995, p. 132), and cites the Greek tradition that true human 
life requires participation in the political life of the state. However, one cannot get 
away from the sense that 'social and political life' in this perspective, is not viewed 
primarily, as it is for the anarchists, as something essentially malleable and subject to 
constant, and often radical, experimentation. 
Winch, too, notes the importance of moral education. But this, again, is in terms of 
virtues required by workers as people interacting with others — the workplace, in 
other words, is seen as 'an essential location for the validation of life-choices, for 
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the acquisition of technical skills in conditions where they are to be applied 
seriously, in forming young people into the values, disciplines and virtues that are 
prized in a particular occupational context and in making them aware of the social 
ramifications of their chosen occupation' (Winch, 2000, p. 79). It is in this context 
that Winch argues for the role of schools in preparing people for such choice-
making, and for continuation of this moral aspect of education in the world of the 
work-place. Again, this world, it is implied, is simply 'out there'. In other words, it 
is not at the meta-level which moral and political questions seem to enter such 
debates on educational aims, but at the level of implementation of educational 
programmes within an already accepted social structure. 
So both Winch and Pring, although rejecting the narrow conception of vocational 
education as 'preparation for the world of work', still seem to remain pretty much 
within the tradition that regards 'the world' - however richly theorized — as something 
which is simply out there, to be prepared for and adapted to by the education system 
and its graduates, rather than to be created or changed. 2 
Education and the Socio-Economic Structure: Cause or Effect?  
In general, although most philosophers in the liberal tradition now acknowledge the 
relationship between educational ideas and political and economic issues, this 
relationship is often implied to be a one-way one: education should fit in with 
economic and political trends, rather than, as has been traditionally argued by radical 
dissenters, opposing them and standing for something different. 
The danger, for Pring, is that education may, by clinging to the traditional liberal 
ideals, become 'disconnected from the social and economic world which it should 
enlighten' (Pring, 1995, p. 123). This is, indeed, a welcome criticism and an 
important reassessment of the traditional liberal ideal. However, it reveals the central 
contrast between this and the far more radical anarchist vision which, rather than 
merely 'enlightening' the social and economic world, seeks to radically change it. 
2 
 A great deal of the literature on the issue of globalization in educational contexts makes similar 
assumptions: the economy, we are told, is moving in certain directions, creating certain changes in the 
labour market, and education must follow suit by preparing children for 'an uncertain future', 'flexible 
job-skills', and 'insecure employment' (see for example Burbules and Torres, 2000, p. 28). 
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So while Winch's general conclusion seems to be in favour of the idea that 
`educational, moral and economic ideals are linked, both conceptually and causally...' 
(Winch, 2000, p. 134), the interesting question here is which way the causality goes. 
For the social anarchists, 'politics, and for that matter economics, is subservient to 
morality...' (Adan, 1992, p. 175). Accordingly, it is the vision of a political order 
based on the moral foundations of the social virtues which, in turn, gives rise to 
particular educational ideals and goals. Although one suspects that both Winch and 
Pring would sympathise with this perspective, it is hard to find explicit support for it 
within their writings on vocational education. 
Another interesting illustration of this difference in perspective comes from John 
White's recent book, Education and the End of Work (White, 1997). In criticizing 
dominant theoretical analyses of the role and nature of work in society, White, while 
questioning Marxist-influenced views on the centrality of labour to human life, 
nevertheless acknowledges, in a way which may seem in tune with the anarchist 
account discussed above, that 'any reasonable account of education should make 
work-related aims central... ' (White, 1997, p. 16). He goes on to address the question 
of how parents, teachers and policy makers should conceive the relationship between 
education and work. This question, he says, cannot be answered in the abstract. 'If we 
could see into the future how things will be in 2050 or 2100, we would be better 
placed. But the future of work is radically uncertain' (ibid, p.69). White then goes 
on to discuss two possible scenarios; one involving the 'continuance of the status quo' 
with regard to the dominance of what he refers to as heteronomous work in societies 
like Britain; the other involving a 'transformation into a society in which 
heteronomous work is less dominant'. Interestingly, White himself acknowledges the 
implications of this approach whereby education may be seen to have a primarily 
reactive function, and makes the important point — a point in keeping with the 
anarchist perspective - that 'education can help to create social futures as well as 
reflect them' (ibid, p. 78). However, in spite of these important broad points, the 
focus of White's analysis is a far narrower one; namely, the role of work in 
individuals' lives (see ibid, p.20). Thus, to the extent to which social questions such as 
equality play a part in his work, they do so in the context of notions like 'universal 
equality of respect', intended to further the aim of helping everyone to attain the 
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means of a life of autonomous well-being. Although White acknowledges that this 
liberal ideal will in all likelihood entail a policy of educational investment in the less 
well-off, any social restructuring involved is secondary to the educational goal of 
fostering children's ability to become autonomous adults. White's preference for a 
society in which industriousness is no longer regarded as a central moral value, and in 
which there is a reduction in heternomous work and a more pluralistic social and 
cultural perception of work, is ultimately a result of this ideal rather than, as in the 
anarchist case, the reflection of a vision of a particular kind of society. 
The Social-Anarchist Revolution: Within the State and Beyond the State  
These issues may be further clarified with reference to the distinction (a distinction 
which, as mentioned in Chapter Six, anarchist theorists commonly fail to make) 
between life within the state and life beyond the state. This is not a purely temporal 
distinction for, on the anarchist conception, the social revolution is an ongoing 
endeavour. Therefore one cannot talk, in this context, of a clear distinction between 
pre-revolutionary and post-revolutionary reality. I suggest, however, that it is helpful 
to distinguish between life in a social-anarchist society and life within the state. 
Thus for example it is quite possible that once the social-anarchist revolution is 
successful, and society is organized in such a way that basic needs are met and 
communal arrangements, ideally, have secured relatively stable economic relations, it 
may make sense to talk of the kind of liberal-vocationalism' that Winch is 
sympathetic to — in other words, an education which, in addition to providing a sound 
intellectual and moral basis, `encourage[s] young people to make occupational 
choices from amongst those that society considers worthwhile' (Winch, 2000, p. 31). 
However, within the nation state, where, according to the anarchist critique, 
inequalities are entrenched and reflected in, amongst other things, the division of 
labour and the market economy, such 'choices' cannot be made freely for they are 
dictated by the economic needs of the state which, by definition, is inimical to human 
freedom and flourishing. 
Furthermore, even if the state is successfully dismantled, given the anarchist 
commitment to perfectibility and to constant experimentation, and bearing in mind the 
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contextualist conception of human nature, it is important for the community to 
continue to provide an education that maintains a critical attitude towards existing 
practices and institutions and fosters attitudes of fraternity and mutual aid. 
The above points about the anarchist perspective on education may suggest that the 
anarchists were unduly concerned with questions about the social good, overlooking 
the question of personal fulfilment and well-being. Indeed, Richard Pring makes the 
point that the apparent conflict between liberal education and social utility 'reflects a 
deeper divide between the pursuit of individual good and the pursuit of social 
welfare' (Pring, 1995, p. 121). But this again presupposes a particular way of 
looking at the individual. In anarchist ethics, as discussed in Chapter Five, individual 
freedom and well-being is created and sustained in the context of social interaction; 
one cannot consistently talk of the individual good without taking social context into 
account. On the anarchist view of morality, indeed, the individual and the moral 
good are conceptually and logically bound (see Adan, 1992, pp. 49-60). Many 
anarchist theorists, most notably Bakunin, were concerned to develop a conceptual 
defence of 'the intrinsic identity between the individual and the common good' 
(Adan, 1992, p. 56). Their conception of the community, as the basic social unit, 
was of 'a whole of wholes, whose function is making possible the fullest realization 
of common good; i.e. the creation of conditions for personal actualization to an 
unlimited degree. [... ] The individual is a whole in itself and the good it attains is 
also an objective good, not merely subjective and thus, in a way, the actualization of 
society at large' (ibid). 
On the policy level of devising specific educational programmes which would help 
children enter the world of work, Winch's analysis makes several important points, 
some of which have interesting connections to the anarchist view. But again, from 
an anarchist point of view, these points are mostly relevant to education beyond the 
state. For example, in his discussion of the issue of transparency of markets, Winch 
points out that all vocational education depends to some extent, for it to have been 
considered a success, on speculation as to the availability of certain jobs in the 
labour market. But, as he explains, 'at the level of skills acquisition, the labour 
market is often a futures market, trading in commodities whose value will only 
become clear at some point in the future [... ] One is, in effect, betting that a current 
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investment will be worthwhile in two or three years time.' (Winch, 2000, p. 128). 
The implicit picture of economic life behind these remarks is of the economic sphere 
as something which is, as White puts it, 'reflected by' rather than 'created by' 
education. Anarchist educators of the type discussed in Chapter Six, fuelled by the 
desire to replace the capitalist state system with what they regarded as a morally 
superior social model, assume a very different picture. An outspoken, and perhaps 
rather extreme expression of this view comes from Harry Kelly, in his outline of the 
purpose of the Modern School in New York at the beginning of the twentieth century 
(see Chapter Six). The anarchist educational movement involves, Kelly argues, 'the 
idea of making all industry cooperative,' from which it follows that 'it is 
inconceivable that education in its future evolution will not sometime take complete 
control and possession of the world's industry' (Kelly, 1916, p. 53). Sinister as this 
may sound, I believe the main point of Kelly's argument is not the proposal of any 
revolutionary tactics for seizing control of the capitalist state, but rather the insight 
that socio-economic structures, moral values, and educational ideals, are all bound 
up in the normative project of constructing educational policy and processes. In this, 
Kelly was echoing Kropotkin's belief that the social anarchist socio-economic 
model is 'of absolute necessity for society, not only to solve economic difficulties, 
but also to maintain and develop social customs that bring men in contact with one 
another; they must be looked to for establishing such relations between men that the 
interest of each should be the interest of all; and this alone can unite men instead of 
dividing them.' (Kropotkin, 1897, p. 16). 
Accordingly, while anarchist educational projects run within the reality of the state 
sought to embody, in their structure and day-to-day management, the principles and 
practice of communal living, their long-term programmes for vocational education 
also embodied the hope that the 'outside world' for which they were preparing their 
children would be — largely as a result of this moral ground-work — a very different 
one from that of the present. 
Education and the Market 
Winch notes that in neo-classical economic theory, the assumption is that markets 
are 'transparent', in the sense that all participants in the market place have access to 
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information about price, quality, supply and demand. But, as he remarks, (ibid), 
`this is patently false', and 'it is now much more widely admitted, particularly 
through the influence of the 'Austrian' school of economics, that markets are not 
completely transparent, that they filter information and depend on local and tacit 
knowledge of buyers and sellers for their successful operation' (Winch, 2000, p. 
128). 
In the case of labour markets, even though professionals may be available to advise 
novices — e.g. pupils undergoing vocational education programmes, 'it is still highly 
likely that there will be insufficient information to make an informed decision when 
the availability of jobs depends on larger macro-economic factors that most people 
will not be in a good position to understand' (Winch, 2000, p. 129) 
In anarchist society, the market would be run along cooperative lines - a point which, 
anarchist theorists were keen to stress, was not hostile to competition. Indeed, as the 
anarchist economist Stephen P. Andrews has argued, 'competition itself is not 
socially negative. [... ] Correctly employed, economical competition leads to the 
growth of a perfectly balanced system of social cooperation' (in Adan, 1992, p. 190). 
The term 'correctly employed' here presumably refers to a climate of individuals 
cooperating in freedom on the basis of a sound moral education. But aside from this 
point, Winch's point about market transparency may be pertinent in the reality of 
anarchist society beyond the state, and in fact suggests that small-scale economies, 
such as that of the anarchist commune, would be more conducive to such 
transparency than the markets of the capitalist state, due not only to the simple 
question of size, but also to the anarchist commitment to participatory self-
government and bottom-up forms of social organization. 
So although Winch is in agreement with elements of the anarchist critique in stating 
that young people are 'potentially at the mercy of a market which may not have a 
particular call for their skills and knowledge at a stage in life when, by definition, 
and according to well-established account of how markets work, they are in a poor 
position to make rational decisions on the labour and training market,' (Winch, 2000, 
p. 130) his solution to this problem is to find ways of linking demand and supply of 
labour so that vocational education can successfully provide students with jobs in the 
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market. He does not see these problems as inherent features of market capitalism 
which can only be remedied by radical political and social change. 
Similarly, Winch argues convincingly that 
For vocational education, it is important to maintain a very broad 
vision of 'preparation for work' which not only encompasses the 
different forms of paid employment, but also domestic and 
voluntary labour. It also follows, from the reluctance that I have 
argued one should have towards unduly elevating the value of 
some occupations and denigrating others according to personal 
taste and preference, that a society that wishes to continue to 
develop various currents not just of skill, but of value and outlook 
on life, needs to take a generous attitude to the provision of 
vocational education, so as to allow for the proper development of 
a wide variety of occupations... (Winch, 2000, p.163). 
But the denigration and preferences which Winch refers to may in fact be, as the 
anarchist would argue, largely a result of the inherent structural features of our 
society. If this is the case then, again, only a radical reconceptualization of our social 
institutions could adequately address these issues. 
We have seen, then, how the anarchist conception of integral education breaks down 
the traditional distinctions between the liberal and the vocational ideal not just from 
a conceptual point of view, nor from the point of view of creating a broader 
educational goal for modern liberal states, but as part of the radical challenge to the 
existing political order. 
When working within the dominant constraints of life within the state, the task for the 
anarchist educator is to lay the grounds for the transition to an anarchist, self-
governing, equitable communities. One can begin this process, as argued by 
Kropotkin, Ward, and others, on the smallest possible scale, by challenging dominant 
values and encouraging the human propensity for mutual aid, cooperation and self-
governance. Indeed, as discussed in previous chapters, the anarchist revolution is 
conceptualised by most of the social anarchists not as a violent dismantling of the 
present system in order to replace it with a radically new one, nor, as in the case of 
Marxism, a remoulding of human tendencies and attitudes, but as a process of creating 
a new society from the seeds of aspirations, tendencies and trends already present in 
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human action. As Kropotkin emphasizes, the foundations of anarchist society are, 
above all, moral, and thus one cannot escape the conclusion that the emphasis of the 
educational process must be on fostering those moral attitudes which can further and 
sustain a viable anarchist society. Of course, part of this process involves adopting a 
critical attitude towards current institutional and political practices and arrangements, 
with an emphasis on the manifestations of oppression and social injustice. But this 
critical stance has to be encouraged in a climate which itself reflects the values of 
solidarity and equality. 
Another essential ingredient in this educational process is the absence of fixed blue-
prints for future organization; in other words, although pupils should be encouraged 
to reflect on broad social and political issues, and to question current institutional 
arrangements, they must not, on the anarchist view, be manipulated into advocating a 
specific form of social organizations, but must be encouraged to see themselves, first 
and foremost, as potential social innovators and creators. Of course, the question of 
whether the anarchist educational projects discussed here in fact succeeded in 
avoiding such manipulation is open to debate. The crucial point of such educational 
endeavours, nevertheless, is to encourage pupils to grasp the central anarchist idea 
that society and political life are malleable and potentially subject to constant 
improvement, rather than a fixed backdrop to passive consumers or bystanders. It is 
in this context that the idea of integral education plays such an important role. Thus, 
although for the social anarchists, the aim of creating a different form of social 
organization remains at the level of an aspiration, with no fixed delineations, the 
moral qualities necessary to sustain such a society are clearly determinate — and 
centre importantly, as discussed above, around the notions of fraternity, solidarity 
and mutual aid. 
Scarcity and the Circumstances of Justice 
The above discussion has conceptual connections with the discussion of the Rawlsian 
notion of the circumstances of justice. For the circumstances of justice which form 
155 
the starting point for Rawlsian liberalism not only assume the absence of fraternal 
interpersonal ties as a basis for human action (see Chapter Five) and, thus for 
decisions taken under the veil of ignorance, but also make assumptions regarding the 
level of scarcity of resources. Kropotkin, in contrast - the principal theorist of 
anarchist economics - developed a notion of a global economy based on the 
assumption that sufficient resources are available, on a global scale, to satisfy all basic 
needs, thus rejecting the basic assumption of fundamental scarcity that underpins both 
classical political economy and the type of neo-classical economic theories which 
Winch cites. Kropotkin, as Knowles (2000) discusses, was scathing in his criticism of 
the way in which Malthusian ideas had permeated economic theory. 'Few books', he 
remarked, 'have exercised so pernicious an influence upon the general development of 
economic thought...' (quoted in Knowles, 2000, p. 30), describing this influence as 
follows: 
This postulate stands, undiscussed, in the background of whatever 
political economy, classical or socialist, has to say about exchange-
value, wages, sale of labour force, rent, exchange, and consumption. 
Political economy never rises above the hypothesis of a limited and 
insufficient supply of the necessaries of life; it takes it for granted. 
And all theories connected with political economy retain the same 
erroneous principle. Nearly all socialists, too, admit the postulate. 
(quoted in Knowles, 2000, p.30). 
In contrast, Knowles argues, 'The driving force of Kropotkin's political economy 
arose from his perceived need to satisfy the needs of all; to achieve the "greatest good 
for all", to provide a measure of "wealth and ease" for all' (ibid). 
Similarly, in arguing that well-being could be guaranteed partly by ensuring that all 
members of society worked no more than five hours a day, Kropotkin claimed to be 
presenting an important challenge to mainstream economic thought (which he 
referred to as 'the metaphysics called political economy'), and which had ignored 
such aspects of economy in the life of the worker: 'few economists, as yet, have 
recognised that this is the proper domain of economics...' (ibid). 
In short, the above discussion seems to support the general insight that, for the social 
anarchists, economic principles and the world of labour were, in an important sense, 
subservient to moral principles, and it is the moral picture of an ideal social sturcture 
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which underlies the anarchist view of education as crucially intertwined with socio-
economic reality. 
Part II The Moral and Political Content of Education 
Removing State Control of Schools 
The actual policy steps required to translate this radical political reconceptualization 
into educational practice bring us back, naturally, to the central anarchist objection to 
the state. Part of the necessary process of emancipating the workers, for the social 
anarchists, involved removing education from the control of the state. Proudhon, 
Godwin and other early anarchist theorists regarded education as a key factor in 
creating intellectual and moral emancipation, much along the lines of the traditional 
liberal ideal. Yet in schools controlled by the state, this was virtually impossible, in 
their view. The first step, then, had to be to remove state control from education. This 
move, in and of itself, of course would not be enough unless the education offered was 
substantively different, in moral terms, from the traditional one; that is, unless, as 
discussed above, it challenged authoritarianism and attempted to temper any 
competitive instincts with the social values of mutual aid, cooperativeness and self-
management. 
Proudhon, one of the first anarchist theorists to develop the concept of integral 
education, envisaged the school becoming something like a workshop. Crucially, he 
insisted that the education system must, like other aspects of society, become 
decentralized, so that the responsibility for the setting up and managing of schools 
would rest with parents, communities, and would be closely tied to local workers' 
associations. (see Smith, 1983, p.26). In this, Proudhon articulated, perhaps more 
than any other anarchist theorist, the idea of the necessary intimacy between school 
and work. He held something similar to the Marxist conception of labour as central 
to human well-being, and insisted that education should be polytechnical — enabling 
the students to master a range of skills, including the theoretical knowledge they 
involved, and only later to specialize. But Proudhon's ideal seems to stem largely 
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from a romantic picture of pre-industrial society and, of course, to translate this 
conception of the school as workshop into our own society would be highly 
problematic. The 'ties with the world of work' which Proudhon envisaged would be 
more likely to be ties with huge corporations and financial companies, involving 
market-capitalist values, than the associations with small artisans and workers guilds 
which formed part of Proudhon's rather naïve romantic vision. 
This problem simply illustrates, once again, the point that although decentralization 
and the consequent undermining of state power is a key goal of anarchist 
programmes, it cannot be achieved without laying the moral and political 
groundwork - without, that is, fostering values capable of sustaining a truly stateless, 
decentralized society. For a more detailed discussion of this point, with reference to 
current proposals for removing education from state control, see Chapter Eight. 
To sum up the argument so far, and to connect these points back to the discussion of 
perspective with which I began this chapter, approaching educational (as well as 
economic) thought from a vision of what the ideal society would look like, and 
making questions about how feasible this vision is, why it is desirable, how different 
it is from our present one, and what the transition would involve part of the 
educational-philosophical debate itself, puts this debate in a very different light. 
From the point of view of a commitment to anarchist principles, it may well be that 
the main conclusions of this discussion are that far more emphasis needs to be placed 
on fostering particular values, and aiming to create an educational environment 
which reflects these values — solidarity, mutual aid, sensitivity to injustice, and so on. 
But even if one disagrees with these specific normative conclusions, one can still 
appreciate the general point that reconceptualizing the relationship between 
philosophy of education and political thought so that the two interact in a way which 
assumes questions about the future form of society to be very much still open to 
debate, and which approaches children, teachers and parents as people engaged in its 
creation, can add a valuable perspective to such debates. At the very least, they may 
help us to rearticulate, re-examine and imbue with greater relevance, some of the 
very values - such as freedom, critical thinking and justice - which lie at the core of 
liberal thought. 
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Education for Social Change 
The above discussion of vocational education has, I hope, helped to draw out the way 
in which anarchist educational programmes and policy reflect the conviction that 
there is a substantive postive core of moral values which is the crucial ingredient in 
any educational process aimed at transforming society in keeping with the vision of a 
stateless society. Particularly, anarchist educators were concerned to identify and 
nurture the social virtues which, so they believed, reinforced both the feasibility and 
the desirability of their ideal. 
This analysis illustrates how the political dimension of anarchist thought is reflected 
at all levels of the educational process — not in terms of imposing a blue-print or 
training a revolutionary vanguard, but in terms of raising awareness of the radical 
possibilities for political change and the vision of a society radically different from 
our own - in which we are not merely concerned to educate workers, but to believe 
that the distinctions between workers and non-workers will disappear. 
The utopian aspect of anarchism is already implied by these comments, and I wish to 
elaborate on how it is reflected in the curriculum by means of discussion of political 
education. This discussion is connected to the idea of vocational education in several 
important respects. 
Roy Edgley (1980) presents the tension between liberal aspirations to break down 
class-based social inequalities and social-political reality rather depressingly, 
suggesting that students are 'prepared for manual work, at least in part, by being 
failed in the predominantly mentalistic process of the schools'. (Edgley, 1980, p.9). 
Edgley draws on D.H. Lawrence's description of the 'malcontent collier' who, due to 
the 'myth of equal opportunity' which permeates the liberal education system, cannot 
be but a failure in his own eyes. If, Edgley argues, education is to take seriously the 
goal of preparing students for the world of work, 
it must ensure that there is at least a rough and at least a relative 
match in skills between its students output and the skill levels of the 
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job positions of the occupational structure. That means that education 
must reproduce, in the skill levels of its students, the gross 
inequalities, in particular the class inequalities, of that occupational 
structure. Given such a task, education's commitment to social justice 
and equality, and essential part of its liberal idealism, is then 
understood in terms of equality of opportunity. Higher and middle-
class job positions and their associated educational qualifications are 
seen as scarce goods to be distributed as prizes in the time-honoured 
bourgeois way, by competition, and although the competitors must 
finish unequal, education meets its moral ideal by ensuring that they 
start equal and compete fairly (Edgley, 1980, p. 8). 
It is, Edgley argues, extremely unlikely that education can eliminate inequalities to 
such a degree, and thus equality of opportunity represents, in the liberal educational 
tradition, 'an unhappy compromise between education's liberal ideals and the reality 
of a class-structured division of labour'(ibid, p.9). 
The anarchist response to this depressing fact is, on the one level, to postulate an ideal 
reality in which the class-structured division of labour - which, it is argued, is a result 
of the modern capitalist state - simply does not exist; to argue that such an alternative 
social reality could exist, and to construct an account of the types of human 
propensities needed to support such a reality. Education then needs to focus on 
fostering such propensities, and on providing both liberal and vocational training so 
as to perpare children to be the creators of such a social reality. Yet this approach on 
its own may seem naïve and, clearly, has to be supplemented by some form of 
political education, so that students understand the critique of existing society, and 
have the analytic tools necessary to forge new forms of social organization. A similar 
realization characterizes some more critical liberal positions and, indeed, one possible 
way out of Edgley's depressing conclusion is the type of radical political education 
formulated by Patricia White. 
Edgley argues, drawing largely on Patricia White's work, for a radical role for 
political education. As White theorizes this idea, political education should have as 
its goal education for action and not 'simply the production of spectatorial armchair 
politicians' (quoted in Edgley, 1980, p. 13). Specifically, political education should 
emphasize democractic processes, whereby through experience pupils would be 
encouraged to democratically transform social institutions into less authoritarian and 
more democratic strucutres. 
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Although Edgley, largely due to his endorsement of what seems like a version of 
Marxist reproduction theory, believes White is overly optimistic with regard to the 
power of political education to democratize social institutions and practices, he 
acknowledges the potential of this type of educational approach. And while White's 
analysis is focused on the democratization of society, the anarchist conception goes 
further in arguing for a complete transformation of social organization, in which, 
alongside the role played by school climate, school structure and other informal ways 
in which social-anarchist values are reflected in educational practice, there is clearly 
an important role to be played by systematic political education. Such education, in 
addition to fostering a critical attitude and an appreciation of democratic principles 
(both aspects which White would endorse), would take the further step of 
encouraging students to reflect on the possible construction of radically different 
social futures. 
The descriptions of anarchist schools in Chapter Six suggest that anarchists indeed 
assigned something like political education a key role in their curricula. For example, 
in Ferrer's school, the vocational training which students underwent was 
accompanied by analyses of the class system and an attempt to critically understand 
the workings of the capitalist market place. But if political education as a distinct 
curricular subject is to have any uniquely anarchist significance, it must reflect the 
utopian element of anarchist thought. The liberal educational perspective, in focusing 
on the notion of autonomy in the context of the liberal state, often leads to demands 
for greater democratization of the work-place, the school and other social institutions. 
The anarchist perspective, in contrast, involves not only the 'leap of faith' that a 
stateless society is possible, and can be sustained along communal, non-hierarchical 
principles, on the basis of already present human capabilities and propensities, but 
also - with crucial educational implications - the utopian hope that the very 
imaginative exercise of encouraging people to conceptualize the exact form of this 
society, and to constantly engage with and experiment with its principles and 
manifestations, will itself be central part of the revolutionary process. It is here — in 
this practice of imagining a world radically different from our own, and in daring to 
believe in its possiblity - that the role of political education takes a central place. 
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Although there is no systematic treatment of such a programme for political education 
in the historical accounts of anarchist educational programmes discussed here, nor in 
the theoretical works on education by leading anarchist theorists, political education, 
in some form or another, clearly permeates all aspects of anarchist educational 
endeavour. Whether in the course of visiting factories at Ferrer's school, or of 
planting their own vegetable garden and managing the produce at the Stelton School, 
pupils were encouraged to develop a critical awareness of the problems and 
complexities of the existing state system and to speculate on alternative modes of 
socio-economic organization. It is interesting, though, to consider a more specific 
attempt to translate the utopian, imaginative element of anarchist thought into 
concerete pedagogical practice. An example of such an attempt is offered by a small 
(and rather amusing) pamphlet published by an independent anarchist publishing 
house, entitled Design Your Own Utopia (Bufe and Neotopia, 2002). Although there 
is little if no reference in the writings of anarchist theorists as to how specific 
educational methods and programmes could be employed to implement anarchist 
ideas in an educational context, I believe this proposal could serve as a model for 
political education both within and beyond the nation state. 
The programme suggested in this pamphlet offers a model for a classroom discussion 
in the context of political education, based around a question-posing pattern, by 
which each question answered (by the group, or individually) leads, by way of a 
consideration of various options and implications, to further questions. Posing and 
answering the questions along the way demands a rigorous and honest treatment of 
normative commitments and values, and a thought-experiment whereby one is forced 
to confront the possible practical implicaitons of one's values. 
The pattern is to start, not from the current institutions of the liberal state, but from an 
open-ended discussion, in the course of which values are articulated and principles 
considered, along with a critical examination of the implications of and justification 
for the principles under discussion. Of course, such an educational approach requires 
a certain degree of sophistication and would probably be more suited to older children 
who have already got some grasp of basic social and political concepts. It could, 
however, be creatively incorporated into a political education programme involving 
familiarization with political concepts, alongside imaginative, utopian thought. 
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The programme starts with the question of scope: Students are asked, as a first step, 
to consider whether their utopia would be a global utopia, a nation-state, a village, a 
city, a bio-region, or some other type of international community (Bufe and 
Neuotopia, 2002, p. 3), before going on to ask questions about the goals of the utopia. 
This question in itself already opens up the discussion to accommodate theoretical 
ideas far broader than those usually covered in political education or citizenship 
courses. The recent QCA recommendations on education of citizenship in schools, for 
example, centre around the notions of developing the knowledge, understanding, and 
skills needed for 'the development of pupils into active citizens.' Although it is hard 
to find fault with this idea as a general educational aim, the perspective from which it 
is formulated is clearly one of understanding and reinforcing the current political 
system, rather than radically questioning it. This is not to suggest that the programme 
is narrowly focused on the state - for it specifically recommends 'an awareness of 
world affairs and global issues' (QCA, 1998, p. 22) alongside an 'understanding of 
democratic practices and institutions' (ibid). However, the playful element of utopian 
thought experiments proposed here could, I suggest, enrich this process of 
`understanding' and 'developing skills and knowledge'. In the anarchist utopian 
experiment, students are asked to speculate on the feasibility of political organizations 
other than the state and their relationship to each other, not as an informative exercise, 
but as an imaginative one. Of course, the QCA report, as well as several writers on 
citizenship education (see for example Fogelman, 1991) emphasize the need for an 
active, participatory role on the part of future citizens, and attach considerable 
importance to 'student empowerment' (Lynch and Smalley, 1991, p. 171). However, 
utopian thought experiments add a valuable dimension to the idea of empowering 
students through experiments in active democracy (ibid) in that simply considering 
the types of questions proposed here can 'help us to understand that the present 
social, political and economic systems are human inventions, and that we, 
collectively, have the power to change them.' (Bufe and Neutopia, 2002, p.1). 
The programme goes on to ask 'What would be the fundamental values of your 
utopia?' and, interestingly, 'Would individuals choose their own goals and values or 
would their goals and values be those of your utopian ideology?' — a question which 
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paves the way for a discussion of the liberal ideal, the ideas of community and 
individual freedom, and other connected issues. 
Further on in the course of the exercise, students are presented with questions about 
the specific content of their utopia, and encouraged to think through their 
implications. For example, 'What would the rights and duties of members of the 
utopia be?'; 'Would the number of children per parent be limited?' What would your 
decision-making process be?' How would production and distribution be organized?' 
and 'Would the roles of men and women vary?' 
I believe that such an educational approach could constitute an attractive, stimulating 
alternative — or at least a supplement - to conventional teaching of political and moral 
issues which, as many writers on utopia have noted (see Chapter Eight), encourages 
creative and critical thinking about social and political reality. A political education 
programme along these lines would clearly have to be thought out in further detail, 
and with a great deal of caution. As mentioned, the social anarchists themselves 
failed to provide any such systematic account. However, I believe this kind of 
approach encapsulates an important aspect of the anarchist educational stance, and is 
valuable in its own right even within a state education system. 
Moral Education — The Missing Link 
In conclusion, the anarchist idea of integral education may, on the surface, seem very 
much like notions such as Winch's 'liberal vocationalism', which both challenges the 
common liberal/vocational distinction and broadens our understanding of productive 
work and its connection to individual well-being. However, I have argued that what 
makes the anarchist perspective distinct from the liberal one is firstly its radical 
political vision — a vision which hinges on a faith in the possibility of a society 
organized in stateless, self-governing, equitable communities - and, connectedly, the 
understanding that while the precise form of such communities is indeterminate, the 
moral values which underpin them have both descriptive and normative validity, and 
need to be reinforced by an educational process. 
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It has to be said, at this stage, that this argument for the centrality of some kind of 
moral education is largely a reconstruction of often indirect and unsystematic 
writings from a variety of anarchist sources. Although the salience of notions like 
solidarity, fraternity and mutual aid pervades all social-anarchist work on education, 
it is hard to find any systematic account of how these notions are to be built into a 
coherent programme for moral education. Indeed, references to pedagogy and to 
concrete educational programmes are few and far between in anarchist literature, 
largely due to the belief that such programmes would and should be determined by 
individual teachers and students according to the specific needs of the community. 
The following account by Bakunin (in Dolgoff, 1973, pp. 373-375) is one of the few 
attempts to lay down such a programme, based on what Bakunin regarded as two 
essential stages in education:3  
Stage 1 (age 5-12): At this stage, the emphasis should be on the development of the 
physical faculties, in the course of which 'the culture of the mind' will be developed 
`spontaneously'. There will be no formal instruction as such, only 'personal 
observation, practical experience, conversations between children, or with persons 
charged with teaching'. 
Stage 2 (age 12-16) Here the child will be introduced to 'the various divisions of 
human knowledge', and will also undergo practical training in a craft or trade. This 
stage involves more methodological and systematic teaching, along with communal 
reading and discussion, one effect of which would be to reduce the weight attached to 
the individual teacher. This stage in essence is the beginning of the child's 
apprenticeship in a profession, and Bakunin specifies that, from the early stages, 
visits to factories and so on must form a part of the curriculum, leading to the child's 
eventual choice of a trade for specialization, alongside theoretical studies. 
Bakunin's second stage is remarkably similar to Winch's idea of liberal 
vocationalism, with his talk of the 'branches of knowledge' clearly referring to 
something very like the liberal idea of initiation into the disciplines. 
3 Interestingly, Bakunin seems to have made no acknowledgement of the existence of any kind of 
educational process before the age of five. 
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However, as stated, this educational programme has to be understood in the context 
of a political vision far more radical in its scope than the liberal one, and a faith —
perhaps, as Ritter suggests, a 'leap of faith' — that this vision can be brought a little 
closer by the very organization and day-to-day running of the educational process in 
such a manner as to embody the moral values underpinning this vision. Precisely 
how these values are to be built into the educational process, beyond the informal 
means of pupil-teacher relationships, decentralized school management, non-coercive 
classroom practices and constant experimentation (all of which are evident in the 
anarchist educational experiments discussed in Chapter Six) is, as mentioned, unclear 
from the literature. Given the anarchist understanding of human nature and the 
consequent acknowledgement that some form of moral education will be necessary, 
even in the post-revolutionary society, to ensure the flourishing of the social virtues, I 
believe that the lack of clarity on this subject is, perhaps, the central weakness of the 
anarchist position on education. 	 Constructing a systematic account of moral 
education is, thus, a key task for the anarchist educator. Although such a task is 
unfortunately beyond the scope of this thesis, the anarchist idea of the school as a 
microcosm of the ideal society, and the emphasis on direct encounters and on 
`learning by doing', alongside the clear acknowledgement of the educational role of 
social institutions and practices, suggest that such an account could be broadly 
Aristotelian in its conception. 
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Chapter Eight 
What's So Funny About Anarchism? 
Liberal Neutrality, Education and the Liberal State 
The social-anarchist perspective on education, as I have argued, is underpinned by a 
specific, substantive vision of the good. While the anarchist belief in the possibility of 
society without the state implies a radical challenge to the dominant liberal view, the 
vision of what this society may look like is based on values, which, as Chapters Four and 
Five discussed, are not at odds with liberal values. In fact, one could argue, as Chomsky 
has done, that the social anarchist tradition is the 'true inheritor of the classic liberal 
tradition of the enlightenment' (in Guerin, 1970, p. xii). Furthermore, this tradition 
perhaps rearticulates the utopian element of classical liberal thought. 
Zygmunt Bauman, for example, describes the liberal project as 'one of the most potent 
modern utopias' in its promotion of a model of the good society, and argues that, at the 
time of its inception, it may have signified a 'great leap forward' (Bauman, 1999, p. 4). 
However, there does nevertheless seem to be a tension between the agenda of anarchist 
education, as reflected in the programmes and curricula developed by educators working 
within the anarchist tradition (see Chapter Six) and that of what is generally referred to as 
liberal education. Specifically, and peculiarly, anarchism as an educational stance seems 
almost both too normative and too open-ended to be palatable to the liberal educator. The 
explicitly anti-statist, anti-capitalist and egalitarian views espoused by anarchist 
educators, and built into their curricula (see Chapter Six) smack too much of dogma, 
perhaps, to those with liberal sensibilities. Yet at the same time, the insistence on the 
indeterminacy of the future society, the demand for constant, free experimentation, and 
the faith in the power of communities to establish their own educational practices, are 
risky ideas to many liberals who, like Eamonn Callan (1997) and Meira Levinson (1999), 
see a formal, state education system not just as an important social good but also as an 
essential guarantor of liberal freedoms, social justice and political stability. 
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Yet, as the preceding discussion shows, the underlying values of the anarchist position 
are not at odds with those of the liberal one. Although they may assign them different 
normative and methodological status, few liberals would be inclined to reject such values 
as freedom, equality, fraternity or solidarity. 
Why, then, does the notion of 'anarchist education' seem, at best, laughable, and at 
worst, threatening, from a liberal point of view? I would argue that the reason this is so is 
because 'liberal education', in recent years, has become synonymous with education in a 
liberal state. Many writers can be seen to conflate the two unthinkingly, and the question 
of the relationship between them is rarely itself the focus of debate. Thus, for example, 
Eamonn Callan, Meira Levinson and Alan Ryan have recently written important works 
on education and liberalism in which, while ostensibly discussing the implications of 
liberal theory for educational ideas, they are actually concerned to outline the role of 
education in the liberal state. Alan Ryan, for example, in Liberal Anxieties and Liberal 
Education refers, at the beginning of his discussion, to liberal education as 'the kind of 
education that sustains a liberal society' (Ryan, 1998, p. 27). However, in the course of 
the book, he slips into discussion of 'educating citizens' (ibid, p.123), clearly assuming 
the framework of the liberal state. A similar process occurs in the writings of several 
other theorists. 
The relationship between liberalism as a system of values and the liberal state as a 
system of political organization is one which is rarely, if ever, scrutinized, whether by 
philosophers of education or by liberal theorists in general. 
Most theorists, indeed, seem to assume, along with Patricia White, not only that the 
liberal state is, to all intents and purposes, the only practical framework available, but that 
theoretically, it has been pretty much established, primarily by Nozick's influential 
argument, that the state is a necessary evil, and that if it didn't exist, 'we would have to 
invent [it] — or back into [it] by degrees at least' (White, 1983, p. 8). 
`Most political philosophers in the past few generations', Miltrany comments (in Sylvan, 
1993, p.215) 'have what the psychoanalysts might call a "state fixation"'. This is no less 
true of philosophers of education. But the theoretical implications of conflating 
`liberalism' with 'the liberal state' are particularly far-reaching in the case of education, 
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and they hinge above all on the notion of neutrality. As developed most famously and 
influentially by Rawls, the liberal notion of neutrality dictates that the state must be 
neutral regarding conceptions of the good. However, it is important to understand that 
liberalism, as an ideological position, is not in itself 'neutral' — as indeed it would be 
logically impossible for any such position to be neutral. So there is nothing neutral about 
the liberal stance itself But once 'liberalism' is taken to mean 'the liberal state', the 
demand for neutrality is logically translated into a demand that individuals and 
communities be free to pursue their own conceptions of the good within a political 
framework and institutions which allow them to flourish and interact as fairly and 
equitably as possible, refraining from any discrimination on the basis of possibly 
competing conceptions of the good. This, in essence, is the basis of Rawls' defence of 
`political liberalism'. If education is then assumed to be one of the central institutions of 
the liberal state, this position is translated into the demand that education in the liberal 
state should be, at most, a facilitator for the pursuit of individual autonomy, and the 
development of civic virtues; these are regarded as, ideally, happily coexisting with 
various different —even conflicting — comprehensive visions of the good. 
Of course, the neutrality thesis has been importantly criticized by liberal theorists, and 
notably by educational philosophers, in recent years. Thus both Callan and Levinson 
argue for a far more substantive vision of the role of education in the liberal state than 
that traditionally derived from Rawls' political liberalism. Similarly, Robert Reich points 
out, in his critique of idea of liberal neutrality, that the very establishment of a state-
funded school system is not neutral: 
In the modern age, there exists no social institution, save perhaps 
taxation, that intervenes more directly and deeply into the lives of 
citizens than schools....it is a fantasy that twelve years of education 
of any sort could possibly leave, as Rawls suggests, all reasonable 
comprehensive doctrines 'untouched'. (Reich, 2002, p.40) 
Reich in fact argues than neutrality is theoretically and practically impossible, and that 
the demands of liberal theory for civic education — primarily as regards fostering 
autonomy - lead inevitably to the demand for a non-neutral process of education, which 
in turn has effects on diversity and other aspects of society. Reich makes the point that 
`these effects are not unfortunate consequences but the purposeful aim of the liberal state' 
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(ibid, p. 42). Yet this argument merely reinforces my above claim about the conflation 
between liberalism and the state: In Reich's analysis, similarly to those of Callan and 
others, it is the state as such that has 'aims' — not liberalism, or even 'liberals' — a point 
which seems to support the anarchist argument that once a state is established it takes on 
a life — and aims — of its own, which may, so the argument goes, have little to do with the 
true needs and aspirations of people and communities. 
Reich and other theorists in the tradition seem little aware of the conflation they make 
between liberalism and the liberal state; one minute they are talking of the demands of 
liberal theory, and in the next they slip into discussion of the demands of the state which, 
when one pauses to think about it, are quite a different thing. There is, as stated, nothing 
inherently neutral about liberalism; but this issue is often glided over. Perhaps inevitably, 
having become the dominant political doctrine in the modern industrialized world, and 
one which in fact reflects actual social and political organization in much of this world, 
liberalism seems to have lost its motivating force. Its normative elements more often 
than not take the form of guidelines for improving or restricting current regulations or 
practices, or for making choices within the existing framework; not for building radically 
new practices. Given this dominance of liberalism as a theory and a system, the 
dominant narrative associated with this tradition has, as Bauman (1999) notes, become 
one of 'no alternative'. The idea that the liberal state is, if not the best of all imaginary 
worlds, at least in effect the best one realistically available, and one which is here to stay, 
encourages, as Bauman points out, a political apathy. 
Flathman has suggested a further reason for the conflation of liberal education with 
education in the (neutral) liberal state, arguing that the conception of liberal education as 
non-specific in the sense of being not vocational, not professional or pre-professional — is 
`reminiscent of those versions of political and moral liberalism that promote its neutrality 
toward or among alternative conceptions of the good'. (Flathman, 1998, p. 139). Thus, 
analogously to the liberal state which is agnostic regarding particular conceptions of the 
good life, the liberal educational curriculum 
	 'seeks to nurture abilities and 
understandings regarded as valuable to a generous —albeit, again not limitless — array of 
careers or callings'. (ibid) 
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But what happens if one pulls apart this conflation? What happens, that is, if, while 
holding on to what can be broadly described as liberal values, one removes the state from 
the equation altogether? Several writers in recent years have theoretically experimented 
with the idea of removing education from state control. 
Indeed, we do not need anarchism to prod us into pondering what education would look 
like without the state. Theorists working broadly within the liberal tradition have 
questioned the role of the state in controlling and determining educational ends, policies 
and processes. And, characteristically, those people who, in such debates, come down 
squarely on the side of state control of schooling, do so out of a carefully argued 
conviction that social ills such as socio-economic inequality and deprivation can better be 
minimized by a centrally controlled system than by leaving things to chance or to local 
initiative, and not out of any political enthusiasm for powerful central government. Thus 
Patricia White, for example, in Beyond Domination (White, 1983, p. 82), claims, on the 
basis of such convictions, that against the arguments for total devolution of educational 
control 'there are no moral arguments, but there are practical and political ones.' 
The Minimal State and Social Values 
Conversely, but starting from the same questioning attitude, James Tooley, in Reclaiming 
Education (Tooley, 2000), presents a thought experiment which supposedly leads to the 
conclusion that educational objectives could be better achieved by private enterprise, 
without the control of the state. The point here is that resolving the question of whether 
or not state controlled education systems can best achieve what could be construed as 
liberal goals, including the goal of social equality, is largely an empirical question. 
Although Tooley argues, convincingly, that the state has not so far done a great job in 
eliminating socio-economic inequalities by means of the educational system, it remains to 
be established (and on the face of it seems quite doubtful) whether a free-market system 
of education such as that which he advocates could do the job any better. Although 
Tooley does document evidence suggesting that in areas where private corporations have 
taken over educational functions, such corporations 'can deliver equity or equality of 
opportunity' (Tooley, 2000, p. 64, my emphasis), he offers no argument to convince the 
reader that the private alternative will further socio-economic equality in the absence of 
State control. Indeed, Tooley's own discussion of the way in which there are often happy 
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coincidences between the profit motives of private educational providers and the 
improvement of opportunities for disadvantaged members of society (see Tooley, 2000, 
pp. 109-110) simply reinforces the impression that in a free-market system, any such 
improvements are largely a matter of chance — a situation which is unlikely to satisfy 
anyone genuinely committed to socio-economic equality. 
Crucially, in the context of anarchist ideas, even in the work of advocates of removing 
state control from education, notably that of Tooley, the state is still assumed to be 
somewhere in the background, albeit in a role perhaps approaching Nozick's notion of 
the minimal State (see Nozick, 1974). 
Yet the Nozickian notion of the State that is assumed by so many neo-liberal writers is in 
itself far closer to the individualist, libertarian picture of individuals in society than to the 
picture which underlies both the social anarchist and indeed the egalitarian liberal 
position. For Nozick, it is important to note, formulates his arguments in the context of 
the anti-statist critiques not of the social anarchists, but of contemporary libertarians such 
as Murray Rothbard and Ayn Rand — keen supporters of free-market economy critiques 
of collectivist ethos. 
The argument of minarchists such as Nozick against such libertarians and individualist 
anarchists assumes the same picture of human nature which forms the background for the 
individualist, libertarian position. It is the supposedly inevitable selfish aspects of this 
human nature which, it is argued, will lead to conflict, thus necessitating some kind of 
minimal state to prevent disorder and maintain harmony. 
The normative value of the social virtues, along with the contextualist view of human 
nature so central to social anarchist thought, are entirely absent from both the libertarian 
and the neo-liberal positions, and thus fail to play a role in Tooley's analysis, which 
draws heavily on the work of neo-liberal theorists. 
Similarly, the view of education which Tooley draws from the perspective, namely that 
those services usually performed by the state could be supplied far more efficiently and 
far more morally by private and cooperative enterprise, ignores the charge, shared by 
social anarchists and Marxists alike, of a systematic bias, in terms of unequal 
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concentration of wealth, inherent in the structure of market relations. The social 
anarchists, in contrast, viewed market activity as a social relation and thus subject to 
control by moral obligations. 
However radical Tooley's position may seem to be, then, the question he poses is not that 
of: what kind of society do we want? But the rather less radical one of: given the kind of 
society we have, what kind of education should we have? The assumption behind such 
intellectual exercises seems to be very much the basic liberal assumption which 
constitutes the conclusion of Rawls' work: the ideal of the liberal state as a generally fair 
framework for negotiating between conflicting conceptions of the good life, managing 
public affairs with minimum coercion and maximizing individual liberty. As mentioned 
above, the social virtues so central to anarchist - and to much of liberal - thought are not 
assigned any normative role in Tooley's conceptualization of the education process. The 
fact that Tooley conflates the term 'education' with that of 'learning' throughout his 
discussion in Reclaiming Education lis indicative of his unwillingness to engage with the 
inherently normative aspects of education, as is the fact that the term 'moral' or 'moral 
education' does not appear even once in his discussion. If Tooley wants to imply that 
one can remain 'neutral' regarding the moral and ideological underpinnings of the 
market-driven society he envisages, this project is arguably undermined both by the point 
that, as Ruth Jonathan has argued, the 'free markets in education' idea is far from neutral, 
and indeed 'education is the one social practice where the blind forces of the market are 
not the expression of liberal freedom, but its nemesis' (Jonathan, 1997, pp. 8-9) — as well 
as by Tooley's self-confessed enthusiasm for Conservative and New-Right political 
agendas (Tooley, personal communication, January, 2003). 
In short, although Tooley and similar critics of state control of education may on the face 
of it seem to be stating a position akin to that of the anarchists, this is far from the truth. 
They may indeed be undermining the institutional power of the state, yet they are not 
doing so out of a commitment to a positive vision of an alternative social arrangement 
based on justice, equality and mutual aid, but, rather, out of the rather vague — and 
I 
 Although the book is ostensibly about education, the private initiatives which Tooley describes so 
enthusiastically in fact seem to be more concerned with the acquisition of skills and training (see 
Tooley, pp. 102-112) than about educating in a broader sense. 
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potentially dangerous - notion that people should be allowed to run their own affairs as 
far as possible. 
This criticism of Tooley's work touches on a more general problem which I raised in the 
Introduction, regarding philosophical work on educational issues, namely, that of 
disassociating discussion of educational concepts and issues from their political and 
social context. Tooley acknowledges, in his Disestablishing the School, that his 
arguments are largely aimed at 'those who would like to do something to ameliorate 
educational disadvantage and injustice' (Tooley, 1995, p. 149). Yet while Tooley's 
arguments suggest that voluntary activity can address such disadvantages, this is a very 
different thing, as mentioned above, from trying to design an educational and political 
programme that will address them. However, I would make the further point - and 
indeed this is one of the central insights of the anarchist perspective on education — that 
there is no such thing as 'educational disadvantages' per se; one cannot address issues of 
disadvantage, social justice and distribution without considering the broader political 
context in which they occur. 
Of course, the confusion surrounding the possibly anarchist-sounding tone of proposals 
such as Tooley's also indicates a need for more careful articulation of the positive core of 
social anarchism - a project to which, I hope, this work has contributed. For in historical 
periods and places where the state represented a monolithic, oppressive entity, associated 
with the repression of liberal freedoms - such as, for example, Spain at the beginning of 
the last century, when Francisco Ferrer set up the Escuela Moderna - social anarchist 
aspirations and visions of alternative models were reflected in the very opposition to the 
state. In many ways, the act of removing social processes, such as that of education, from 
the control of the state, seemed, in itself, to be a radical statement of belief in an 
alternative. However, when the state in question is a liberal state, the mere act of 
removing spheres of action from state control is, in itself, not enough to pose an 
alternative set of values; contemporary social anarchists have, perhaps, to be far more 
careful and far more explicit than their nineteenth century counterparts in stating what 
exactly it is that they object to in current political arrangements, and how their model of 
the good society and their means for achieving it are different from and superior to those 
of the dominant (liberal) discourse. Thus, for example, many contemporary anarchist 
activists take it for granted, due to the traditional anarchist opposition to state 
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monopolies, that community-based or independently-run educational initiatives should be 
supported. However, as the discussion of Summerhill in Chapter Six suggests, the values 
and aims implicit in such initiatives may not always be in keeping with those of the social 
anarchist project. 
To use Rawlsian terminology, then, one could say that on the anarchist view, a 
comprehensive conception of the good is not a given aspect of individual flourishing, 
different versions of which are to be negotiated amongst by a neutral political system, but 
rather something constantly being pursued, the quest for which, crucially, is a collective, 
and an open-ended, project. Of course, as Kymlicka has argued (Kymlicka, 1989), a 
liberal society should be one in which people are not only given the freedom and the 
capabilities to pursue existing conceptions of the good, but also one in which people are 
free to constantly form and revise such conceptions. In social anarchism, perhaps, the 
difference is that the conception of the good is, in an important sense, although perhaps 
not exclusively, one which is arrived at through a communal process of experimentation. 
The anarchist educator cannot argue that the school must provide merely basic skills or 
act to facilitate children's autonomy, and abstain from inculcating various conceptions of 
the good. For, on the anarchist view, the school is a part of the very community that is 
engaged in the radical and ongoing project of social transformation, by means of an 
active, creative pursuit of the good. This process, which can only be conducted through 
an active, experimental and communal engagement, in dialogue and out of a commitment 
to social values, is at one and the same time a way of establishing the moral basis for a 
self-governing, decentralized society, and an experiment in creating such a society. From 
this social-anarchist perspective, there is no 'elsewhere' where children will get whatever 
substantive values they need in order to flourish. If the values they get from home 
conflict with those of the school, then this is a part of the process of social creation, not a 
problem to be negotiated by coming up with a formal, theoretical framework invoking 
notions such as liberal neutrality. Thus, while Flathman, Callan, Levinson and others are 
concerned to address the question of whether 'civic, democratic, and other specifically 
political conceptions of education are vocational rather than liberal and whether such 
conceptions are appropriate to a liberal regime' (Flathman, 1998, p. 146), they assume 
that we know and accept just what a liberal regime consists of. From an anarchist 
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perspective, however, it is precisely this 'regime' that we are in the process of exploring, 
creating and re-creating. 
So if one removes the assumption of the framework of the liberal state from the equation 
entirely, the question 'how should we educate?' is stripped of its demand for neutrality. 
In other words, one has to first ask who it is who is doing the educating, rather than 
assuming that it will be the (liberal) state, before one can go on to ask which values will 
inform the educational process. This accounts for the normative aspect of anarchist 
educational ideas — an aspect which, as argued, seems to be at odds with the liberal 
project, but is only so if one accepts the conflation between liberalism and the liberal 
state. 
Of course, a possible objection to this argument would be that anarchists, in effect, 
simply replace the notion of the state with that of society, so that the problems, for the 
liberal, remain the same. The social anarchists, however, would respond to this criticism 
with a defence of the qualitative distinction between the state and society. This 
distinction is, perhaps, best articulated by Martin Buber who had considerable sympathy 
for the anarchist view that 'social transformation begins with the community and is 
therefore primarily a social rather than a political objective' (Buber, quoted in Murphy, 
1988, p.180). For the anarchists, social relations governed by the state (including a 
communist state) are essentially different from those constituted by spontaneous forms of 
social cooperation, and this is so largely due to their anti-hierarchical nature. Thus 
although most liberals do not hold any essentialist definition of the state, and could 
perhaps argue that a federated anarchist commune shares the same functions as the liberal 
state and is therefore subject to the same theoretical considerations, anarchists would 
disagree. The anarchist position is that hierarchical, centralized functions are inherent 
features of the modern capitalist state which, once replaced with an organically-
established, self-governing, de-centralized system of communities, would lead to 
qualitatively different types of social relationships, permeating all levels of social 
interaction. 
This is the idea behind Gustav Landauer's famous remark that 
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The state is not something which can be destroyed by a revolution, but 
is a condition, a certain relationship between human beings, a mode of 
human behaviour; we destroy it by contracting other relationships, by 
behaving differently (quoted in Ward, 1991, p. 85). 
Revolutionary Tactics: Social Anarchism Versus Marxism 
The anarchist anti-hierarchical stance also indicates an important difference between the 
social anarchist perspective and that of Marxism, with obvious implications for 
educational ideas. As mentioned earlier, anarchists saw the revolutionary struggle to 
change society not as a linear progression, in which there is a single point of reference —
the means of production — and a single struggle. As Todd May puts it, in Marxism there 
is 'a single enemy: capitalism' (May, 1994, p. 26), the focus of Marxist revolutionary 
thought thus being on class as the chief unit of social struggle. Anarchist thinking, in 
contrast, involves a far more tactical, multi-dimensional understanding of what the social 
revolution consists in. Connectedly, an anarchist thinker, unlike a traditional Marxist, 
cannot offer abstract, general answers to political questions outside of the reality of social 
experience and experimentation. In anarchism then, as Colin Ward says, 'there is no 
final struggle, only a series of partisan struggles on a variety of fronts' (Ward, 1996, p. 
26). 
The implications of this contrast for education are significant, and are connected to 
Marx's disparaging view of the anarchists and other 'utopian' socialists. For in the very 
idea that there may be something constructive and valuable in positing an ideal of a 
different society whose final form is determined not by predictable historical progress, 
but by human experimentation, constantly open to revision, the anarchists reject the basic 
Marxist materialist assumption that consciousness is determined by the material 
conditions of life — specifically, by the relations of production. The anarchist position 
implies that, at least to some degree, life may be determined by consciousness — a 
position which also explains the optimism inherent in this anarchist enthusiasm for 
education as a crucial aspect of the revolutionary programme. 
On the Marxist view, until the relations of production themselves are radically changed, 
`the possibility of an alternative reality is not only impossible, but literally unthinkable' 
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(Block, 1994, p. 65), for our thought structures are determined by the reality of the 
base/superstructure relationship. However, in anarchism, an alternative reality is 
`thinkable'; furthermore, it is in some sense already here. As the discussion of the 
anarchist position on human nature makes clear, the human capacity for mutual aid, 
benevolence and solidarity is reflected in forms of social relations which exist even 
within the capitalist system, and whose potential for social change is not rendered 
unfeasible by the capitalist relations of production. It is these capacities which, on the 
anarchist view, need to be strengthened and built on, a project which can be embarked 
upon without a systematic programme for revolutionary change or a blueprint for the 
future, but by forging alternative modes of social organization in arenas such as the 
school and the work-place. 
Much work in radical educational theory in recent years is based on some variant of 
Marxist reproduction theory, according to which 'all practices in the superstructure may 
be viewed as products of a determining base, and we have only to examine the products 
for their component parts, which ought to be easily discerned from the economic base' 
(Block, 1994, ibid). Reproduction theorists thus regard schools and education as 
basically derived from the economic base, which they inevitably reproduce. As Block 
notes, this idea leads to the generally pessimistic Marxist view of education, according to 
which even alternative schools are allowed to exist by the system itself, which 
marginalizes them and thus continues to reproduce the dominant social norms and 
economic structures. 
The anarchist perspective, as mentioned, involves not merely subverting the economic 
relations of the base, but conceptualising a social-economic framework that is not 
structured in a hierarchical way. The pyramid of the Marxist analysis of capitalism is not 
simply inverted, but abolished. Thus for example, in Marxism, the status of the dominant 
definitions of knowledge — as reflected, e.g., in the school curriculum - is questionable 
because it is determined by the unjust class system, reflecting the material power of the 
ruling class. However, in anarchist theory, what renders a national curriculum or a body 
of knowledge objectionable is the simple fact that it is determined by any central, 
hierarchical top-down organization. For the anarchist, incorporating 'working-class 
knowledge' or that of excluded cultural or social groups into the school curriculum of a 
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state education system would be equally suspect - the problem is in that there is a 
curriculum and a national school system at all. 
So although anarchists share the Marxist insistence that the structural inequalities of 
society have to be abolished, they believe that this project can be embarked upon on a 
micro level; in this they share, perhaps, the faith in the emancipatory power of education 
common to many liberal theorists. 
Goals and Visions 
These remarks may lead one to believe that the anarchist approach to social change is 
more of a piecemeal, tactical one, than a strategic one. Todd May in fact argues that the 
opposite is the case, claiming that the anarchists, faced with the need to adopt either a 
strategic or a tactical position, have to opt for the former due to their reductionist view of 
power and their humanist ethics (May, 1994, pp.63-66). Yet I believe that both these 
readings are too narrow. What the anarchist perspective in fact suggests is that one can 
be, and in fact has to be, both tactical and strategic; what May refers to as the anarchists' 
`ambivalence' between a purely strategic and a purely tactical stance is in fact a kind of 
pragmatic realism, summed up by Chomsky in his argument that: 
In today's world, I think, the goals of a committed anarchist should be 
to defend some state institutions from the attack against them, while 
trying at the same time to pry them open to more meaningful public 
participation — and ultimately, to dismantle them in a much more free 
society, if the appropriate circumstances can be achieved. Right or 
wrong — and that's a matter of uncertain judgement - this stand is not 
undermined by the apparent conflict between goals and visions. Such 
conflict is a normal feature of everyday life, which we somehow try to 
live with but cannot escape. (Chomsky, 1996, p. 75) 
So while certain elements of anarchism — notably its insistence on social 
improvements 'here and now' — may be reminiscent of Popper's characterization of 
`piecemeal social engineering' (Popper, 1945, pp.157-163), the social anarchist 
perspective in fact straddles Popper's contrast between utopian social engineering and 
piecemeal social engineering. It is, as I hope to have shown, utopian in that it holds 
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onto a radical vision of society; however it is not narrowly utopian in Popper's sense 
as it has no fixed blueprint, and the commitment to constant experimentation is built in 
to its vision of the ideal society. It is 'piecemeal' in the sense that it advocates a form 
of gradual restructuring, as in the comment by Paul Goodman, quoted in Chapter 
Four: 'A free society cannot be the substitution of a "new order" for the old order; it is 
the extension of spheres of free action until they make up most of social life' (quoted 
in Ward, 1973, p. 18). 
And, as I think the projects of anarchist educators and the anarchist criticism of 
Marxist revolutionary theory make clear, it is also piecemeal in Popper's sense that it 
is concerned with 'searching for, and fighting against, the greatest and most urgent 
evils of society, rather than searching for, and fighting for, its greatest ultimate good' 
(Popper, 1945, p. 158). 
Chomsky indeed expresses something like this idea in summing up the anarchist stance 
as follows: 
... at every stage of history our concern must be to dismantle those forms of 
authority and oppression that survive from an era when they might have been 
justified in terms of the need for security or survival or economic 
development, but that now contribute to - rather than alleviate - material and 
cultural deficit. If so, there will be no doctrine of social change fixed for the 
present and future, nor even, necessarily, a specific and unchanging concept 
of the goals towards which social change should tend (Chomsky, in Guerin, 
1970, p. viii). 
This perspective, then, like Popper's piecemeal approach, 'permits repeated experiments 
and continuous readjustments' (Popper, 1945, p. 163). 
Yet at the same time, the anarchist approach is distinct from what Popper characterizes as 
piecemeal social engineering in that it does not simply concern 'blueprints for single 
institutions', but sees in the very act of restructuring human relationships within such 
institutions (the school, the work-place), a creative act of engaging with the restructuring 
of society as a whole. 
The anarchist utopia, then, although it does envisage 'the reconstruction of society as a 
whole' (Popper, 1945, pp. 169-161), is not utopian in Popper's sense as it is not an 
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`attempt to realize an ideal state, using a blueprint of society as whole, [...] which 
demands a strong centralized rule of a few' (ibid). And while the kind of social 
restructuring envisaged by the social anarchists is not simply, as Popper characterizes 
utopian engineering, 'one step towards a distant ideal', (see the discussion on means and 
ends in Chapter Six), neither are they 'a realization of a piecemeal compromise'. 
Creating, for example, a school community run on social-anarchist principles is both a 
step towards the ideal and an embodiment of the ideal itself. 
Anarchism, to continue this line of thought, is perhaps best conceived not so much as a 
theory — in Popper's rationalistic sense - about how a society can be organized without a 
state, but as an aspiration to create such a society and, crucially, a belief that such a 
society can in fact come about, not through violent revolution or drastic modification of 
human nature, but as an organic, spontaneous process, a process the seeds of which are 
already present in human propensities. 
Given these points, one may argue that anarchism, in a sense, needs the theoretical 
components of liberalism to carry it beyond the stage of aspiration to that of political 
possiblity. For example, the analytical work carried out within the liberal tradition on 
such key notions as autonomy, individual rights, consent and justice, provides valuable 
theoretical tools for working out the details of the anarchist project. But it is not this 
theorizing which constitutes the core of anarchism, but the aspiration itself. In education, 
this is crucially important. While anarchism perhaps makes little sense without the 
theoretical framework of the liberal tradition (a tradition which, following Chomsky, it 
may be a continuation of), it could also be argued that liberalism needs anarchism, or 
something like the social anarchist vision, to remind itself of the aspirations behind the 
theory. Built into these aspirations is, crucially, the belief that things could be different, 
and radically so, if only we allow ourselves to have faith in people's ability to recreate 
social relationships and institutions; a sort of perfectibility which, while cherishing 
traditional liberal values, pushes us beyond the bounds of normal liberal theory. In this 
context, Maclntyre's comments (MacIntyre, 1971) that liberalism is essentially 'negative 
and incomplete', being a doctrine 'about what cannot be justified and what ought not to 
be permitted', and that hence 'no institution, no social practice, can be inspired solely or 
even mainly by liberalism' — seem to make sense. 
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Utopianism and Philosophy of Education 
I have argued that part of the reason why anarchist education is, on the face of it, 
objectionable to philosophers within the liberal tradition, is because of the common 
conflation between liberalism as a body of values, and the liberal state, as a framework 
within which to pursue these values. This conflation, I have argued, could explain why 
the normative, substantive aspects of anarchist education seem problematic for those 
wishing to preserve some form of political liberalism. However, there are also those who 
object to anarchism's political ideal — that of the stateless society — simply on the grounds 
of its being hopelessly utopian, and who would thus argue that it is pointless to try to 
construct a philosophy of education around this ideal. As mentioned in the Introduction, 
the charge of utopianism is one of the commonest criticisms of anarchism and, in my 
view, raises several interesting philosophical questions. In what follows, I shall attempt 
to address this charge, and to grapple with some of these questions. 
Martin Buber was one of the first to note how the concept utopia had been 'victimized in 
the course of the political struggle of Marxism against other forms of socialism and 
movements of social reform. In his struggle to achieve dominance for his idiosyncratic 
system of socialism, Marx employed 'utopia' as the ultimate term of perjoration to damn 
all "prehistoric" social systems' (Buber, 1958). 
In the mid-nineteenth century, indeed, the social anarchist position could be perceived as 
an argument over the contested intellectual ground of the developing nation state; its 
utopianism, for Marx, lay in its rejection of the materialist position. Yet now that the 
nation state is such an established fact of our political life, and theoretical arguments 
justifying its existence are so taken for granted that they are rarely even articulated, it is 
the very distance between the anarchist vision and that of the dominant liberal state 
tradition that strikes the outsider as utopian. As discussed above, although philosophers 
of education devote a great deal of energy to the articulation, analysis and critique of 
liberal values and their educational implications, the framework within which these 
values are assumed to operate is rarely the subject of debate. It is the anarchist 
questioning of this framework, then, which constitutes its radical challenge. 
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Of course, the charge that anarchism is utopian has some truth if one accepts Mannheim's 
classic account, according to which 'utopian' describes: 'all situationally transcendent 
ideas which in any way have a transforming effect on the existing historical, social order' 
(Mannheim, 1991, p.173). 
But there is an important sense in which anarchism is definitely not utopian or, at least, is 
utopian in a positive, rather than a pejorative, sense. Isaiah Berlin has characterized 
utopias in a way which, as David Halpin (Halpin, 2003) points out, is highly restrictive 
and problematic, and fails to capture the constructive role of utopias as 'facilitating fresh 
thinking for the future' (ibid) which Halpin and other theorists are keen to preserve. 
Nevertheless, Berlin's characterization is useful here as it is indicative of a typical critical 
perspective on utopian thought and thus serves to highlight the contrast with anarchism. 
Berlin states: 
The main characteristic of most (perhaps all) utopias is that they are 
static. Nothing in them alters, for they have reached perfection: there 
is no need for novelty or change; no one can wish to alter a condition 
in which all natural human wishes are fulfilled (Berlin, 1991, p.20). 
This is clearly in contrast to the anarchist vision of the future society, on two counts. 
Firstly, due to the anarchist conception of human nature, most anarchist theorists are 
under no illusion about the possibility of a society without conflict; a society which, as in 
Berlin's description of utopia, 'lives in a state of pure harmony' (ibid). Rather, they 
envisage a particular way of solving conflict. As William Reichert states, 'Anarchists do 
not suppose for a minute that men would ever live in harmony [.. J. They do maintain, 
however, that the settlement of conflict must arise spontaneously from the individuals 
involved themselves and not be imposed upon them by an external force such as 
government' (Reichert, 1969, p. 143). Secondly, it is intrinsic to the anarchist position 
that human society is constantly in flux; there is no such thing as the one finite, fixed 
form of social organization; the principle at the heart of anarchist thought is that of 
constant striving, improvement, and experimentation. 
In an educational context, this contrast is echoed in Dewey's critique of Plato's Republic. 
As Dewey notes, Plato's utopia serves as a final answer to all questions about the good 
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life, and the state and education are constructed so as to translate it immediately into 
reality. Although Plato, says Dewey, 'would radically change the existing state of society, 
his aim was to construct a state in which change would subsequently have no place. The 
final end of life is fixed; given a state framed with this end in view, not even minor 
details are to be altered. [...] Correct education could not come into existence until an 
ideal state existed, and after that education would be devoted simply to its conservation' 
(Dewey, 1939, pp. 105-106). This, again, is in clear contrast to the anarchist vision. 
Of course, the utopian nature of Plato's account does not detract from its philosophical 
value. All this suggests that the 'feasibility' of any political vision should not, on its 
own, be a reason for disregarding it as a basis for serious philosophical debate. Many 
writers on utopias, indeed, have stressed the transformative element of utopian thinking, 
arguing that the study of utopias can be valuable as it releases creative thought, prodding 
us to examine our preconceptions, and encouraging speculation on alternative ways of 
conceptualizing and doing things which we often take for granted. Politically speaking, it 
has been argued that 'utopianism thus offers a specific programme and immediate hope 
for improvement and thereby discourages quiescence or fatalism' (Goodwin and Taylor, 
1982). 
Thus, as David Halpin says in his discussion of Fourrier's nineteenth century depiction 
of the Utopian Land of Plenty, where whole roast chickens descended from the sky, 
`Fourier was not envisaging concretely a society whose members would be fed 
magically. Rather, through the use of graphic imagery, he was seeking to mobilize 
among his readers a commitment to a conception of social life in which being properly 
fed was regarded as a basic human right' (Halpin, 2001, p.302). 
There are further aspects of utopianism, specifically in the anarchist context, which 
connect to the suspicion, or derision of anarchist positions by many liberal theorists. For 
while many liberal and neo-liberal theorists seem amenable to the idea of utopia as an 
individual project, the social anarchist faith in the social virtues, and their vision of a 
society underpinned by these virtues, imply a utopia which is necessarily collective. 
Nozick's vision of the minimalist state, for example, is clearly utopian in the general 
sense described above. Yet, as Barbara Goodwin points out, the utopian nature of 
Nozick's minimal state lies 'not in the quality of the individual communities (all of which 
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appeal to some people and not to others) but in each individual having the power to 
choose and to experiment with the good Life. Utopia is having a choice between Utopias' 
(Goodwin and Taylor, 1982, p.82) 
The anarchist vision, both in its insistence on the centrality of the social virtues, and in its 
normative commitment to these virtues, seems to be demanding that we extend Nozick's 
`utopia of Utopias' to something far more substantive. Indeed, many liberals would 
agree that it is the lack of just such a substantive vision which is partly to blame for the 
individualist and often alienating aspects of modern capitalist society. Thus, for example, 
Baumann has spoken of our era as one characterized by 'the privatisation of utopias' 
(Baumann, 1999, p.7), in which models of 'the good life' are increasingly cut off from 
models of the good society. Perhaps the kind of utopianism inherent in social anarchist 
thinking can help us to amend this situation. 
The anarchist utopian stance, at the same time, arguably avoids the charges of 
totalitarianism which so worried Popper and Berlin due to two important points: firstly, 
the fact that, built into its utopian vision, is the demand for constant experimentation, and 
the insistence that the final form of human society cannot be determined in advance. 
Secondly, the insistence, based on their view of human nature and their conceptualisation 
of social change, that the future society is to be constructed not by radically transforming 
human relations and attitudes, but from the seeds of existing social tendencies. This is, 
indeed, in contrast to the Marxist vision, where, as Baumann points out, 'the attempt to 
build a socialist society is an effort to emancipate human nature, mutilated and humiliated 
by class society'. 
The anarchist rejection of blueprints, while arguably rescuing anarchists from charges of 
totalitarianism, can at the same time be perceived as philosophically, and perhaps 
psychologically, somewhat threatening, as Herbert Read points out. The idea that, as 
Read puts it (Read, 1974, p. 148), 'the future will make its own prints, and they won't 
necessarily be blue', can give rise to a sense of insecurity. Yet such insecurity, perhaps, 
is a necessary price to pay if one wants to embark on the genuinely creative and 
challenging project of reconstructing society, or even reconstructing political and social 
philosophy. 
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It has in fact been argued that much mainstream work in political theory, notably in the 
liberal tradition, is conducted in the shadow of what could be seen as another aspect of 
the 'sense of insecurity' provoked by the open-endedness of such utopian projects as 
social anarchism. This view is eloquently argued for by Bonnie Honig, in her Political 
Theory and the Displacement of Politics: 
Most political theorists are hostile to the disruptions of politics. Those 
writing from diverse positions — republican, federal and 
communitarian — converge in their assumption that success lies in the 
elimination from a regime of dissonance, resistance, conflict, or 
struggle. They confine politics (conceptually and territorially) to the 
juridical, administrative, or regulative tasks of stabilizing moral and 
political subjects, building consensus, maintaining agreement, or 
consolidating communities and identities. They assume that the task 
of political theory is to resolve institutional questions, to get politics 
right, over and done with, to free modern subjects and their sets of 
arrangements of political conflict and instability (Honig, 1993, p.2). 
In an academic culture dominated by this perspective, it is hardly surprising that a 
position such as social anarchism, which both challenges the dominant political system 
with a radically different vision, and holds that this vision, while accessible, cannot be 
fully instantiated either in theory or by revolutionary programmes, but must be the result 
of spontaneous, free experimentation - is rarely taken seriously. Yet as both Noam 
Chomsky and Paul Goodman have commented, this type of utopianism is not so far 
removed from the liberal tradition. 	 Paul Goodman (1952, pp. 18-19) argues that 
American culture has lost the spirit of pragmatism embodied in the thought of James and 
Dewey. In a climate where, he says, 'experts plan in terms of an unchangeable structure, 
a pragmatic expediency that still wants to take the social structure as plastic and 
unchangeable comes to be thought of as "utopian".' 
Richard Rorty, too, has noted the connections between the type of utopianism embodied 
in the social anarchist view and the pragmatism of Dewey and other thinkers. His 
discussion of this idea captures, for me, the value of this perspective for our educational 
thought. Rorty argues that what is distinctive about Pragmatism is that it 'substitutes the 
notion of a better human future for the notions of 'reality', 'reason' and 'nature" (Rorty, 
1999, p.27). While nineteenth century social anarchism, as an Enlightenment tradition, 
cannot be said by any means to have rejected these notions of reason, reality and nature, I 
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think there is nevertheless an important insight here in terms of the role of utopian hope 
in social anarchist thought. 
The anarchist view that what Fidler refers to as 'awakening the social instinct' is the key 
role for education, and Kropotkin's insistence that the 'fundamental principle of 
anarchism' (in Fidler, p. 37) consists in 'treating others as one wishes to be treated 
oneself,' seems to me in keeping with Rorty's argument that moral progress, for the 
pragmatists, 'is a matter of increasing sensitivity' (Rorty, 1999, p. 81). Such sensitivity, 
Rorty explains, means 'being able to respond to the needs of ever more inclusive groups 
of people', and thus involves not 'rising above the sentimental to the rational' but rather 
expanding outwards in 'wider and wider sympathy' (ibid). This image, which Rorty 
describes as a 'switch from metaphors of vertical distance to metaphors of horizontal 
extent' (Rorty, 1999, p. 83) also seems to me in tune with the anarchists' rejection of 
hierarchical structures, and the image of the ideal anarchist society as one of 
interconnected networks rather than pyramidal structures. Furthermore, Rorty argues, 
this element of utopian hope and 'willingness to substitute imagination for certainty' 
(Rorty, 1999, p. 88) emphasizes the need for active engagement on the part of social 
agents, articulating a desire and a need 'to create new ways of being human, and a new 
heaven on earth for these new humans to inhabit, over the desire for stability, security 
and order' (ibid). 
Rorty's notion of 'replacing certainty with hope' seems to me highly pertinent to the 
above discussion of social anarchism and, especially, to the implications of a 
consideration of the utopian aspects of the social anarchist position for the way we think 
about education. One aspect of this point is that the utopian — in the sense of radically 
removed from reality as we know it — aspect of a theory should not in itself be a reason to 
reject it. Even the evident failure of those utopian projects which have been disasterously 
attempted should not lead us to reject the utopian hopes which underlie them. As Rorty 
says, 
`The inspirational value of the New Testament and the Communist Manifesto is not 
diminished by the fact that many millions of people were enslaved, tortured or starved to 
death by sincere, morally earnest people who recited passages from one or the other text 
to justify their deeds.' (Rorty, 1999, p. 204). The anarchist project, arguably, is less 
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liable to such dismal failure for firstly, if one accepts its account of human nature, this 
account establishes that the type of society which the social anarchists seek to establish 
does not go completely against the grain of existing human propensities. Furthermore, as 
discussed here, the idea of trying to implement this project on a grand scale, by violent 
means if necessary, is completely incompatible with anarchist principles. For the flip-
side of what Ritter refers to as the anarchists' daring leap' is the point that, as noted by 
Buber, the social anarchist 
desires a means commensurate with his ends; he refuses to believe 
that in our reliance on the future 'leap' we have to have now the 
direct opposite of what we are striving for; he believes rather that we 
must create here and now the space now possible for the thing for 
which we are striving, so that it may come to fulfilment then; he does 
not believe in the post-revolutionary leap, but he does believe in 
revolutionary continuity (quoted in Ward, 1991, p. 84). 
Whether or not one is convinced by these social anarchist arguments, it seems to me that 
Rorty's point that such hopes and aspirations as are embodied in this position may 
constitute 'the only basis for a worthwhile life' (Rorty, 1999, p.204) is a compelling one. 
As far as philosophy of education is concerned, it may be true that attempting to construct 
a position on the role and nature of education around the notion of hope could lead to 
neglect of the need to work out clear principles of procedure and conceptual distinctions. 
However, this notion may perhaps insert a more optimistic and motivating element into 
educational projects characterized by an often overriding concern to formulate procedural 
principles. 
Furthermore, the perspective of starting debates into educationally relevant issues, like 
the social anarchists, from a position of hope — in other words, taking the utopian position 
that a radically different society is both desirable and attainable — can have clear policy 
implications. For example, arguments for equality of opportunity in (state) education, as 
put forward by liberal theorists, often involve a veiled assumption that socio-economic 
inequality is an inevitable feature of our life. Thus Harry Brighouse argues (1998) that 
educational opportunities should be unaffected by matters of socio-economic status or 
family background. In so doing, he assumes, as he himself readily admits, 'that material 
rewards in the labour markets will be significantly unequal' (Brighouse, 1998, p.8). 
Were he to take seriously the aspiration of creating a society in which there were no 
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longer any class or socio-economic divisions, he may be led to placing a very different 
emphasis on the kind of education we should be providing (e.g. one which emphasized a 
critical attitude towards the political status quo, and the promotion of certain moral values 
deemed crucial for sustaining an egalitarian, cooperative society). 
Patricia White has discussed the notion of social hope in her 1991 paper, 'Hope, 
Confidence and Democracy', where she notes the powerful motivational role played by 
shared hopes 'relating to the future of communities'. Yet while acknowledging a need 
for such social hope in our own democratic society, White admits that 'Liberal 
democracy is not in the business of offering visions of a future to which all citizens are 
marching if only they can keep their faith in it' (White, 1991, p. 205). Such a view 
would, obviously, undermine the liberal commitment to an open future and to value 
pluralism. However it seems, on the basis of the above analysis, that the type of utopian 
hope associated with anarchism may fit White's description of a possible way out of this 
liberal problem, namely, 'that it is possible to drop the idea that the object of hope must 
be unitary and inevitable and to defend a notion of hope where, roughly speaking, to 
hope is strongly to desire that some desirable state of affairs, which need not be 
inevitable and is not impossible, but in the path of which there are obstacles, will come 
to pass'. (White, 1991, p. 205) 
In terms of how we conceptualise education, what the above discussion suggests is that 
the interplay between our hopes — or our strategic goals — and our tactical objectives is 
not a conflict to be decided in advance, but an interesting tension that should itself be 
made part of educational practice. In certain contexts, tactical decisions may make 
sense, and thus the type of educational change and action promoted may not appear very 
radical, but the hope, as a long-term goal, is always there, and even if it is only, as 
Chomsky states, a 'vision' this vision has tremendous motivating force for those 
involved in education. 
Taking the social-anarchist perspective seriously, then, can help us to think differently 
about the role of visions, dreams, goals and ideals in educational thought. It suggests 
that perhaps we should think of education not as a means to an end, nor as an end in 
itself, but as one of many arenas of human relationships, in which the relation between 
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the vision and the ways it is translated into reality is constantly experimented with. 
Philosophy of education, perhaps, could be seen as part of this process. 
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Conclusion 
Faith in the power of intelligence to imagine a future which is the 
projection of the desirable in the present, and to invent the 
instrumentalities of its realization, is our salvation. And it is a 
faith which must be nurtured and made articulate: surely a 
sufficiently large task fir our philosophy (Dewey, 1917, p. 48). 
I hope, in the preceding discussion, to have gone some way towards constructing 
what an anarchist philosophy of education would look like. There are certain 
important insights to be drawn from my analysis, both regarding anarchism's 
significance as a political ideology, and regarding educational philosophy and 
practice. 
Situating Anarchism; Insights and Implications 
Firstly, in the course of this discussion, I hope to have dispelled some common 
misperceptions about anarchism as a political theory, especially with regard to its 
position on the need for social order and authority, and its conception of human 
nature. Above all, I have argued that the anarchist view of human nature is not 
naively optimistic, but rather embraces a realistic, contextual approach to human 
virtues and capabilities. The implications of this idea form the core aspects of the 
anarchist position on education; namely, that systematic educational intervention in 
children's lives, on the part of social institutions, is necessary in order to sustain the 
moral fabric of society, and that this education must be, first and foremost, a moral 
enterprise. 
Secondly, I believe it is clear from the above analysis that the values and aspirations 
underpinning social anarchist thought are - perhaps surprisingly — fairly close to 
those which inform the liberal tradition. Anarchism's affinity with liberalism, as well 
as with certain strands of socialism, suggests that we should perhaps extend our 
understanding of liberalism beyond the constraints of the liberal state. One does not 
have to reject liberal values in order to challenge dominant aspects of the political 
framework which we so often take for granted. The question of what remains of 
liberalism if one removes the state from the equation is a philosophically puzzling 
191 
one, but, I suggest, the challenge of trying to answer it may itself be a valuable 
exercise in re-examining and re-articulating our liberal values and prompting us to 
think through the political implications and scope of these values. 
Specifically, examining the implications of the underlying values of social 
anarchism, in the comparative context of liberal values, may lead us to rearticulate the 
utopian aspect of the liberal tradition. More broadly speaking, I believe that 
philosophers, and especially philosophers of education, need to constantly examine 
and articulate the normative assumptions behind their educational ideas. If, like many 
liberal theorists, we consciously make compromises in our philosophical treatment of 
educational notions such as 'equality' — compromises which imply an aquiescence 
with existing political structures — we should at least articulate our reasons for such 
compromises, and the way they reflect our substantive ideals. Challenging the 
political framework within which we commonly formulate such ideas may be one 
way of prodding us to engage in such a process of articulation of our aspirations and 
values. 
Anarchism remains a confusing and often frustrating body of ideas, and this thesis 
has by no means resolved the theoretical and practical tensions it involves. 
Specifically, the charge that social censure will undermine individual freedom in an 
anarchist society remains a troubling one (eloquently depicted in Ursula Le Guin's 
science-fictional account of an anarchist colony, The Dispossessed). Similarly, one 
has to ask oneself whether anarchism, with its Enlightenment understanding of 
progress and the inevitable triumph of secular, socialist values, is theoretically 
equipped to deal with the contemporary issues of life in pluralist societies -
especially with the question of value pluralism. I have to admit that I find the 
arguments by Chomsky and others that one cannot resolve such theoretical tensions 
in advance, but that they have to be worked out through experimentation — an 
unsatisfactory response to this problem. 
These theoretical tensions notwithstanding, I have suggested that both educational 
activity and philosophy of education may be more challenging and motivating 
activities if they are guided by a utopian hope - by a normative vision, not j ust of the 
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good life (a phrase commonly emplyed by philosophers of education), but of the good 
society — however far removed this may seem from where we are now. 
Of course, there is nothing unique to anarchism about the idea of an ideal society. 
Indeed political liberalism, as formulated by Rawls, is in many ways an ideal theory; 
a model for the ideal society. It leads to conclusions as to institutional practices and 
processes so as to enable individuals to live together in what is conceived as the 
optimal political model — the liberal state. Anarchism's model is similarly ideal, but 
does away with the state. It, like liberalism, begins from intuitions about the moral 
worth of certain human attributes and values, but its model is strikingly different from 
that which we have today. Many modern democracies, one could argue, approach 
something like the Rawlsian model, but need its theoretical framework and arguments 
to strengthen and underpin their institutions and practices. For anarchism, however, 
the ideal society is something that has to be created. And education is primarily a 
part of this creation; it involves a radical challenge to current practices and 
institutions, yet at the same time a faith in the idea that human beings already possess 
most of the attributes and virtues necessary to create and sustain such a different 
society, so do not need to either undergo any radical transformation or to do away 
with an 'inauthentic' consciousness. 
An Anarchist Philosophy of Education? 
At the beginning of this thesis, I posed the question of whether or not anarchist ideas 
could yield a comprehensive, coherent and unique philosophy of education. As 
indicated by the above remarks, I believe that while my analysis suggests that 
anarchism does not perhaps offer a systematic theory of education, it does have 
significant implications for how we conceptualize education and educational aims, for 
how we address educational questions in policy and practice, and for how we do 
philosophy of education. 
As far as educational practice is concerned, there are several weaknesses in the 
anarchist account. Primarily, the sparse attention paid by anarchist writers on 
education to the issue of pedagogy both exposes this account to theoretical questions 
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about the most appropriate pedagogical approach, and opens the door for questionable 
pedagogical practices, as witnessed by some graduates of the Stelton Modern School, 
who suggest (see Avrich, 1980) that the actual teaching practices of certain teachers 
at the anarchist schools were far from anti-coercive. Indeed, the whole question of 
the teacher-pupil relationship in both its psychological and political dimensions, is 
undertheorized in this literature. Although the anarchist account of authority goes 
some way towards situating and justifying this relationship theoretically, there is 
clearly a great deal more that could be said on the subject. Similarly, and perhaps 
most importantly given its central role in creating and sustaining the ideal society, the 
development of specific approaches to and methods of moral education is sorely 
lacking from anarchist work on education. Although I have hinted at the form such a 
programme of moral education may take, and have emphasized its crucial role, I 
cannot undertake the project of constructing it in a work of this scope. 
In spite of these weaknesses in the theoretical framework of anarchist educational 
practice, I think the above analysis establishes that anarchist education is a distinct 
tradition in the world of what is often loosely referred to as 'radical education'. As 
such, it differs in important respects from both extreme libertarian positions and 
various aspects of the free school movement, both in its content and in the 
conceptualization of education which it embodies. 
Above all, an anarchist perspective, I have argued, can help us see questions about 
the relationship between education and social change in a new light. Although the 
anarchist failure to distinguish in any systematic way between social life within as 
opposed to beyond the state is the cause of much confusion regarding the role of 
education in promoting and sustaining social transformation, I hope my analysis goes 
some way towards drawing this distinction, and clarifying its philosophical 
significance. 
At the same time, I believe that part of anarchism's appeal, and indeed its uniqueness 
as a perspective on education, lies in its ability to transcend the means/ends model 
and to perceive every educational encounter as both a moment of striving, through 
creative experimenting, to create something better, and of celebrating and reinforcing 
what is valuable in such an encounter. I can find no better way of illustrating this 
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idea than through analogy with a very particular instance of education, namely: the 
parent-child relationship. As parents, we are constantly aware of the future-oriented 
aspect of our relationship with our children. The question of who they will be and 
how they will turn out is a constant element of our interaction with them, our 
concerns, and our motivations and goals for the decisions we make regarding them. 
Yet to construe this relationship as reducible entirely to this intentional educational 
aspect would be, surely, to miss the point. For our interaction with our children is 
also a mutually challenging and stimulating relationship in terms of who they - and 
we - are now. What makes this relationship so complex is the fact that it involves 
constant interplay and tensions between the present and the future; between our 
desires and hopes for our children, our vision of an ideal future in which they will 
play a part - and our attempt to understand who they are; between our efforts to 
respect their desires and our inescapable wish to mould these desires; between our 
own ideals for the future, and the challenges posed for them by the complexities of 
the present. While the way in which we raise our children is often informed by our 
commitments, values and aspirations, it is equally true to say that these values and 
commitments are constantly challenged and questioned by the experience of raising 
children. In a sense, this inherently confusing, challenging and creative mode of 
interaction sums up the essence of the anarchist perspective on education. In thus 
rejecting simplistic distinctions between ends and means, goals and visions, it 
suggests a certain anti-hierarchical stance not only in its model for the ideal society, 
but also in our very patterns of thinking. 
Furthermore, the anarchist stance on the relationship between education and social 
change has important practical implications. For the anarchist utopia, as discussed, is 
not a blueprint for the future society. Therefore the focus of education is not in 
implementing aspects of this utopia, but in fostering the attitudes and virtues needed 
to sustain it, alongside a critical attitude to current social principles and practices, out 
of which the utopian vision grows and which, in turn, inform them. Education is thus 
not seen as a means to creating a different political order, but as a space — and 
perhaps, following Buber, a relationship - in which we experiment with visions of a 
new political order — a process which itself constitutes an educative and motivating 
experience both for educators and pupils. I have suggested that this perspective 
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constitutes an alternative to certain dominant views, according to which we tend to 
regard education as either an end in itself or a means to an end. 
Interestingly, one conclusion suggested by my analysis is that the very failure by 
many commentators to pay adequate attention to the central role of education in 
anarchist thought has itself contributed to much of the conceptual confusion and 
apparent tensions surrounding anarchist theory. For the often-cited naivete of the 
optimistic view attributed to anarchists, according to which it is possible to maintain a 
benevolent, decentralized society without institututional control, does not take into 
account the central and ongoing role of education in both promoting, fostering and 
maintaining the moral foundations deemed necessary to support such a society. In 
many standard works on anarchism, notably the studies by Miller, Morland and 
Ritter, education gets barely a passing mention. This is especially striking in 
Morland's work, which is a detailed study of human nature in social anarchism 
(Morland, 1997). In light of the complete absence of any discussion of anarchist 
education in Morland's work, his concluding remark that 'something above and 
beyond a conception of human nature is required to explain the optimism of the 
anarchists' (Morland, 1997, p. 198) seems quite astonishing. 
As this work has suggested, the anarchists' acknowledgement of the need for a 
substantive educational process, designed along clear moral principles, goes hand-in-
hand with their contextualist account of human nature, thus turning what what might 
otherwise be regarded as a sort of naïve optimism, into a complex and inspiring social 
hope. A notable exception to this tendency to overlook the centrality of education to 
the anarchist account is the work of Barbara Goodwin. In her discussion of 
anarchism in Using Political Ideas (Goodwin, 1982), Goodwin refers to the 'the 
moral basis of anarchist society', arguing that 'the real interest of anarchism lies not 
in the precise details of communal organization, but in the universal principles on 
which such communities would be based' (Goodwin, 1982, p.118). In discussing 
anarchist education in this context, Goodwin acknowledges its important function in 
promoting and nurturing 'the moral principles which formed the basis of the anarchist 
order' (Ibid, p. 128). This thesis, I hope, goes some way towards justifying this 
acknowledgement and exploring just what it consists in. It thereby also shows that 
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articulating the anarchist view on education is an important contribution to the 
ongoing debate on the viability of anarchism as a political ideology. 
In conclusion, although there are clearly problems involved in the argument for a 
society without the state, I suggest that social anarchism offers a motivating vision 
which both embodies some of our most cherished human values and suggests 
imaginative ways of realizing them. As such, it constitutes an educationally valuable 
and constructive aspiration. 
Seyla Ben-Habib has distinguished between 'the politics of fulfillment' and 'the 
politics of transfiguration', as follows: 
The politics of fulfillment envisages that the society of the future 
attains more adequately what present society has left 
unaccomplished. It is the culmination of the implicit logic of the 
present. The politics of transfiguration emphasizes the emergence 
of qualitatively new needs, social relations and modes of 
association, which burst open the utopian potential within the old. 
Within a critical social theory the articulation of norms continues 
the universalist promise of bourgeois revolutions — justice, 
equality, civil rights, democracy, and publicity — while the 
articulation of utopia continues the tradition of early socialist, 
communitarian, and anarchist movements — the formation of a 
community of needs and solidarity, and qualitatively transformed 
relations to inner and outer nature. In short, while norms have the 
task of articulating the demands of justice and human worthiness, 
utopias portray modes of friendship, solidarity, and human 
happiness. Despite their essential tension, a critical social theory is 
only rich enough to address us in the present, in so far as it can do 
justice to both moments (Benhabib, 1986, p.13). 
The same, perhaps, could be argued for a critical and vital philosophy of education. 
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